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**AN INTEGRATED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
FOR TRANSFORMING GENDERED UNPAID CARE WORK:  
COMPARISON OF TURKEY AND ITALY**

ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE: SPS/09

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*I dedicate this thesis to all the caregivers sustaining the world, particularly those  
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## ABSTRACT

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This thesis, using *four pathways* approach (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) as an analytical model and combining this model with *5Rs* approach (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020) under *integrated analytical framework*, investigates the structural determinants of gendered unpaid care work through case studies in Turkey and Italy. The thesis focuses mainly on the past two decades, representing significant improvements as well as backlashes regarding gender equality. It utilises the existing feminist tools and approaches, namely *four pathways* and *5Rs*, with a novel perspective to explore different contexts and integrates them to produce unique *gendered unpaid care work index* for transformative policy proposals. The novelty of this thesis is to analyse a social phenomenon embedded in our daily lives with modern feminist theoretical tools and expand them by changing their practical use. In this context, after introducing the problem and the overview of the thesis in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature, focusing on the household production and social reproduction, to theoretically capture the structural constraints of gendered unpaid care work. This thesis categorises these constraints under five categories as patriarchy and social reproduction; agency-oriented arguments and neoliberal approach; employment and economic gender inequality; social care inequality; and intersectional gender inequalities. Using *four pathways* model (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021), case studies conduct comparative analysis to capture these structural constraints under (i) employment opportunities and labour market regulations, (ii) neoliberal and patriarchal socio-normative structure, (iii) legal and institutional normative structure, and (iv) social care systems and dynamics. The original contribution of the study is to expand the feminist perspective with an *integrated analytical framework* and to produce the *gendered unpaid care work index* by going beyond the existing literature that tends to focus on only one *pathway*, mostly labour force participation. Chapter 3 explains the rationale of the framework and the research problems of the thesis and aims to justify the reasonings behind feminist research and the case study approach. It also identifies the boundaries of the study arising from various reasons. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 investigate two case studies under *four pathways* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) in Turkey and Italy that form the core of the thesis. Chapter 6 presents the key findings according to the final *integrated analytical framework* and fifteen policy dimensions of gender transformative policy actions in the *gendered unpaid care work index* developed based on the case study results. The principal aim of this *index* is to support the transition from *four pathways* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021)

of gendered unpaid care work to the *5Rs* - *recognition*, *reduction* and *redistribution* of care work, *representation*, and *reward* of the care workers (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020). This index ranks Turkey and Italy based on the fifteen dimensions and according to their gender equality performance in unpaid care work. Key findings indicate that although Italy outperforms Turkey, paid and unpaid labour division remains significantly gendered in both countries. Therefore, there is an evident need for political, legal, and institutional improvements in most dimensions to equalise and transform gendered unpaid care work.

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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5R	Recognise, Reduce, Redistribute, Representation and Reward
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
COFOG	Classification of the Functions of Government
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DppO	Department for Equal Opportunities (Dipartimento per le Pari Opportunità)
EECA	Eastern Europe and Central Asia
EIGE	European Institute for Gender Equality
EU	European Union
EUROSTAT	Statistical office of the European Union
GDI	Gender Development Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDSW	General Directorate on the Status of Women
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GNP	Gross National Product
GSS	General Health Insurance (Genel Sağlık Sigortası)
HDI	Human Development Index
HETUS	Harmonised European Time-Use Surveys
HLFS	Household Labour Force Survey
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INIS	Italian National Institute of Statistics
INPS	National Institute of Social Security (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale)
ISFOL	National Institute for Public Policy Analysis (Istituto nazionale per l'analisi delle politiche pubbliche)
ISTAT	Italian Statistical Institute (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica)
LFS	Labour Force Survey
LGBTIQ+	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer and other gender identities and sexualities not explicitly included in the term
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NDC	Notionally Defined Contribution
NEET	Neither in Education Nor in Training
NLI	National Labour Inspectorate (Ispettorato Nazionale del Lavoro)
OC	Opportunity Cost
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECDSTAT	Statistical office of the OECD
PFA	Platform for Action
RC	Replacement Cost
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SGK	Social Security Institution (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu)
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SNA	System of National Accounts and Supporting Tables
SSN	National Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale)
ŞÖNİM	Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centres (Şiddet Önleme ve İzleme Merkezi)
TURKSTAT	Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu)
TUS	Time-Use Survey
UK	United Kingdom
UCW	Unpaid Care Work
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Funds
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB	World Bank
WEF	World Economic Forum
WHO	World Health Organization

# 1. INTRODUCTION

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Gender inequality is one of the most persistent disparities today, although it has come a long way. The gradual changes in economic, demographic, normative spheres and traditional lifestyles allow women to marry later, get a better education, and occupy more prestigious jobs than in the past (OECD, 2021c; WEF, 2021). These developments are likely to positively contribute to gender equality and income distribution (Galor & Weil, 1996; M. Gregory, 2011; Sayer, 2005). Hence, they include the crucial steps to ensure inclusive growth and effective use of production factors and strengthen the socio-economic conditions of women (IMF, 2017).

On the other hand, mainstream approaches that evaluate gender equality only in terms of economic growth and progress ignore that gender inequalities are caused mainly by hierarchical gendered power relations and struggles based on class, ethnicity, religion, colour and other reasons (Chatzidakis et al., 2020; Crenshaw, 1991). Thus, they remain insufficient to address gender inequality comprehensively. From this perspective, the claim for ‘globalised gender equality’ ignores or conceals the main drivers of gender discrimination (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1996; hooks, 1981; Lindio-McGovern & Wallimann, 2016).

The contradiction between the commitments and actions of the governments on gender inequality also points to this (O’Hagan, 2015; UN Women, 2019; WEF, 2021). The gap in question is the most apparent evidence that the “focus and purpose” of public policymaking in policy responses to gender equality can quickly “evaporate” (Bustelo, 2017) if not well established (Addabbo et al., 2020). As demonstrated by many studies and institutional reports (Addabbo et al., 2020; European Commission, 2014, 2018; Jacquot, 2017, p. 27; The European Commission, 2021), there has been a sharp deterioration in the gender equality commitment of governments at the national level and localisation of the recommendations of transnational organisations, especially since the second half of the 2000s. The increasing emphasis on macroeconomic goals in this period created new obstacles to identifying and contesting gender inequalities (Cavaghan, 2017, p. 51) produced by the gendered socio-economic, legal and political structure.

The recent coronavirus pandemic has further exposed the inadequacy of these structures to eliminate gender inequalities, as well as inequality in the distribution of income and wealth (Del Boca et al., 2021; EIGE, 2022; Rubery & Tavora, 2021). Among these, gendered unpaid care work, which includes cooking, cleaning, and providing emotional support to family

members and loved ones, remains one of the most significant reasons for gender disparities (Charmes, 2019; Ferrant et al., 2014; UN Women, 2019). According to the Global Gender Gap Report, in 2021, the global gender gap was almost 32 per cent, which was a step back compared to the previous year (WEF, 2022, p. 5). It is difficult to achieve gender parity due to gender discrimination in the workplace, the gender pay gap (WEF, 2019, p. 17), and, most importantly, the burden of unpaid care work, which is disproportionately shouldered by women (Elson, 1998; Esim, 2000; Moser, 1989; Pearson & Elson, 2015; Quinn, 2016; Rake, 2002). With the pandemic, the severity of unpaid and even paid care work has become more apparent (De Henau et al., 2016; De Henau & Himmelweit, 2021; Eurofund, 2020; Fortier, 2020). While unpaid care work for men and women has intensified during the pandemic, most of this work has been undertaken by women (Del Boca et al., 2021; İlkaracan & Memiş, 2021). On the other hand, the socio-economic fragility of women during the pandemic period was also reflected in the gender-based violence figures (Farina & Angelucci, 2020). Around a third of women worldwide have experienced physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner during the lockdowns due to the pandemic (Azcona et al., 2020; EIGE, 2022; OECD, 2021c; UN Women, 2020b).

In this sense, the pandemic indicated that, despite glamorous gender equality claims, there is a significant gap left by governments in education, health and social care and protection, including high-income countries (EIGE, 2022; The European Commission, 2021; WEF, 2021). Women have historically filled this gap, mostly belonging to more disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups (Razavi, 2007). While their care needs have often been overlooked and neglected, these women have provided care services, particularly to meet the requirements of upper social groups (Fraser, 2017; Hartmann, 1976; Pateman, 1988). For this reason, acknowledging the value of the women's unpaid labour, which is used as a cost-free absorber (Pearson & Elson, 2015), is primarily about the human rights of these women who overtake both social reproduction and the production that is ignored in the economy (Razavi, 2007).

Gendered unpaid care work, thus, which is the term that highlights that caring for people without remuneration is often performed by women, remains one of the most relevant reasons why more than half of working-age women are outside the labour market (UN Women, 2019; WEF, 2021). On an average day, women worldwide spend nearly three times more hours than men on unpaid care work (UN Women, 2019, 2020b). On the other hand, unpaid care is often not recognised as 'work' by society and the mainstream economy (Elson, 2017; Fraser, 2017; Pearson, 2019; Waring, 1999). As a result, unpaid care work is not considered a part of

the productive economy and remains outside the national income calculations (Reid, 1934; Waring, 1999).

However, care is essential to the functioning of societies, and failure to recognise and support care work (Elson, 2017) has significant consequences for individuals, families, and society as a whole (Bhattacharya, 2017b). In particular, gendered unpaid care work limits women's participation in the labour market and their ability to achieve economic independence (Benería, 1999a; Elson, 1992; Rubery, 2014; Toğrul & Memiş, 2011). This perpetuates gender inequalities and contributes to the gender pay gap (European Commission, 2018). Social care services such as childcare, elderly care and home care can help alleviate some of the unpaid care work burdens on women (Del Boca et al., 2020; OECD, 2021d). However, access to these services is often limited, especially for low-income families and individuals (Sarti, 2010). Additionally, social care services can be prohibitively expensive for many people. The inadequacy of these services increases women's career gaps and causes gendered pension gaps at later ages (Elveren, 2008; OECD, 2021a). The legal framework and cultural norms surrounding unpaid care work also play a role in shaping the ways in which care work is valued and supported (Ferrant et al., 2014; Lonergan, 2015; Sargent & Kotobi, 2017). In many societies, strong cultural norms continue to dictate that care work is the responsibility of women and should be done unpaid (Appelbaum et al., 2002; Karimli et al., 2016). These norms are supported by laws and policies that do not recognise and effectively redistribute unpaid care work (Crenshaw, 1989; ILO, 2021a).

Overall, gendered unpaid care work is a complex and multifaceted issue with important implications for societies as well as women (Ilkcaracan, 2016; Pearson & Elson, 2015). Recognising the value of unpaid care work is essential in taking steps to support and compensate those who perform it (European Commission, 2018; OECD, 2021e). This requires universal social care services, changing cultural norms around care work, and creating a care economy (Chatzidakis et al., 2020) that includes creating a legal framework that recognises unpaid care work and effectively supports caregivers (Elson, 2017).

In this context, this thesis addresses the gendered unpaid care work and aims to provide an alternative feminist tool to explore potential transformative policy dimensions of care provision. Feminist literature has shown that gendered unpaid care work is deeply intertwined with employment opportunities and labour market regulations, but also neoliberal and patriarchal socio-normative structure, legal and institutional normative structure, and social care systems and dynamics. This thesis analyse these structural constraint factors in Turkey



and Italy, using four *pathways approach* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) to capture women's access to *paid employment opportunities and labour market regulations* (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Bruegel, 1979; Ilkkaracan, 2017; Pearson & Elson, 2015), *neoliberal and patriarchal socio-political normative structure* (Folbre & Hartmann, 1989; Pateman, 1988); *legal and institutional normative structure* (Elson & Cagatay, 2000; Fraser, 2017; Waring, 1999); and *social care system and dynamics* (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Budlender, 2010; Chatzidakis et al., 2020). These categories will represent in this thesis the *four pathways* of gendered unpaid care work, the model coined by Cantillon and Teasdale (2021). By employing this concept in this thesis, its scope and content will be broadened with the integration of 5Rs approach (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020) into the discussion. As most current research focuses on one of the dimensions, specifically women's participation in the labour market (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Bruegel, 1979; Charmes, 2019); thus, analysing gender unpaid care work within these *four pathways* in combination of potential transformative policy solutions under 5Rs - *recognition, reduction and redistribution* of care work, *representation*, and *reward* of the care workers (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020)- will provide a more integrated approach. In doing so, it will enable us to conceptually capture the broader processes or factors that need to be addressed to seek greater gender equality and, thereby, analyse widely situated unpaid work (Reid, 1934; Waring, 1999).

The original contribution of this study is to create a novel *gendered unpaid care work index* through case studies and contribute to the feminist efforts in literature to define the policy dimensions to support transformation of care work. The ultimate aim of the thesis is to provide an *integrated analytical framework* which will navigate the transition from gendered unpaid care work to *recognising, reducing and redistributing* care work (Elson, 2017), *representation* and *reward* of care workers (Addati et al., 2018; Rost et al., 2020), using existing feminist tools and approaches.

In the remainder of the thesis, Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature to address critical feminist concerns surrounding gendered unpaid care work. In doing so, the primary purpose of this chapter is to explore the structural determinants of the construction and permanence of gendered unpaid care work to which feminist literature refers. These factors are crucial as they will guide case studies to understand and discuss gendered unpaid care work in Turkey and Italy. This chapter also reveals what gender means in this thesis and how it has become a means of exploiting unpaid domestic labour through neoliberal theory and policy practice. It also discusses the historical and socio-economic origins of gendered unpaid care

work by presenting the structures contributing to the gendering unpaid work under five headings - employment opportunities and labour market regulations, neoliberal and patriarchal socio-normative structure, legal and institutional normative structure, and social care systems and dynamics- by drawing from the literature. Therefore, this chapter is crucial in defining the significant contributors to unpaid care work, which will structure the case studies and, thus, the *integrated analytical framework*. Lastly, it focuses on the debates around recognising unpaid care work and including women's unpaid work in household production, starting with feminist efforts to make unpaid care work visible. Chapter 3 explains the methodological approach and present philosophical justifications for the research questions and the rationale for the choice of the feminist framework applied to the case studies. This chapter aims to clarify and justify the research problem of the thesis.

Chapters 4 and 5 draw upon each of the *four pathways* to examine unpaid care work in the country contexts of Turkey and Italy. The case study chapters present the current situation of unpaid care work in Turkey and Italy according to the latest available data. They focus on the *four pathways* mentioned above to separately analyse the relevant elements related to gender roles and their reflection on labour markets, government policies of practices, legal and institutional structure, and the social care dynamics in country contexts. Regarding gendered unpaid care work, Turkey and Italy have similarities, as well as peculiarities that draw attention and provide comparison reasons (Addabbo, 2017; Gimenez-Nadal & Molina, 2021; İlkaracan & Memiş, 2021). These two Mediterranean countries, one EU member and the other long-standing candidate, generally represent higher gender inequality rates, with unpaid and paid work no exception (EIGE, 2022; Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c; WEF, 2019). In addition, Turkey and Italy are similar in placing the family at the centre regarding welfare service provision and associating households with these services (Donà, 2022; İlkaracan, 2012). This understanding of welfare also points to the existence of patriarchal state foundations in these countries (Pateman, 1988; Waring, 1999). On the other hand, Southern European and Turkish welfare systems, in the post-1980 period, began to separate as the first one prioritised social inclusion and reduction of inequalities by reflecting the impact of the EU, while the latter reflected the influence of the IMF and World Bank with neoliberal structural adjustment policies (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010; Kongar & Memiş, 2017). Notwithstanding this differentiation, gender equality in these two countries lags behind their peers, and there is a significant gap to close, especially in terms of unpaid care work. Given these similarities and peculiarities of Turkey and Italy, the case study approach will enable us

to comparatively explain the links of socio-economic, political, legal, and cultural structures to gendered unpaid care work.

Chapter 6 brings together all the relevant discussions from the previous chapters to highlight the factors that initiate or perpetuate the gendered division of labour and place them in a more *integrated analytical framework*. This framework further develops the potential of the *four pathways* framework (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) to support decision-makers in their policy-decisions to drive transformative changes. In doing so, this thesis aims to integrate *four pathways* model (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) with *5Rs* approach (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020) for support transition from gendered unpaid care work to the recognition, reduction and redistribution of care work and the representation and rewarding of caregivers. This integration emphasises potential policy dimensions under *gendered unpaid care work index* in which fifteen policy areas determined to compare the performance of Turkey and Italy. This *index* highlights the differences and similarities in current policy measures between the two countries, to interpret the patterns or deviations regarding gendered unpaid care work. Finally, Chapter 7 draws upon the concluding remarks of the thesis. Key findings suggest that although Italy outperforms Turkey in gender-transformative efforts related to unpaid care work, both countries need structural improvements.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW: STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF CONSTRUCTION & PERPETUATION OF GENDERED UNPAID CARE WORK**

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In adventure stories, it is boys who go around the world, travel as sailors on boats, subsist on breadfruit in the jungle. All important events happen because of men. Reality confirms these novels and legends. If the little girl reads the newspapers, if she listens to adult conversation, she notices that today, as in the past, men lead the world. The heads of state, generals, explorers, musicians, and painters she admires are men; it is men who make her heartbeat with enthusiasm.

—Simone de Beauvoir (1949, p. 351)

In human society, for daily life to continue, the production and distribution of goods and services, feeding, clothing, and shelter are essential. Additionally, almost everything people use and is involved in their daily lives requires care -such as houses, plants, companion animals, energy sources etc. (Himmelweit, 2018; O’Hara, 2014). Therefore, it is surprising that mainstream economics pays little attention to care and its value while focusing on activities, resources, and outputs that create supposedly “high value” in terms of mainstream economic valuation (O’Hara, 2014). In contrast, the ever-expanding and deepening feminist literature, especially in recent decades, has brought together different conceptual and theoretical arguments and perspectives to highlight the role of gendered unpaid care work in production and reproduction (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Cagatay et al., 1995; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Carbone & Farina, 2020; Folbre & Hartmann, 1989; O’Hagan, 2013, 2018; Teasdale, 2013; Waring, 1988). The one common point of these debates is that besides the mainstream economy, there is another reproduction and care economy, which is in constant interaction with the male-dominated economy and absorbing all the negative consequences it creates (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Folbre, 1994; O’Hagan, 2018; Pearson & Elson, 2015; Razavi, 2007; Waring, 1988).

In this care economy, unequal gender relations inherent in the patriarchal capitalist system undoubtedly contribute to the oppression and exploitation of women, particularly working-class women of colour, immigrants, and minorities (see Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Carbone & Farina, 2020; İlkaracan & Memiş, 2021; Karamessini

& Rubery, 2014; O'Hagan, 2018; Pearson & Elson, 2015; Razavi, 2007). On the other hand, social and cultural norms, expectations, attitudes and practices, and formal and informal laws and institutions shape and constrain the behaviours of individuals, groups, and communities (Fineman 2017; Folbre 1994; Weedon 1987). The influence of this normative structure on gender roles also defines acceptable or unacceptable behaviour in society (Ferrant et al., 2014).

Even in today's societies, behavioural norms characterising paid and unpaid care work is related to the homemaker/breadwinner model. In this model, men work outside the home for wages to ensure the financial security of their families. The demand for family wages is a high priority as men are expected to earn enough to meet the family's cash needs (Appelbaum et al., 2002). Conversely, women are assigned to the private sphere that isolates them, devalues their labour, exploits them, and makes them socio-economically dependent on others (Fraser, 2017; Hartmann, 1976; Pateman, 1988). As a complement to men's responsibilities outside the household, women are often regarded as responsible for meeting the family members' care needs, including unpaid domestic chores and caring for children and older adults. Moreover, when women take up a paid job outside the home, it often overlaps with their responsibilities at home, such as caring or assistance (Folbre & Nelson, 2000; Fraser, 2017; Hook, 2006).

In addition, worldwide, many public policies and programs, including those for women's economic empowerment, have a patriarchal tendency to develop policies aligned with these so-called responsibilities of women (Ferrant & Thim, 2019; Pearson, 2019). These policies, built on neoliberal understandings of agency (Karamessini & Rubery, 2014), assume that a disproportionate share of women's unpaid care work is natural or given (Appelbaum et al., 2002; Hook, 2006). This approach is also based on the implicit or explicit assumption that issues related to unpaid care work are a private matter best managed within the household (Connell, 1987; Millett, 2000; Pateman, 1988). This discriminatory policy-making tendency is particularly burdensome for women living in poverty, who do not have adequate access to public services and have limited finances to purchase goods and services to replace the labour required for such work (ActionAid, 2021). On the other hand, when care work is outsourced, a significant proportion of these workers are from ethnic minorities, and as a result, pre-existing inequalities aggravate the situation (Charlesworth et al., 2015; Enríquez, 2018).

In light of these issues, this chapter focuses on feminist literature to address critical feminist concerns surrounding gendered unpaid care work. The primary purpose of this chapter is to reveal the conceptual and theoretical framework on which this study is based. In this sense, the first section of this chapter focuses on the concepts of gender, inequality, and neoliberalism

and how neoliberal theory and policy practice function as intensifiers in integrating gender and inequality and exploiting unpaid domestic labour.

The second section discusses the structural determinants of the construction and perpetuation of gendered unpaid care work to which feminist literature refers by compiling them under five categories as (i) patriarchy and social reproduction, (ii) agency-oriented arguments and neoliberal approach, (iii) employment and economic gender inequality (iv) social care inequality and (v) intersectional gender inequalities.

Finally, in relation to the structural factors introduced in the second section, the last section delves into feminist efforts to recognise unpaid care work and the philosophical and practical implications of these efforts. It focuses on the debates around recognising unpaid care work and including women's unpaid work in household production. On the other hand, this section also focuses on the existing gap between feminist efforts and neoliberal-patriarchal policy practices. This gap highlights the need for the practical use of existing feminist approaches as analytical tools to facilitate the transformative policy-making process. With this inference, the final subsection covers the two feminist public policy approaches that will be adapted as an analytical framework, tested with case studies in Turkey and Italy, and attempted to be further developed as an *integrated analytical framework* to support policymakers in transformative policy processes. Both approaches focus on the burden of unpaid care work on women from a similar feminist perspective, one pointing to problem areas and the other to possible policy solutions.

The first approach, *four pathways*, centres around feminist literature that focuses on barriers to the socio-economic empowerment of women. The *four pathways* approach, which was coined by Cantillon & Teasdale (2021), focuses on the *four pathways* intersecting with unpaid work with specific emphasis on the country context of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021). In order to test and further develop its scope, the pathways in this framework- *access to and opportunities in the labour market; social and cultural norms; social care infrastructure; and the legal and institutional environment* - (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021)- will guide case studies to explore and interpret the specific contexts of gendered unpaid care work in Turkey and Italy.

The second approach, the *5Rs*, is located in the strand of feminist literature focusing on transformative policy solutions to gender inequalities, including unpaid care work. This approach was originally developed by Elson (2017) as '3Rs': *recognise, reduce, and*

*redistribute* unpaid care work, and later expanded by CSOs and scholars to include the fourth ‘R’ as *representation* (Rost et al., 2020). ILO (2018) recently added the fifth ‘R’ – *reward*. The 5Rs approach reveals the potential policy areas to reduce gender inequalities related to unpaid care work and address barriers against women’s empowerment (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017). The importance of the 5Rs approach (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020) for this thesis is that, integrated with the *four pathways* approach (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021), it will contribute to highlighting the gender transformative opportunities in public policy processes with specific contexts of Turkey and Italy. Thus, these two approaches together will form the foundation of the *integrated analytical framework*.

All these suggest that feminist literature has focused not only on the *recognition* of unpaid care work, which required its measurement, but also on the *reduction* and *redistribution* of unpaid care work, *representation*, and *reward* of the care workers. In this context, the remainder of this chapter will address the gendered structural factors surrounding gender relations and aims to interpret the relationship between them and gendered unpaid care work.

## **2.1. GENDER, [IN]EQUALITY AND NEOLIBERALISM: MAIN CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

For several reasons derived from the nature of things, in the family it is the father who should command. First the authority of the father and mother ought not to be equal; on the contrary, there must be a single government, and when there are differences of opinion there must be one dominant voice that decides. Second, however slight we regard the handicaps that are peculiar to a wife, since they always occasion period of inactivity for her, this is a sufficient reason for excluding her from this primacy.

—Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1755, p. 2)

In this thesis, gender is a historical (Butler, 1993) and constructed concept by civilisation as a whole rather than being a biological, psychic, or economic destiny (Beauvoir, 1949). From this perspective, gender is a structure that regularly conceals its genesis based on the tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and maintain polarised genders. As the credibility of these productions covers up cultural constructs and punishments for those who do not agree to believe them, construction forces the belief in its requirement and naturalness (Butler, 1999). The reduction of gender to biology (genes, hormones, morphology, etc.) by

imposing a “single and stable identity” and implying female unanimity ignores the fact that the concept of ‘woman’ alone cannot encompass all different historical, socio-economic and cultural paths (Martin, 2004; Pilcher & Whelehan, 2004; Witt, 1995). It also denies sociability and susceptibility to the social structure of gender (Martin, 2004). Thus, this approach ignores the political, social, and cultural paths that construct and perpetuate gender and hierarchic relations surrounding it (Butler, 1999; Weedon, 1987; Wittig, 1992).

In reality, gender disparities are created by socio-economic, cultural, and political institutions and structures (Beauvoir, 1949; Butler, 1999). They infiltrate every sphere of public and private life and determine who will do what, for whom, who is what and what may become (Weedon, 1987). They shape the family, education and well-being, business and politics, culture, and leisure based on hierarchical relationships (Addabbo, Rodríguez-Modroño, et al., 2015a; Jourová, 2019; Yerkes et al., 2020). Moreover, based on the ‘woman’ category, ties to maternity, childcare and unpaid domestic and care work are often taken for granted (Benería, 1995; M. Gregory, 2011; Laslett & Brenner, 1989). Low-income women, in particular, often struggle to negotiate with the contradictory demands of their dual roles as mostly unpaid caregivers and wage workers (Appelbaum et al., 2002; England, 2005; Enríquez, 2018; Ferrant & Thim, 2019).

Especially with the uptrend of neoliberalism, this phenomenal burden of unpaid care work on women has increased, as many studies have shown (Antonopoulos & Hirway, 2010; Baines et al., 2020; İlkkaracan, 2012; Kaya Bahçe & Memiş, 2013). This effect is mainly due to the gradual downsizing of the state and the public sector, their diminishing social roles, and the reduction of the redistributive role of the budgeting process, public expenditures, and tax policies (Atkinson, 2014; Blyth, 2013; Piketty, 2014; Roubini & Mihm, 2010). Indeed, the most important feature of this period has been the privatisation and contraction of the state (Harvey, 2007).

As a result, the state’s intervention in the economy has evolved into steps taken to compensate for the destruction caused by the economic system itself and to support the free movement of financial markets in every way (Atkinson, 2014; Blyth, 2013; Piketty, 2014; Roubini & Mihm, 2010). In this sense, the issue of resource allocation and the question of who will bear the cost of stabilisation has become even more critical (Kaufmann & Stützel, 2017). However, successive bailouts and further financial liberalisation have been the only response in the last four decades (Cecchetti, 2008; Stiglitz, 2010b, 2010a).



This meant that while increasing public spending to save the global banking system, the costs of crises were socialised through contractionary fiscal policies and raised indirect and personal income taxes (Blyth, 2013; Piketty, 2014). These policies seriously distorted the living standards of the working class and low-income families (Bhattacharya, 2017a). However, governments and financial institutions focused solely on transferring wealth and value upward, mainly to one per cent and higher positions in professional management classes (Fraser, 2019). Additionally, privatising services previously provided by the public has often been driven by the interests of the private sector rather than the needs of the people (ActionAid, 2021). This contractionary approach has also reduced the available resources and tools that could be used to produce gender-responsive and transformative public services (Bassett, 2016).

Indeed, neoliberalism, as a financial liberalisation and speculative profit-centred approach, per se and through its periodic crises, risked losing progress on gender equality by undermining employment and social welfare protections and setting aside gender equality policies (Karamessini & Rubery, 2014). It exacerbated existing gender inequalities by deepening social class division through income and wealth distribution inequality (Blyth, 2013; Fraser, 2019; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). The burden of the crises, along with the economic recessions and austerity policies, laid particularly on women by diminishing the social state and producing and reproducing oppressive, coercive, and discriminatory tendencies in all public and private spheres (Addabbo et al., 2013; Elson, 2010; Karamessini, 2014; Pearson & Elson, 2015). These also included systematic tyranny, radicalisation and stigmatisation of non-normative sexuality and identities (Ben-Porat et al., 2021; Donà, 2021).

On the one hand, neoliberal policies focused on austerity, ignoring the gendered division of labour, especially unpaid work related to domestic reproduction, consider women an expandable and cost-free resource that can absorb all the extra work to sustain life (Pearson, 2019). On the other hand, it is accelerating the reduction of public services, including healthcare, childcare, education spending, and affordable and regulated housing and social services for older people and those whose disabilities or illnesses prevent them from actively participating in the labour market (Benería, 1999a; Elson, 1992, 1995, 2002; Rubery, 2014; Toğrul & Memiş, 2011).

Empirical evidence (Abramovitz, 2012; Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Barry, 2020; Blyth, 2013; Pearson, 2019; Rubery, 2014) suggests that austerity policies widen gender inequalities and worsen women's situation. Governments' choices for austerity have a disproportionately disruptive effect in each stage of the life cycle of the already economically

and socially disadvantaged unpaid carers, of which the overwhelming majority are women (Busby, 2014; Thomson et al., 2018). Some studies (Benería, 1999a; Elson, 1992, 1995, 2002; Rubery, 2014; Toğrul & Memiş, 2011) have also shown the socio-economic burden attributed to women through structural adjustment programs<sup>1</sup> implemented by the IMF and the World Bank since the 1980s to support neo-liberalisation, particularly in low and middle-income countries.

According to Elson (2010), these gendered socio-economic consequences arise from the gendered structure of the macroeconomic system and its crises. First, they are gendered as they emerge from gendered economic processes in which women are hardly present in key decision-making positions. Second, neither private nor public resources are equally distributed and fail to address the needs of women as “producers” and “caregivers”. Therefore, the impact of these economic structures is also gendered. Contrarily, in the neoliberal approach, the market is purged of its historical and structural conditions and power relations that create and sustain inequalities between countries and groups over time (A. Roberts, 2015). Thus, the ‘discourse of freedom’, which should theoretically eliminate all prohibitions and restrictions on the individual’s choice, becomes a new form of restraint and pressure, urging people to follow, not deviate (E. Chen, 2013). In this way, combining traditional gender roles with the expected behaviour of the modern neoliberal subject forms the definition of the ‘good citizen’ (Dabrowski, 2021). The naive claim that the household of these ‘good citizens’ is always a place of harmony and equally shared resources is also consistent with the interests of neoliberalism. Under this structure, with the accumulation of income and other resources, the differences existing between individual family members are minimised and hidden (Evans, 2017).

For this reason, in such an unequal socio-economic structure, as Folbre and Hartmann (1989) put forth, flattering the claim that caring for others is not a critical work form but rather part of women’s very nature is a way of reducing the cost of receiving such a service. In this case, it is necessary to unveil the social, economic, historical, and political determinants behind gendered unpaid care work to make its indispensable role in a capitalist society visible (Arruzza et al., 2019). Therefore, the remainder of the chapter is devoted to the theoretical discussion of these determinants in the context of neoliberalism, patriarchy, and unpaid labour. The focus

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<sup>1</sup> Key components of structural adjustment programs are longer-term reforms in trade liberalisation, capital account liberalisation, deregulation of government controls, and privatising public services and state-owned enterprises (Berik et al., 2009).

will be on, as Fraser (1997, p. 282) states, “the norms, meanings and structures of the personality embedded in institutions and social practices, in social action and the embodied habitus and the ideological state apparatus”.

## **2.2. INTERLINKED DIMENSIONS OF GENDERED UNPAID CARE WORK IN A “CAPITAL-ORIENTED” ORDER**

“Non-producers”, housewives, mothers who are “inactive” and “unoccupied” cannot, apparently, be in need. They are not even in the economic cycle in the first place. They can certainly have no expectation that they will be visible in the distribution of benefits that flow from production.

—Marilyn Waring (1999, p. 1)

The concept of unpaid care work in this study refers to the direct care of individuals and domestic work carried out for family members, other households, or the community without remuneration (Razavi, 2007). This includes direct supervision of persons, such as the care of children, elderly, ill or disabled family members, and indirect care, such as cooking, cleaning, mending, or fetching water for the physical, psychological, emotional, and developmental needs of one or more people (Antonopoulos & Hirway, 2010; Himmelweit, 1995). The term “gendered unpaid care work”, on the other hand, states that mainly women undertake these unpaid jobs, although there are differences due to race, class, income status or other reasons (Budlender, 2010; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Elson, 2017; Karimli et al., 2016; Razavi, 2007). This study adopts the definition of unpaid care work constituting an overlapping area for non-remunerated domestic and care responsibilities (See Table 1 below).

*Table 1: Overlapping areas in the terminological framework of unpaid care work<sup>2</sup>*

UNPAID WORK	CARE WORK	UNPAID CARE WORK
<p>Unpaid work involves a wide variety of activities that take place outside of the cash connection. It includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>unpaid work on the household plot or family business,</li> <li>activities such as fetching water and collecting firewood for self-consumption; and</li> <li>unpaid care of one's child, elderly parent or friend affected by an illness.</li> </ul> <p>Some work in this category is included in SNA (See Tables 2 and 3).</p>	<p>Care work includes the direct care of persons; it may or may not be paid. Those in need of intensive care, including young children, older people, and people with various illnesses and disabilities, but healthy adults also need and receive care.</p> <p>Paid caregivers refer to nannies, babysitters, nurses, and other caregivers who care for older people, young children, and others with illnesses in homes and other institutional settings (public, market, non-profit).</p>	<p>Unpaid care work is caring for people without an explicit monetary reward. The most extensive unpaid care work occurs within households/families in almost all societies. However, individuals also provide unpaid care between households and families - for other relatives, friends, neighbours, and community members - as well as within various institutions (public, market, non-profit, community) on a free or voluntary basis.</p> <p>Unpaid care work constitutes the overlapping area in three categories.</p> <p>This category of work is outside the SNA production boundary (See Tables 2 and 3).</p>

Source: Razavi (2007, p. 6)

Although the provision and availability of adequate and safe care services are critical to human well-being and the functioning of our societies and economies (Elson, 2000), it is not organised effectively and not well remunerated. Providing care requires mental, physical, and spiritual effort and consumes the time and resources of the caregiver (Chatzidakis et al., 2020; Himmelweit, 1995). In addition, the workload it creates is not evenly distributed among women and men in households and between the state, market, families, and civil society (Razavi, 2007). Women in all economies and cultures carry out most unpaid care work (Budlender, 2010; Elson, 2017; Fraser, 2003; M. Gregory, 2011). However, it is particularly burdensome for women with limited financial resources and a lack of access to care services (ActionAid, 2021; Ferrant et al., 2014).

Nevertheless, economists and many policy actors have neglected the socio-economic issues associated with unpaid care work. One reason for this disregard is the neoliberal definition of the household (Goldschmidt-Clermont, 2000; Ironmonger, 1996). According to this definition, the household only provides labour to the business sector in return for income and either consumes or accumulates it. As feminist economists point out (Addabbo, 2017; İlkaracan & Memiş, 2021; Pearson & Elson, 2015), this is a very limited view because it obscures the fact that households are linked to the rest of the economy by producing most of the basic needs and maintaining reproduction through unpaid labour (Antonopoulos & Hirway, 2010). Thus, the amount of unpaid care work performed, and the way it is distributed have significant impacts on the well-being of individuals and communities, as well as economies (Budlender, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> In this study, care-labour and care-work will be used interchangeably.

Unpaid care work is mainly associated with women, femininity, and ‘unproductive’ occupations that have long been devalued (Chatzidakis et al., 2020). On the other hand, the burden imposed on women through gendered labour structures leads to their exploitation and has negative impacts at every stage of their lives (Arruzza et al., 2019). While the number of out-of-school children at the primary and lower secondary levels has almost halved since the second half of the 1990s, 32 million primary-age girls are still out of school (ILO, 2021b). Moreover, although the child marriage rate dropped from one-fourth to one-fifth, still 6.5 million women worldwide are married before the age of 18 (Kelly & Johnson, 2020; Turk Stat, 2022c; WEF, 2021). In addition, particularly in low-income countries, as parents prioritise boys’ education and allocate more resources, girls’ educational enrolment and completion rates remain relatively lower (European Commission, 2021).

One of the most significant consequences of all these is that women have lower labour force participation and, thus, less visibility in the public sphere (Ouedraogo & Marlet, 2018). At the same time, male dominance with three-quarters of the parliament seats worldwide and the absence of a gender equality lens in politics constantly produce gendered policies, tax, and expenditure programs (WEF, 2021). As a result, more than 2.5 billion women and girls worldwide still face the consequences of discriminatory laws and gaps in legal protection, significant limitations, discrimination and violence in their daily lives (Kelly & Johnson, 2020).

On the other hand, women who participate in ‘work life’ by overcoming all these difficulties face constant discrimination in the workplace. Worldwide, more women of working age than men remain out of the paid workforce due to unpaid care responsibilities (The European Commission, 2021; WEF, 2021). According to ILO, only in 2020, during the pandemic, over 2 million moms left the labour force to care for their children and family (ILO, 2022). In particular, women in the lower-income group are forced to choose part-time and informal employment to prioritise unpaid care work or to have the flexibility to fulfil their care responsibilities. That is, women contribute less to social protection and accumulate less wealth, and they become poorer and more vulnerable in older ages (Rost et al., 2020). Therefore, defining unpaid care work as a category of ‘economic activity’ that interacts with market production has been considered by some scholars (İlkkaracan, 2017; Reid, 1977; Waring, 1999) to be the most critical contribution of feminist economics to the discipline of economics. Nevertheless, gendered unpaid care work remains a significant social and economic burden for women and a critical factor hindering gender equality. Thus, increasing the well-being of women and reducing these gender inequalities is essential not only for the economy but also

for ethical and social reasons (DeRock, 2019; Giannelli et al., 2012; Gündüz & İlkkaracan, 2019).

In this respect, as will be discussed below, the gendered division of labour and spheres of economy are deeply intertwined with certain institutional, cultural, and economic factors (Addabbo, 2017; Berik et al., 2009; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; İlkkaracan, 2016; Pearson & Elson, 2015). These factors not only represent structural problem dimensions as part of a systemic formation but also indicate gaps that need improvement to support the transformation of gender relations (Reid, 1934; Waring, 1988). Thus, they have critical importance in exploring gendered unpaid care work in country contexts and moving towards policy actions for transformation. Although gendered unpaid care work has been associated with many different elements in the ever-expanding and enriching feminist literature, this thesis has gathered the most problematised dimensions under the following five headings: (i) patriarchy and social reproduction, (ii) agency-oriented arguments and the neoliberal approach, (iii) employment and economic gender inequality, (iv) social care inequality and (v) intersectional gender inequalities. The remainder of this section will discuss these factors as structures of gendered oppression (Barrett, 1980; Beauvoir, 1949; Millett, 2000) and present their position in the theoretical foundation of the thesis.

### **2.2.1. Patriarchy and Social Reproduction**

One of the structures that feminist literature has mostly problematised to investigate the dynamics of the unequal distribution of unpaid care work is patriarchy (Folbre & Hartmann, 1989; Hartmann, 1976; hooks, 1981). Patriarchy as a political institution (Millett, 2000) has been used, in the most general sense, to refer to power relations (Beechey, 1979), focusing on the order of subordination (Barrett, 1980; Hartmann, 1979; Walby, 1990). In this sense, patriarchy is the hierarchical and interdependent set of social relations, structures and practices between women and men, in which men dominate (Hartmann, 1976; Walby, 1990). Beyond patriarchy, this study favours the concept of ‘patriarchal relations’, as some other feminists do (Connell, 1987; Maynard, 1995), to refer to more pluralistic forms of relations between men and women and to reveal women’s activism, ability to resist, struggle and take action.

For Hartmann (1979), the material basis of this patriarchal relationship between sexes lies not only in child-rearing in the family but also in all the social structures that enable men to control women’s labour. Under the “patriarchal capitalist white supremacist order”, as

Hartmann states (1979, p. 13), gender hierarchies, like racial hierarchies and others, function to determine the production and reproduction of people, among other things, and the continuation of the social organisation structure. Patriarchal relationships at stake manifest themselves most evidently in traditional heterosexual marriages and family relationships. As Pateman (1988) argues, marriage functions as a kind of employment contract in the patriarchal family structure. Under this patriarchal dome being a wife entails being a homemaker. In this sense, a woman is a person who works for the husband in the house of marriage with the essential abilities she possesses by the very nature of her existence (Pateman, 1988).

At this point, women's supposed superior abilities in care, which are assumed to be innate, are supported by the arguments that women can perform occupations that require less physical or mental effort and do not work as efficiently as men in paid jobs (Honneth, 2003). Then, gender functions as the primary determinant of the distinction between paid 'productive' labour and unpaid 'reproductive' labour, assigning the latter to women as the primary responsibility (Carriero & Todesco, 2016; Pearson & Elson, 2015; UNDP, 2013). The second category refers to a much more comprehensive network of relations beyond the management of domestic order under the phenomenon of social reproduction (Bhattacharya, 2017a; Fraser, 2017; Munro, 2019). While social reproduction has been defined in a contested way among feminists and other theorists (Bhattacharya, 2017a; Cock & Luxton, 2013; Gill & Bakker, 2003; Laslett & Brenner, 1989; Marx, 1867; Quick, 2016; Vogel, 2013) depending on how they understand social relations and various economic and social structures, three areas have come to the fore in these definitions: biological reproduction (Witt, 1995); daily maintenance and reproduction of the labour-power (Gill & Bakker, 2003); and lastly continuity and reproduction of the existing social structures (Benería & Sen, 1981; Bhattacharya, 2017b; Munro, 2019; Quick, 2018). In order to continue segregation between production and reproduction, most societies have developed different forms of control over social reproduction that underpin the subordination of women (for example, control of sexual and reproductive activities, women's subjugation through gendered family policies, or the transfer of wealth, usually to men, through inheritance systems).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Butler (1997) argues that capitalist economic order dependent on reproduction is necessarily interconnected to the reproduction of heterosexuality. According to Butler (1997), both gender and sexuality have become part of material life not only because of their way of serving the sexual division of labour, but also because normative sex serves the reproduction of the normative family. Similarly, although intertwined with the spheres of production and finance, the definition of motherhood as isolated reproductive labour complements and perpetuates capitalist, patriarchal modes of production by reproducing dominant hierarchical power structures and public/private gender roles in care work (Daskalaki et al., 2020).

The construction of social division based on gender and the association of overall domestic labour performance of women with reproduction rather than production also facilitates the routine exploitation of care labour by the market, either in the form of low-wage care workers or women's unpaid labour (Arruzza et al., 2019). Therefore, the association of women with care work represents a cycle of devaluation, exploitation, and oppression based on the assertion that these activities have less or no economic value than that of men (Budlender, 2008; Charlesworth et al., 2015). This argument also conceals that unpaid care work involved in the reproduction sphere is in constant relationship with the market economy and contributes immensely to the production and finance spheres (Pearson & Elson, 2015). The importance of the reproductive sphere in the economy and its links to the productive sphere becomes even more evident in the light of feminist studies indicating that women are the most important carriers of the results of contractionary neoliberal policies since the 1980s (Çağatay & Özler, 1995; Due & Gladwin, 1991; Elson, 1995; Toğrul & Memiş, 2011).

In an environment where neoliberal understanding greatly restricts the social activities of the state, the reproduction sphere provides services directly related to human beings' daily and intergenerational reproduction, mainly through care, socialisation, and education (Benería & Sen, 1981; Bhattacharya, 2017b; Fraser, 2017; Laslett & Brenner, 1989). In other words, it is precisely this sphere where the necessary care for human welfare is created (Pearson & Elson, 2015). The problematic coordination and gendered nature of the norms that dominate the structure and functioning of the spheres of production, reproduction and finance (Pearson & Elson, 2015) create setbacks for low-income families, especially for women in them (Kantola & Lombardo, 2017).

Gender, from this perspective, configures the divide between the high-wage, male-dominated manufacturing and professional occupations in paid labour and the low-wage, female-dominated "pink-collar" and domestic service professions (Fraser, 2003). The deviation of time-use among women and men and their disproportionate occupation in different spheres are the most obvious indicators of this (Pearson & Elson, 2015). While the unpaid labour women perform in the household keeps many of them away from the paid labour market, the increase in female employment creates more demand -by those who could afford it- for market substitutes of home-produced goods (Folbre, 1994), including care work. When the public sector does not provide these goods and services, the socio-economic gap between those who can afford these services and those who cannot increase dramatically, particularly in terms



of education, healthcare, and social protection (Elson, 2016; Elson & Cagatay, 2000; Pearson & Elson, 2015).

On the other hand, while there is evidence that men's unpaid work time increases with female employment (Charmes, 2019; Ferrant et al., 2014; Hook, 2006), most workers who undertake paid or unpaid care work are women, and they are mostly low-income, women of colour, and immigrant women (Hopkins, 2017). Thus, as women become more involved in the paid labour market, wealthier families will outsource more care, resulting in the concentration of disadvantaged women in relatively low-wage and precarious jobs (Moore, 2018). In this unequal structure, even today, women continue to take more responsibility than men, within the family and in communities, for unpaid care and housework, meeting daily needs, and caring for children and frail elderly, sick or disabled (Elson, 2017). The neoliberal approach, which gradually reduces the redistributive social role of the state and emphasises so-called 'free' individual choices, has a significant role in this inequality incontrovertibly.

### **2.2.2. Agency Oriented Arguments and Neoliberal Approach**

As vulnerable and interdependent social beings, people need care within social relationships and institutions throughout their life. The vulnerability at stake emphasises the human condition and thus requires reconceptualising care as a human right (Fineman, 2017). In this framework, vulnerability is a universal phenomenon that stems from our incarnation (Bjørnholt & McKay, 2014), drawing attention to the care network within social institutions, individuals, communities, and the state. In other words, the main argument is that care is essential to human survival and to help those receiving care develop their capabilities to benefit themselves and others physically, emotionally, and intellectually throughout their lives (Karimli et al., 2016). The care provided within this social and institutional relations network not only means direct care from one person to another but also self-care, the creation of specific prerequisites for delivering care, and care delivery management, including legal and institutional protection (Enríquez, 2018).

Contrary to this simple social reality, the abstract legal subject implied by neoliberal Western democracies does not reflect the vulnerability that is the very nature of the human condition mentioned above (Fineman, 2017). This is because the discipline of economics and its institutional and legal structure has historically been associated with a particular androcentric focus and set of methods (Gilman, 1911), in contrast to alleged gender neutrality.

The dominance of this view and its supposed superiority over all other economic approaches made it possible to strongly influence theory and practice (Bjørnholt & McKay, 2014). The idealised hu‘man’ being, in this socio-economic structure with its institutions, is primarily the male: rational, autonomous, have perfect information, perfectly capable of functioning in a perfectly competitive market, altruistic at home while self-interested outside. On the other hand, women are primarily defined by their physical and social connections: subjective, emotional, fragile, gentle, obedient, humble and always altruistic (Benería, 1995; Bjørnholt & McKay, 2014; Elson et al., 1997; Folbre, 1994). From this point of view, while men represent the rationality of the public sphere with all its legal and institutional framework, women represent all the intimacy of the private sphere. Thus, the moral identity attributed to women through these unenacted rules functions as a means of limitation on women’s actions in both households and public institutions (Evans, 2013).

However, the dominant liberal discourse of the rational individual itself conceals the conflict and contradiction between hegemonic institutionalised definitions of women’s nature and the social role inherent in the sexual division of labour, family structure, and women’s experiences with these institutions (Weedon, 1987). In this sense, these agency-based arguments enable the transfer of unspoken values, aspirations, perceptions, and expectations about women from one culture to another (Braunstein et al., 2020; Hipp & Bünning, 2021; Pateman, 1988). At the same time, portraying individuals as responsible or capable of choice and change, they disguise the fact that social institutions and repeated practices create those choices. Therefore, these arguments blur the line between the real choice capability of women and the institutions and regulations that sustain and mediate power (Evans, 2013). Moreover, these arguments transform perceptions and expectations directed to women in line with the neoliberal state and inevitably change all social relations. This stems from the fact that such a career self, portrayed as a rational individual, can exist only in a certain set of oppressive and exploitative relationships and may be based on the work of other subordinated identities (Hutchings, 2013).

This biased economic, institutional, and legal structure, thus, creates barriers to mainstreaming gender equality policies, including social welfare programs (Elson & Cagatay, 2000), as well as to a range of human rights, including leisure rights, rights to work and social security, freedom of expression and to seek justice (Karimli et al., 2016). Considering gender inequality only from an economic perspective via issues such as women’s human capital, productivity, or opportunity cost contributes to this biased structure (Cuberes & Teignier,

2014). Similarly, the emphasis on the financial aspects of gender equality, such as increased economic participation of women for higher growth, does not focus on the problem occurring from the gendered economic structure (Gonzales et al., 2015).

With the androcentric understanding of policymaking, neoliberal policy practices only concentrate on using the female potential for economic efficiency and fail to address feminist concerns. Therefore, in an environment driven by financial concerns rather than social realities (Karimli et al., 2016), women lack the support necessary for the basic functions of human life in most parts of the world. Women remain behind men in nutrition, health, literacy, employment, and participation in political life and are exposed to more physical and sexual abuse (Eurofund, 2020; European Commission, 2018; Farina & Angelucci, 2020). They often lack opportunities to develop their imaginations and cognitive abilities under double-shift and full responsibility for housework and childcare. In all these respects, unequal social and political conditions give women unequal human capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000a).

Indeed, significant differences in current policy approaches to paid or unpaid care work worldwide have profound implications for gender equality when other contingencies such as sickness, disability, or unemployment are included (Razavi, 2007). In this framework, care is a gendered term in the sense that it is regarded as a feminine duty from the mainstream economic perspective, social traditions, and state policies (Antonopoulos, 2008; Charmes, 2019; Rost et al., 2020). This acknowledgement also indicates that although gender discourse has permeated through policy-making institutions, actors have reinterpreted the concept of gender according to their institutional needs (Braunstein, 2012; Kantola & Lombardo, 2017; Prügl, 2015).

Therefore, this neglect of related aspects of human life should be defined as a form of gender bias in aspects of human life that are traditionally associated with femininity (Folbre & Nelson, 2000). On the other hand, it is the nature and importance of the social role of care, not the gender of the caregiver, that puts individuals who perform this role in a disadvantaged position. This argument means that all caregivers, regardless of their gender, will be subject to this structure and the ideology that emphasises the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the rational individual (Fineman, 2017).

For this very reason, care should be regarded as a human right considering its importance and necessity in human life. People should have the right to provide and receive care under conditions that do not restrict other rights or aspects of life (Elson, 2017; Fineman,

2017; Folbre, 1994; Fraser, 2017). However, formal or informal care systems, institutional and legal structures often lack a coordinated structure (Benería, 1999b; Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010). Most public policies and laws assist women in ‘fulfilling their socially assigned care responsibilities’ and being employed in paid work in accordance with occupational gender segregation rather than recognising and reducing the burden on them (Baines, 2006; Folbre, 1994; WHO, 2011). The insufficient legal protection, gaps in the laws and legal practices and the inadequacy of essential services force women to seek part-time or flexible working options or leave paid work temporarily or permanently to balance home and work life (OECD, 2022a; Rost et al., 2020). Thus, the gendered institutional structure leaves women behind men in every aspect of socio-economic life (Charlesworth et al., 2015; Enríquez, 2018; Toğrul & Memiş, 2011; Zacharias et al., 2014). That is because the disadvantaged socio-economic position of women, which is evident in employment, concerns many critical areas, such as access to education, health, and social protection rights (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; İlkaracan, 2012; ILO, 2022).

### **2.2.3. Employment and Economic Gender Inequality**

The ideology that a woman’s place is at home defines women’s relationship with the labour market and the social and economic rights attached to it (Rubery, 2014). In its simplest form, this assumption presumes women as caregivers first and as labour force participants second (Elson, 2000; England, 2005; Waring, 1999). From this perspective, women’s labour constitutes only an essential part of the reserve labour army<sup>4</sup> (Bruegel, 1979). Thus, women whose primary responsibilities are determined within the household face severe sanctions when they go beyond these limits. The gendered economic inequalities, such as the ‘motherhood penalty’- the increasing income inequality in childbearing and raising of women working paid jobs - are the most concrete evidence of this (M. Gregory, 2011).

Nevertheless, for a long time, mainstream economists sometimes explicitly, often implicitly, viewed economic inequality as a necessary condition for achieving the goals of economic growth and market efficiency or, at best, an unfortunate side effect (Blyth, 2013; Franzini & Pianta, 2016; Piketty, 2014). In line with this approach, over the last few decades, enhanced global economic integration, the adoption of market-oriented reforms, and the increasingly limited role of the state in managing economies have extended wealth and income

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<sup>4</sup> See Marx & Engels (2008, p. 44).

inequality between and within the countries (Berik et al., 2009; Elisabeth Klatzer & Christa Schlager, 2015; Kantola & Lombardo, 2017). In particular, low-income countries seeking finance from the IMF and the WB had to adopt these new neoliberal policies as a condition of international support, which included a reduced role of the state in steering investment, fiscal and monetary policy (Jolly et al., 2012; Varoufakis, 2011).

The limited presence of the state in the economy, but also in education, healthcare and social protection, as well as fair income and wealth distribution, affect women the most (Benería, 1999a; Çağatay & Özler, 1995). This economic impact on women, in which the state's role has decreased, and austerity policies have gained momentum, has three interrelated pillars.

First, as government cuts public spending and reduces social care expenditure, women bear the greatest responsibility for family welfare through unpaid care work to ensure daily and intergenerational reproduction (Braunstein, 2012; Pearson, 2019). Regardless of their employment status, women per day work in unpaid care for 77 minutes more than men in middle-income countries, 54 minutes more in low-income countries, and 26 minutes more in high-income countries (Charmes, 2019). However, the burden of unpaid work creates time poverty and increases the pressure on women, making it difficult to devote time to paid work, leisure, and other activities (Waring, 1999). Indeed, 42 per cent of working-age women remain out of the paid workforce due to unpaid care responsibilities, compared to 6 per cent of men in the same age group (Rost et al., 2020). On the other hand, girls' school enrolment and completion rates remain relatively low as parents prioritise and allocate more resources to boys' education. The proportion of women neither in education nor in training (NEET) in the population aged 15-24 tends to be higher than men (Bettio & Verashchagina, 2014). All these exacerbate gendered economic inequalities in which women are poorer, malnourished, less educated, and overworked than men (Seguino, 2000b) across generations (Atkinson & Bourguignon, 2015). Globally, for every 100 men aged 25-34 living in impoverished households, 122 women live in poverty (OECD, 2022a; Rost et al., 2020). Thus, although women work double shifts, in most cases, when unpaid care responsibilities are added (İlkkaracan, 2012; ILO, 2022), the existing macroeconomic approach leaves them unremunerated and financially dependent on their partners or families (Rake, 2002). This also makes it difficult to leave an abusive relationship.

Beyond these, cuts in the public sector directly affect women's employment. This is due to public employment, where women are disproportionately employed and one of the few

sources of relatively high-quality jobs for women in all European countries (United Nations, 2018). That is also because public sector employment creates more family-friendly working conditions and a lower gender gap than in the private sector (European Commission, 2018). With above 60 per cent, public sector employment presents an overrepresentation of women (Rubery, 2013).

Secondly, the time poverty combined with women's roles as household managers, especially in lone-parent households, force them to pursue job opportunities that are more flexible and offer time for their families (Farrell, 2005). However, as these jobs tend to offer lower wages, it limits women's ability to maintain their livelihoods, especially when they outsource care (Del Boca, 2022). For this reason, in cases where social protection rights are insufficient, more women than men leave or quit their jobs. This causes more significant career interruptions among women (The European Commission, 2021). Indeed, women worldwide spend more time outside the labour market than men (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Donà, 2022; European Commission, 2014; WEF, 2019). These career cuts affect hourly payments, future earnings, and pensions, putting women at higher risk of poverty, social exclusion and less protection in older ages (Bozkus & Elveren, 2008; Farrell, 2005; OECD, 2021a, 2021e). Therefore, given the position of women caught between work and family life, it is also not surprising that current wage structures suggest that women's collective bargaining power is likely to be lower than that of men (European Commission, 2018). This is also consistent with the prevalence and persistence of the gender pay gap<sup>5</sup> in any economy (Braunstein et al., 2020).

In addition, due to the biased structure of the labour market, women are overrepresented in some sectors and professions while others are intensely male-dominated (Addabbo, Rodríguez-Modroño, et al., 2015b; M. Gregory, 2011). Indeed, occupations predominantly conducted by women, such as healthcare, childcare, teaching, sales, and assistantship, offer relatively lower wages, while men overwhelmingly occupy high-paying management and supervisory positions (Arulampalam et al., 2007; European Commission, 2018; Jourová, 2019; Oehmichen et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2011).

Nevertheless, this segregation still does not explain why men generally receive more promotions than women in each sector and receive better wages (Campus, 2010; Dedeoğlu, 2000; Demirdizen, 2013; Lombardo & Meier, 2014; Oehmichen et al., 2014). What better explains this is that, despite being illegal, wage discrimination continues to contribute to the

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<sup>5</sup> The difference in average gross hourly wage between men and women across the economy.

gender pay gap worldwide (European Commission, 2018). Empirical evidence shows that women are more likely to face mobbing, glass ceiling (Arulampalam et al., 2007; Oehmichen et al., 2014), sticky floor (Smith et al., 2011) and similar discriminations, as well as wage discrimination. On the other hand, with the increase in the education level of women, the level of women's participation in the labour force also increased, and many countries, especially in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, enacted laws regarding equal wages (European Commission, 2018; OECD, 2021e). Despite this, the continuing gender wage gap shows that there is still much to be done about wage inequality between men and women (Whitehouse, 2003). Still today, women tend to earn less per hour than men across the EU (women earn 84 cents for every 1 euro a man makes for the same job), regardless of whether it is a high-skilled or low-skilled profession (Jourová, 2019). Additionally, women work almost two months free each year compared to men. While the situation has improved, progress has been extremely slow in the EU, with a decline in the gender wage gap of only 1 per cent in the past seven years (European Commission, 2018; Jourová, 2019; OECD, 2021e).

Given all these, it is likely to conclude that women in any sector tend to make significant efforts to balance their work, family, and social responsibilities attributed to them through traditional gender roles. On the other hand, the *mainstream*, or the *malestream*, policies, also have an overwhelming effect on women's presence in paid labour and employment opportunities. Thus, the macroeconomic structure itself holds a gendered nature, evidenced by the gendered division of labour between paid and unpaid labour (European Commission, 2014; WEF, 2019). However, it is also indicated by the distribution of female and male employment across different sectors -finance, production, and reproduction- (Pearson & Elson, 2015), differences in wages (Seguino, 2000a), gendered job segregation, unfair distribution of income and resources within the household (The European Commission, 2021) and inequitable access to financial resources and financial market (Seguino, 2000b). As a result, inaccurate or delusive gendered assumptions embedded in macroeconomic models, as discussed before, mislead macroeconomic policies (Berik et al., 2009) and hinder socioeconomic justice.

#### **2.2.4. Social Care Inequality**

The relationship between women and social care represents a dualistic structure. First, women act as shock absorbers in case of any interruption or disruption to public services required for social reproduction, such as healthcare, education, and social protection, bridging the gap through unpaid work (O'Reilly & Nazio, 2014). Second, the vast majority of those

working in the healthcare and other social reproductive sectors are women (Addati et al., 2018). For this reason, women are also more likely to need care for themselves. Thus, they are among the most affected by the continuing funding gap in the care sector (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Bettio & Verashchagina, 2014; Elson, 2017; Pearson, 2019; Pearson & Elson, 2015).

On the other hand, the decline in welfare spending reinforces women's gendered roles, and increased care responsibilities as mothers and homemakers contribute to these adverse outcomes (Daskalaki et al., 2020). Many studies (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Barry, 2020; Cummins, 2018; Eikemo et al., 2018; Greer-Murphy, 2018; Lonergan, 2015; Sanders-McDonagh et al., 2016; Sargent & Kotobi, 2017) have empirically documented the severe gendered effects of the reduction of social welfare provisions and entitlements on women, such as domestic violence, mental health disorders, emotional distress, barriers for migrant women to access healthcare and other social services, inability to access childcare services, precarious and informal employment and social exclusion. While eligibility requirements are tightened for some major social security benefits, government spending cuts often leave women precarious (OECD, 2021e). On the other hand, all these destructive reforms threaten women's safety by making it harder to leave an abusive relationship with their children (Ginn, 2013).

In addition, formal and informal political processes affect income and wealth inequality, which determines access to education, social care, paid jobs and social security (Balakrishnan et al., 2016). Accordingly, women are more likely than men to experience poverty and aggressive cuts in social benefits and drop out of employment (Abramovitz, 2012; Durbin et al., 2017). This is particularly true in times of crisis<sup>6</sup> when most women are likely to face freeze and erosion of wages and an attack on pensions (Ginn, 2013). On the other hand, gender-blind stimulus spending of governments tends to stimulate growth in construction, IT, and manufacturing, all male-dominated sectors, rather than in sectors where women are concentrated, such as health, care and education (Rubery, 2015). The stimulation spending of governments directed these sectors mostly accompanied austerity policies to reinforce the neoliberal order, significantly diminishing the presence of the public sector and social services (O'Manique, 2015).

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<sup>6</sup> At the beginning of the recession in 2008, female unemployment was slightly higher than male unemployment in the EU-27, while during the recession period of 2007-2010, gender gaps in employment, unemployment, wages, and poverty were balanced downwards (Bettio et al., 2013). However, female unemployment later proved to be stickier as it had experienced a less sharp increase in economic recession than male unemployment and slower improvement when the recovery started (A. Gregory et al., 2013).



Neoliberal policy practices thus halt gender equality activities and undermine socio-economic justice (Klatzer & O'Hagan, 2018; O'Hagan et al., 2015). This pro-austerity approach to social care neglects that investment in social infrastructure produces long-term gains (De Henau et al., 2016; Ilkcaracan et al., 2021) and a better-educated, healthier, and better-cared-for population (Perrons, 2017).

Similarly, women's contributions to healthcare and their dominant role in the social care of families and communities are still underappreciated drivers of the well-being of societies and nations (Langer et al., 2015). With the recent Covid-19 health crisis, the problems created by the deep-rooted social inequalities that already exist and the problems arising from the inability to design adequate policies against them have come to the fore (Blundell et al., 2020).<sup>7</sup> In a way, it functioned as a litmus paper to make inequalities more exposed by affecting the most those who are socio-economically disadvantaged, working in precarious jobs and part-time workers, women who are economically dependent on others, single mothers and families with dependents (Alon et al., 2020; Azcona et al., 2020; Diallo et al., 2020; van Barneveld et al., 2020). However, despite the dystopian perspective created by the pandemic and the increasingly deepening inequalities, some were more hopeful, stating that this process has also indicated other ways of living (Matthewman & Huppertz, 2020). Indeed, in every country affected by the pandemic, we have witnessed people taking responsibility, acting in solidarity, singing joyfully from their balconies, applauding key workers with appreciation, supporting and protecting those in need wherever possible and caring for each other.

Therefore, this period has shown how necessary collectivity is and that care is one of the deep-rooted universal human values. That is, care is critical to sustaining a society under the most challenging conditions (Peters, 2020; van Osch, 2020). Acknowledging that this outlook is promising for the future has also meant that we need fundamental changes in building our societies. Although a strand of research argues that there might be improvements in the distribution of care burden by gender<sup>8</sup>, during this crisis, women were exposed to situations that aggravated their living conditions exponentially in various ways (Shah &

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<sup>7</sup> The path that ended up with this outbreak (and others before) was fraught with significant problems, as Wallace points (2016), such as rapid urbanisation, suburbanisation, migration to cities, continuous capitalist industrial expansion, interregional integration, and deep economic differentiation, and inadequate health systems were one of biggest of these problems.

<sup>8</sup> In this respect, women, mostly in key sectors (health, grocery stores and pharmacies) continued their activities during the social isolation and lockdown, while men, most of whom were 'office workers', would lose their jobs or work from home; in either case, men would inevitably provide or contribute to care work, at least childcare. Hence, companies eventually will be more sensitive to care labor or just childcare (Alon et al., 2020). See also (Hipp & Bünning, 2021) for a combined analysis of both optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints.

Khurana, 2020). While men were reported to have higher mortality rates during the pandemic, the resulting economic and social effects have important implications regarding social care systems and dynamics (Azcona et al., 2020). It is possible to discuss them under three intertwined channels.

First, as mentioned earlier, women comprise most health and care workers. The data indicates that seven of ten social care and healthcare workers worldwide are women (Boniol et al., 2019). The current crisis has also disproportionately affected industries with high female employment (Alon et al., 2020).<sup>9</sup> As studies have shown (Farré et al., 2020; Möhring et al., 2021; Reichelt et al., 2021), with reduced economic activity and a significant decline in income, women, in particular, faced at risk of layoff and losing their livelihoods. The data indicates (World Bank, 2020) almost 150 million additional people will be ‘pushed’ into ‘extreme poverty’<sup>10</sup> mostly due to the slowing economy, job losses, and lack of social protection (Azcona et al., 2020). In this dreadful outlook, the proportion of women is expected to be higher. In 2021, nearly half a billion women and girls will live on less than 1.90 dollars daily - including almost 50 million, estimated to be pushed into poverty due to Covid-19 (Azcona et al., 2020).

Second, as the care burden at home increases, women’s time poverty deepens (Azcona et al., 2020). The obligation to look after the children at home, which emerged with the closure of the schools, has a significant role in this. While both male and female single parents spent longer than average hours on childcare (52 hours for women, 36 hours for men), female single parents with children under 12 years old spent the most prolonged hours of all groups (77 hours per week) (Eurofund, 2020). In line with the imposition of traditional gender roles, women during the pandemic had to reduce their working hours or quit their jobs to provide childcare (Fortier, 2020; Landivar et al., 2020; The European Commission, 2021). Having more people at home increased unpaid care work, and because restaurants were closed, people had to cook more at home. Moreover, in many cases, the heavy burden of hospitals and medical care centres required unpaid home care for patients. In all these situations and in all others where products or services were no longer available or scarce, women, in particular, took more responsibility

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<sup>9</sup> Rubery and Tavora (2021, pp. 73–74) categorises the most common feminised professions in terms of Covid-19 and its consequences as follows: (1) closed workplaces and activity could not be carried out at home such as personal services, non-essential retail, many cleaners and helpers, (2) closed workplaces, but activity could be performed at home such as administrative and professional occupations and lastly (3) open workplaces with intense activity level and high risk such as health care, social care, related cleaners and helpers, and food retail. Male intense sectors, such as logistics, police, agriculture, engineers associated with utilities, and telecommunications and information technology in most cases remained open and most of them were suitable for work from home.

<sup>10</sup> The poverty line used by the World Bank to estimate people living on less than \$ 1.90 a day. See [here](#) for more detailed definition. (Accessed 17/02/2022).

(Diallo et al., 2020; van Osch, 2020); while reducing the time they spent on their professional activities and for themselves (Cui et al., 2020).

Third, empirical studies have shown that, beyond economic difficulties, this period has more negative effects on women's mental health than that of men (Oreffice & Quintana-Domeque, 2021). Gender-based violence also has a substantial impact on this. The pandemic has reinforced gender-based violence, confirming that the risk of domestic violence tends to increase in times of crisis, which many studies have long pointed out (The European Commission, 2021). While lockdown measures were imposed to keep people safe at home, the home was not safe for everyone, and isolation measures played a demonstrable role in the significant increase in domestic violence reports (Bashevskaja, 2020; Diallo et al., 2020).

All these issues indicate the disadvantaged position of women in society and how important effective social care systems are to improve it. However, this problem is deepening with all kinds of crises of the capital-oriented economic system. Thus, as Elson (2010) points out, the effects of crises are never gender-neutral, and clearly, Covid-19 is no exception. In this sense, it is crucial to recognise the value that the capitalist society benefits from but ignores its gendered impacts.

### **2.2.5. Intersectional Gender Inequalities**

The theory of intersectional categories of inequality, namely intersectionality, was coined and developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) in the late 1980s to refer to the intersection of multiple and simultaneous discriminations, which in her path-breaking study was race and gender. Although this metaphor had already been circulated in many ways by the anti-apartheid feminist movements by then (Bose, 2012; Carastathis, 2014), Crenshaw (1989) systematised the conceptualisation.

As a common standpoint, these movements opposed the definition of woman - heterosexual, white, well-educated, and relatively privileged- which had been at the centre of the feminist movement until then and was supposed to represent it (Bürkner, 2012; Walby et al., 2012). One of the main claims of these movements was that Western feminism had subordinated 'other' feminist movements, for example, Black feminism, that do not fit this stereotypical definition, just as patriarchy subordinated women (Hartmann, 1976). Intersectionality paved the way for feminist debates on gender equality to be constructed at the intersection of subfields such as disability, age, sexual orientation, religion, class, caste, race,

colour, ethnicity, citizenship, nationality, socioeconomic status, and others. The definitional scope of intersectionality, including all social identity constructs, means each individual may have unique simultaneous social barriers (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1996).

The underlying idea of intersectionality as a perspective and subsequent feminist movements is that subordination, discrimination, and marginalisation of women cannot be adequately addressed unless intersectionality is involved (Davis, 1990; hooks, 1981). This is because intersectional experience points to a more critical process of creating social status than the sum of distinctions based on individual differences (Crenshaw, 1989).

Therefore, any approach that aims to be functional in gender equality but is based on the experiences of women who do not have a shared history and that ignore the discriminations that exist at the intersection of systematic differentiation will not be a remedy for women who face different obstacles (Crenshaw, 1991). Intersectionality is crucial then to understanding gendered power relations not only as manifestations but also as interactive systems. It reveals that the discriminations encountered are not homogeneous and may arise from different social conflicts (Hankivsky, 2014).

From this perspective, although unpaid care work is a common burden for most women globally, the meaning and type of this work, the way it is conducted, and its conditions are not universal (Kızılırmak et al., 2022; WEF, 2022). Capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000b), resources and bargaining powers, and the different positions of individuals and communities are both the cause and the consequence of this deviation (Appelbaum et al., 2002). In other words, unpaid care and reproductive labour practices diverge depending on gender and socioeconomic and personal circumstances. More specifically, those working in low-paid care work experience serious difficulties in addition to the unpaid care work they undertake for their family members and communities (Rai et al., 2014).

Likewise, cross-country evidence suggests that unpaid care work is particularly burdensome for women living in poverty, young women who do not have adequate access to infrastructure and public services, and who have limited finances to purchase goods and services to replace the workforce required for such jobs (ActionAid, 2021; Ferrant et al., 2014). Women in low-income countries face severe challenges from inadequate infrastructure and climate crises (Ferrant et al., 2014; Rost et al., 2020). They spend more time, for example, on fetching water, collecting wood, or home-schooling children (Karimli et al., 2016). However, when these conditions and many others force them to migrate to middle- or high-income

countries, they are often employed as domestic and care workers for relatively low wages. They thus face an increased burden of care, which is nevertheless undervalued (Lonergan, 2015; Sarti, 2010). Therefore, even if women in disadvantaged positions due to the interacting discriminations make spatial changes, this does not always result in a societal position change. In this specific case, social relations shape, transform and create new definitions of spaces, not the opposite (Angelucci, 2019).

Intersectional gendered relationships then permeate the spheres of production, reproduction, and finance and expose disadvantaged women to contradictions, including disempowerment, exploitation, and personal costs (Baines et al., 2020). Neglecting these conflicts and the contribution of social care to human development, instead focusing on neoliberal goals, results in inequities in the distribution of wealth both locally and globally (Braunstein, 2015; Braunstein et al., 2020; A. Gregory et al., 2013). This biased approach also creates barriers to understanding the different consequences of supposedly similar problems (Folbre & Nelson, 2000). Thus, the first step in resolving the contributing factors to this contradictory structure is to recognise the value of care and the generators of these hierarchical gender relations on the public level. The following section is devoted to acknowledging feminist efforts in this direction and highlighting approaches to developing them further.

### **2.3. RECOGNISING UNPAID CARE WORK IN ECONOMY: TURNING INVISIBLE INTO VISIBLE**

For decades, the value created by unpaid care work has been at the centre of feminist struggles and has been debated in feminist economics. Many feminists (Gilman, 1911; Reid, 1934, 1977; Waring, 1999) have opposed the invisibility of unpaid care work and the exclusion of it in national accounting systems. On the other hand, the dominant economic approach, referring to the unpaid and supposedly non-economic character of the social reproduction sphere, claimed that the value created here was not statistically measurable and had no numerical or economic value (Razavi, 2007).

Thus, one of the critical efforts of feminist economics for a long time has been to make visible the invisible, that is, the sphere of reproduction and the unpaid care labour involved here. After decades of struggle, much progress has been made by feminist economists and women's rights advocates to bring a feminist perspective to economics (Bjørnholt & McKay, 2014). Unpaid care work is now more visible and on the agenda of international organisations.

It is partially included in the international ‘national accounting system’ standards. The United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has addressed unpaid care work as a global priority in gender equality efforts.<sup>11</sup>

On the other hand, considering the value of unpaid labour only on a monetary basis, emphasising that it is also work, and assuming that the significant socio-economic problems connected to it will be solved by including (part of) this work in national accounts has led to other concerns (Appelbaum et al., 2002; Aslaksen & Koren, 1996; Elson, 2017; Himmelweit, 1995; Rost et al., 2020). For this reason, measuring and valuing unpaid care work is a very controversial area, but it is also critical for different reasons for women, communities, and nations. Time-use surveys, introduced in the 1990s (Aslaksen & Koren, 1996; Ironmonger, 1996; Luxton, 1997; Miller & Razavi, 1995; Varjonen & Kirjavainen, 2014), are an essential tool for obtaining gender statistics on a variety of topics, including unpaid care work (UN, 2016). This section will briefly present the historical background of the measurement and valuation of unpaid care work, its place in household production economics and its involvement in national accounts. Finally, the last subsection will focus on two specific feminist approaches (*four pathways* and *5Rs*) important to this work, their practical use and further development to support transformative policymaking.

### **2.3.1. Feminist Foundations of Recognition of Unpaid Care Work**

Feminist scholars have long pointed out that a more just and sustainable economy is not possible with the unrealistic assumptions of the mainstream economy. It is particularly problematic that mainstream economics does not focus on economic systems that enable economic activity but are viewed as external (Aslaksen & Koren, 1996, 2014; Benería, 1999b; Craig, 2012; UNDP, 2003). These external systems are often associated with gendered concepts of care and refer to the sphere of social reproduction (O’Hara, 2014).

However, households and unpaid labour involved here contribute to increasing efficiency and productivity by providing the support that the finance and production economy inevitably needs (Pearson & Elson, 2015). At the same time, on the production side, households are engaged in subsistence production and sometimes more than that (Gilman, 1911; Waring, 1999). Therefore, measuring unpaid domestic and care work is crucial to obtaining more comprehensive economic activity estimates, making women’s labour visible, and

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<sup>11</sup> SDG 5 “[Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls](#)”. See also [here](#) for further information.

understanding income distribution better (Aslaksen & Koren, 2014). This approach developed long ago in the pioneering works of feminist economists. Gilman (1898), one of the most influential intellectuals in the women's movement of the early twentieth century, questioning the traditional gendered division of labour, criticised its androcentric resonations in economics as a discipline concerning production, reproduction and distribution:

[...] If you have not the incentive of reward, or the incentive of combat, why work? "Competition is the life of trade". Thus, the Economic Man. But how about the Economic Woman? To the androcentric mind she does not exist. Women are females, and that's all; their working abilities are limited to personal service (Gilman, 1911, pp. 102–103).

Similarly, Reid (1934), a pioneer in the debate on the importance of non-market activities, particularly household production, to the economy, also criticised the antagonistic and patriarchal understanding of economics. Reid (1934, 1977), moving beyond, emphasised the concern of the exclusion of household production from national income accounts. According to her (1934), focusing only on the price-regulated part of the economic system caused economists to ignore the productive work of households, which was the most important economic institution:

[...] Few people appreciate [household production's] importance. This neglect of household production is partly due to the fact that [...] household is not a money-making institution. The more we concentrated on money values the more we have overlooked that part of our economic system which is not organised on a profit-basis (Reid, 1934, p. 3).

More than half a century later, politician and scholar Waring (1988) contributed to reaching a broader audience on the subject with her book 'If Women Counted'. In the following years, Waring continued to draw attention to the invisibility of women's unpaid domestic work in measurements of economic value and criticised the fact that emphasising a superficial category of "productive" work in mainstream economic doctrine was far from everyday reality:

Every time I see a mother with an infant, I know I am seeing a woman at work [...] I know that money payment is not necessary for work to be done [...] The criterion for "productive" work, proposed over fifty years ago by home economist Margaret Reid, was that any activity culminating in a service or product, which one can buy or hire someone else to do, is an "economic activity" even if pay is not involved. Yet in [...] economics courses [...] it is not unusual to find sentences such as "Most of us prefer no work to work with no pay." Who is "us," I wonder (Waring, 1999, p. 21).

Unpaid care work has since been deliberately adopted and developed as a terminology within the feminist theory to analyse the importance of care work and highlight its role in perpetuating gender inequality from one generation to the next (Addabbo, 2017; Benería, 1999b; Gilman, 1898, 1911; Reid, 1934; Waring, 1988, 1999). These actions have been influential, to some degree, in placing unpaid care work in national accounting systems when counting a country's relative wealth and growth. In this context, four world conferences on women organised by the United Nations since 1975 contributed to forming the issue on the international agenda. However, from a feminist point of view, the problem raised then, and still relevant today, is the devaluation of unpaid care work, which is a part of the social fabric and indispensable for social development (Gilman, 1911; Reid, 1934; Waring, 1999). On the other hand, even after the action to include unpaid care work in national accounts, mainstream economists have focused on its importance for economic dynamism and growth with an instrumentalist approach, regardless of its contribution to human capital or social investment (Razavi, 2007). Approaching the value of gendered unpaid care work with purely capitalist concerns risk losing the ability to value the “personal and relational aspects” of most domestic activities (Himmelweit, 1995, p. 8). Before continuing the discussion of the measurement of unpaid care work in national accounts, the following subsection will take up the feminist debate about household production and the unpaid labour used in that production, which is predominantly female. Therefore, it aims to reveal the redefined structure of the household under the guidance of feminist literature.

### **2.3.2. Economics of Household Production and Unpaid (Re)productive Labour**

Household production is defined as producing goods and services for a household's direct use, such as shelter, food, clean clothing, and childcare, with one's own capital and unpaid labour (Ironmonger, 2000; Quick, 2016). However simple this definition may appear, household production is controversial among feminist and mainstream economists (Becker, 1965; Ferguson, 1999; Goldschmidt-Clermont, 2000; Ironmonger, 2000; Quick, 2016; Reid, 1977; Waring, 1988). It represents different views on the meaning and interpretation of household, the effects on women's domestic exploitation, and how to deal with it. The common thread in these discussions, albeit from very different perspectives, is to reveal the relationship between household production and the monetary capitalist economy, including the mode of production and the means and labour-power used in the production process. Household



production can be better defined considering these contradictions and the unpaid labour that this sphere absorbs.

According to Reid's (1934) definition, which has survived to this day and is still used in feminist debates, as well as in mainstream economics and national account calculations:

[household production] consists of those unpaid activities which are carried on, by and for the members, which activities might be replaced by market goods, or paid services, if circumstances such as income, market conditions, and personal inclinations permit the service being delegated to someone outside the household group (Reid, 1934, p. 11).

As capitalism expanded, the organisation of markets accelerated, and household production gradually declined. However, household and small commodity production have not disappeared completely, considering simple commodity production in households (Quick, 2018). On the other hand, the historical process that resulted in households being unable to live on their own production is complex. For example, the 'enclosure movement' deprived people of the working class access to many natural resources they use in this production (Polanyi, 1944; Quick, 2018). This detachment process led to the disconnection of households from their previously owned natural resources through subsequent massive land privatisations. The result was converting people who once used these lands as tenants into wage labour (Polanyi, 1944). As the sum of the value they produced within the household was increasingly insufficient to meet their needs, it was inevitable that some of the total working hours would be sold to capitalists (Quick, 2018).

Once it is acknowledged that household production still exists and is also a production sphere, then the question arises who is shouldering the workload in this organisation or who is the "labourer", in Marx's words (1867, p. 187). As discussed in this study thus far, women carry most of the burden for household production. Although this fact has been shown with evidence in many studies (Addabbo, 2017; Benería, 1999b; İlkaracan & Memiş, 2021), to perfectly fit women's unpaid labour into the category of "labourer" mentioned above, there are some missing components. As evident in this phenomenon itself, women neither receive remuneration or wage in this relationship nor do they "freely offer their labour as a commodity", or they are "free to dispose of their labour-power as their commodities" (Marx, 1867, pp. 186–188). Therefore, many factors arising from this capitalist and patriarchal and thus extremely unequal and hierarchical structure of the economy and its gendered reflections on societies affect this relationship.

On the one hand, the household and its production are at the core of the capitalistic economic system for performing complex and intertwined tasks (Gilman, 1911), which incorrectly implies a “consensus” on using pooled money resources, time as well as effort. On the other hand, this supposedly harmonised unit of the economy is where women’s labour is exploited (Reid, 1977). While social reproduction is a condition of possibility for sustainable capital accumulation, capital’s pursuit of unlimited expansion tends to destabilise the social reproduction processes on which it is based (Fraser, 2017). This contradiction emphasises the ambivalent and neglectful structure of capitalism. In other words, unpaid care labour, besides wage labour, is also shaped by the rules of capital, as it involves both the production and reproduction of labour-power and the minimisation of the labour required for it (Quick, 2018), which is far from trivial considering gender relations.

This idea is based on the fact that households in a capitalistic society contribute to the capital accumulation process via the value production of labour-power over the wage, generation of the working class, as well as purchasing of commodities and services (Munro, 2019). However, mainstream economics, which focuses on households as consumers rather than producers, fails to discuss the allocation of time devoted to various household production processes (Ironmonger, 2000). Additionally, the tendency to capture only the monetary equivalent of household production, as neoclassical economics seeks to do, ignores social conflicts inherited in the questions such as how much of household production is in monetary equivalents, what is deemed “subsistence”, how it is determined or how it changes over time (Munro, 2019; Quick, 2018). On the other hand, while heterodox economics provides a more solid basis for understanding the social relations under capitalistic societies and going beyond social democratic demands and challenging the fundamental dynamics of the capitalist economy, it is not sufficient for understanding the hierarchical and oppressive nature of gender relations (Hartmann, 1979).

At this point, the feminist social reproduction approach is critical to shift the focus of the anti-capitalist struggle from commodity production to human production and reconnecting with the reconstruction of everyday life. In doing so, this approach reveals the central role of social reproduction in the reproduction of labour-power as well as in the class struggle (Federici, 2014). This inference also points to the profoundly rooted character of patriarchal relations, much older than capitalism, surviving many radical and historical economic changes. Therefore, the struggle to dissolve patriarchal domination also means the struggle to abolish

capitalist relations of exploitation and, ultimately, the struggle against all forms of subjugation (Hartmann, 1979; Vogel, 2013).

### **2.3.3. Measuring Unpaid Domestic Labour in National Accounts**

As mentioned thus far, for feminist economics, the invisibility of women's unpaid work in national accounting systems and the destruction it has perpetrated has long been an important field of struggle. This is a struggle to formulate a feminist strategy against the failure of mainstream economic systems to account for the various unpaid work performed by women, which is essential to the reproduction and sustenance of societies. It is also a stand against the denial of the environmental and social impacts created by the macro-economic perspective focusing only on economic growth figures (Abel & Nelson, 1990; Bjørnholt & McKay, 2014; Chatzidakis et al., 2020; Ferber & Nelson, 1993; Macdonald, 1995; Reid, 1934, 1977; Waring, 1999).

The United Nations Statistical Office published the first System of National Accounts and Supporting Tables (hereafter SNA) in 1953<sup>12</sup>, prepared by a group of five male national income experts appointed by the male UN Secretary-General. However, there was a significant gap in the SNA developed by this report, which fell outside the expertise and interests of these five men and the overall institutional approach, as was later evident by denunciation from feminist writers. The fundamental aim of this report was to provide a “coherent picture of economic structure” (UN, 1953, p. 1) from economic statistics, claiming to respond to the need for practical knowledge about the functioning of the economic system as a whole and how its various parts relate to one another (UN, 1953).

However, the “coherent picture of the entire economy” *by no means complete* (Waring, 1999, p. 39), as gendered unpaid labour was excluded from the national accounting system. Deane (1946), as a young female researcher under the supervision of the group chairperson that created the first SNA, applied a national income measurement method developed for the UK to selected colonial territories (Deane, 1946; Messac, 2018). A significant conclusion of this “experiment”, in Deane's terms (1946, p. 147) was that, although they assumed only goods and services that are traditionally exchanged for money should be considered in calculations, no goods or services produced in a subsistence economy meet this condition. For the self-sufficient producer, income cannot be measured in output or expenditure but by calculating the

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<sup>12</sup> For the “Historic Versions of the System of National Accounts” see [System of National Accounts](#) (Accessed 17/02/2022).

output of all goods and services produced in some common denominator (prices, hours worked, calories, or other indices). The line between production and consumption was also not clear enough to separate the two processes (Deane, 1946).

The main problem was that while production or consumption was visible if the goods were purchased in the market or the goods were consumed by a person in the labour force whose primary product is that good, not if goods were produced in the household by unpaid labour and consumed by them. In this case, neither production nor consumption was visible (Waring, 1999). This approach was also overestimating economic growth. This was because following women's participation in the market, public or private institutions provided care and other services to some extent and therefore included in the calculations. However, long before these estimates covered these services, mainly women's unpaid labour was already providing these within the household (Aslaksen & Koren, 1996).

Nevertheless, the methodology excluded a large part of household labour -primarily women's unpaid care work- from the national income and recorded militarism and environmental destruction as growth became a global standard. In 1984, the group chairperson that created the first SNA was even awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to developing national accounts systems. Thus, excluding women's unpaid care work from national accounting systems was affirmed and rewarded institutionally. However, successive national income scholars in different parts of the world would come to different conclusions on the method, particularly on the production boundary. The discussion was on the dividing line between productive activities to be included or not in national income. This issue has become the most debated in non-monetary or subsistence production contexts, driven mainly by female producers. Feminists have begun to question the assumptions underlying national income calculations, and by the 1980s, reforming national income accounting methods had become a feminist phenomenon (Aslaksen & Koren, 1996; Ferrant et al., 2014; Razavi, 2007; Reid, 1934; Waring, 1999). In addition to the attempts to measure the household economy, which emerged in the years before these developments but did not find an echo in the national accounting system, related studies developed in academia (Gilman, 1898, 1911; Reid, 1934, 1977; Waring, 1988) and some national statistics offices included monetary evaluations to emphasise the economic importance of household production (DeRock, 2019; Goldschmidt-Clermont, 2000; Schmidt, 2014).

In parallel to these developments, mainstream economists have been increasingly interested in the home and family realms since the mid-1960s.<sup>13</sup> Studies focusing on developing a neoclassical model of household behaviours laid the foundation for what has been called the “new home economics” (Ferber & Nelson, 1993; Reid, 1977). Thereby, the measurement of the household economy eventually became the focus of attention of many researchers, and households began to be regarded as an important centre of consumption and production. In particular, starting from the 1980s, many authors uncovered gaps in income statistics such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP) (Goldschmidt-Clermont, 2000; Ironmonger, 2000; Waring, 1999). The earliest studies (Mitchell et al., 1921; Kuznets, 1934; Lindahl et al., 1937) aimed to acknowledge and measure the approximate value of household production generally used one of the three basic estimation methodologies.<sup>14</sup> Although they were a wide-ranging set of crude approximations, these early studies presented a rough idea of the size of household production. Overall, they concluded that the total value of housework was almost one-third of the gross national product, which was a very substantial amount (Hawrylyshyn, 1976).

Consequently, in the 1993 revision of the SNA, the UN Statistical Commission recommended that national statistical offices prepare accounts for economic activities outside predefined production boundaries. These “Satellite” accounts, showing the use of natural resources or the extent of economic production by households, were separate from, but consistent with, the main SNA accounts of the market economy (Ironmonger, 2000). In this new framework of SNA, activities such as caring for children, sick, elderly, and disabled members, cooking, cleaning, purchasing goods, and managing the household were still not included in the production boundary but were monitored by satellite accounts (see Table 2 and Table 3).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> See i.e., Gary Becker (1965) *A Theory of the Allocation of Time*; Gary Becker (1974) *A Theory of Marriage*; Reuben Gronau (1977) *Leisure, Home Production and Work*.

<sup>14</sup> In the opportunity cost approach, the assumption was that “the rational individual” dedicated time to housework so that its marginal value equals the opportunity cost market wage; the generalist replacement approach assumed a single person is hired to do all the housework, while the specialist replacement approach presumed that separate market substitutes are hired to perform each specific household task (Hawrylyshyn, 1976). These approaches are still used to estimate the economic significance of women’s unpaid care work (Aslaksen & Koren, 1996; Giannelli et al., 2012; Gündüz & İlkkaracan, 2019; Zacharias et al., 2014).

<sup>15</sup> While the “third person” approach employed here is in line with the one of Margaret Reid (1934, p. 11), although she classifies these activities as productive, the SNA excludes them from the boundaries of production. Her test was: “If an activity is of such character that it might be delegated to a paid worker, then that activity shall be deemed productive.”

**Table 2: Forms of work and the System of National Accounts 2008**

Intended destination of production	For own use		For use by others				
Forms of work	Own-use production work		Employment (work for pay or profit)	Unpaid trainee work	Other work activities	Volunteer work	
	of services	of goods				In the market and non-market units	In households producing
			goods	services			
Relation to 2008 SNA	Activities within the SNA production boundary						
	Activities inside the SNA general production boundary						

Source: International Labour Organization (2013); United Nations Statistics (2017)

**Table 3: Scope of forms of works within and beyond SNA**

Own-use production of goods (within SNA production boundary)	Own-use provision of services (outside the SNA production boundary)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Goods produced and/or processed for storage: From agriculture, fishing, hunting, gathering</li> <li>• Goods produced and/or processed for storage: From mining, forestry, incl. firewood, other fuels</li> <li>• Fetching of water</li> <li>• Household goods manufactured: Furniture, textiles, clothing, pottery</li> <li>• Build own dwelling, major repairs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Managing the household and accounts</li> <li>• Buying goods, transporting them</li> <li>• Preparing food, serving meals, recycling, throwing the rubbish</li> <li>• Cleaning, maintaining household premises, fixtures, other goods, decorating, gardening</li> <li>• Caring for children (including supervising) or elderly members, transporting them, caring for pets</li> </ul>

Source: International Labour Organization (2013)

Following this, in 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and the resulting Platform for Action (PFA) demanded full recognition of women’s economic production. The PFA commissioned relevant government and United Nations agencies and national, regional, and international statistical services to create more comprehensive knowledge on all types of employment and work (Ironmonger, 2000). This international advocacy work was reinforced by the 1995 Human Development Report, which focused on the contribution of women to the economic and social development of their families, communities, and societies (UNDP, 1995, 2003).

However, in Waring’s terms (1999), the major drawback of these advocacy efforts was the risk of promoting the idea that the unidimensional growth paradigm, based on inadequate tools for assessing the importance of communities’ well-being and environmental problems, should remain the main focus of economic policy. The question, then, was whether

measurement and valuation issues were still relevant to unpaid work done by women. The answer to this question was also evident in the inclusion of household production estimates as satellites account for the original calculations and simply monetising such work just to monitor (Bjørnholt & McKay, 2014; Ferber & Nelson, 1993; Messac, 2018; O’Hara, 2014; Waring, 1999). It was clear that reducing the well-being of people to a monetary value was a shallow approach, just as equating development with income (Waring, 1999).

After recognising the need for new indices and tools to understand not only the economic significance but also the socio-economic structure, political, cultural, and historical background of gender relations, new tools such as the Human Development Index (HDI), Gender Development Index (GDI) and time-use surveys came to the fore. Although the PFA of the Beijing Conference on Women called for regular time-use surveys to measure unpaid work, time-use was a key missing human development indicator. In the absence of national time-use surveys, governments were pressured to include time-use questions in their Census (Waring, 1999), but this was useful to a point. Finally, in the 1990s, in Europe and beyond, Time-Use Surveys were introduced at the national level.

Despite all these developments, unpaid work is still vastly unrecognised in economic analysis, and governments continue to formulate their policies on crude statistics on the monetary economy (Varjonen & Kirjavainen, 2014)<sup>16</sup> Thus, feminist efforts to value social reproduction and unpaid care labour still seem valid. On the other hand, there is also a concern that the emphasis that these key activities are also ‘work’ and their value should be recognised may result in the tendency to prioritise only their economic impact. As mentioned above, this issue will remain related to the social value attributed to it. In this context, the use of time or the allocation of time will be at the centre of these social value discussions.

#### **2.3.4. Measuring Unpaid Time: Time Poverty of Women and Time-Use Surveys**

The UN (2003) defines time-use data as quantitative summaries of how men and women spend or dedicate their time during a given period.<sup>17</sup> Time-use data was first systematically collected in the USSR in the early 1920s to analyse housework and family

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<sup>16</sup> See for example Eurostat “inactive population” definition. [Glossary: People outside the labour force - Statistics Explained \(europa.eu\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&plugin=1) (Accessed 17/02/2022).

<sup>17</sup> Usually for only 24 hours, but they may also cover seven days of the week and ideally represent time allocation patterns over an entire year.

relationships (Benería, 1999b; Juster & Stafford, 1991; Mespoulet, 2015; Prudenski, 1962). Following these early studies, mainly in response to pressure from feminist economists, the importance of time-use data has been recognised, and many attempts have been made to measure unpaid work through time-use surveys at the national level (Aslaksen & Koren, 1996; Benería, 1999b; Himmelweit, 1995; Ironmonger, 1996, 2000; Luxton, 1997; Miller & Razavi, 1995; Varjonen & Kirjavainen, 2014). In Europe, nationally representative time-use surveys began to be used around the 1980s to reveal the difference between the time women and men spent on household chores and childcare. This boosted the discussions about women's unpaid work. Eurostat, the EU's statistical office, funded the development of European time-use survey guidelines in the 1990s, encouraging authorities to develop policies for household satellite accounts to consider requirements in the activity classification of time-use surveys (Varjonen & Kirjavainen, 2014).

Especially after this period, many studies and advocacy work have highlighted the value of time and that care work has tangible as well as intangible costs and benefits. As with valuing material work, counting has been explored in two main ways: counting hours spent (input approach) and assigning a substitute value to activities undertaken (output approach) (Marty & Craig, 2014). The emphasis on the economic contribution of unpaid work (output approach), including care work (such as Eisner (1989)'s and Ironmonger (1996, 2000)'s Gross Household Product approach) and the utilisation of the time-use data as a means of capturing change in the magnitude of the economic indicators continue to attribute value to economic productivity (Aslaksen & Koren, 1996; Craig, 2012). Counting time rather than attributing a monetary value to it, on the other hand, reflects the view that unpaid work activities are valuable in their own right.

Measuring the economic value of unpaid work can be a powerful rhetorical tool for discussing its significance. However, it still does not solve the problem of recognising unpaid care work, rewarding unpaid carers or addressing gender disparities in paid and unpaid work distribution (Varjonen & Kirjavainen, 2014). The importance of counting the input stems from the fact that the main issue is not money but, in many respects, how we are to live. This approach puts the activity itself front and centre rather than its economic value. In particular, the emphasis on the social necessity of care work points to this fact, revealing that it is necessary for the functioning of society (Marty & Craig, 2014) and that none of the current monetary measurement tools can or is willing to capture this significance.



Time-use surveys, through this broad perspective, as classified by the UN (2016), might be used for obtaining transformative gender statistics related to gendered time allocation patterns, unpaid work, participation in all forms of paid work, working time and working spheres. It also provides information on work-life balance, the investment of time in education and health, welfare, and quality of life, and thus gendered intrahousehold inequality (UN, 2016).

The data on time-use show that men and women still have distinctly different responsibilities within the household. For example, daily household chores remain primarily the responsibility of women, while men spend more time on paid work (Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c). Worldwide, women perform around three-quarters of unpaid care work, or more than 75 per cent of the total hours provided. On average, women spend 3.2 times more time on unpaid care work than men (Charmes, 2019; The European Commission, 2021).

Important here to note that while women devote time to various household chores, it is the responsibility to care that mostly limits their participation in activities outside the home, including paid work (Razavi, 2007; Elson, 2017; Fraser, 2017; Charmes, 2019). Caregiving, which encompasses all childcare, including helping with schoolwork as well as caring for sick and disabled persons, now has a larger share of household chores than it did in the second half of the 1900s (Aslaksen & Koren, 2014). These activities are also the more personal aspects of domestic life, which are not most easily accepted under the dominant concept of “work” and retain the invisibility features that once characterised all unpaid work (Himmelweit, 1995).

On the other hand, the ambiguous argument that the care work is dependent on and inseparable from the performer (Himmelweit, 1995)<sup>18</sup> reinforces the risk of attaching these activities to women as constant performers of them. In addition, while it is indeed difficult to accurately measure the time spent physically and emotionally on care activities, the visibility and documentation of these activities will increase recognition of their importance to human well-being, especially if the burden of these activities to women and communities is well highlighted (Benería, 1999b; Elson, 2016, 2017; Fraser, 2017; Jolly et al., 2012; O’Hara, 2014; Pearson, 2019; Waring, 1999).

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<sup>18</sup> Himmelweit (1995, p. 6) argues the three pillars of the definition of “work”: i) It requires an understanding of alternative uses of time for which there is a concept equivalent to “opportunity cost” figures, ii) It should potentially be able to enter into some kind of division of labour, iii) It should not matter who is performing the activity.

### **2.3.5. Towards Transformative Policy Solutions: Four Pathways and 5Rs Approach**

As discussed so far, one strand of the feminist social policy debate, for decades, has centred around exploring and analysing the feminisation of care work and how it creates and perpetuates power, status, and money inequalities between women and men. A significant amount of work in this branch (Addabbo, 2017; Budlender, 2010; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Elson, 2017; Ferrant & Thim, 2019; İlkaracan & Memiş, 2021; Pearson & Elson, 2015; Rost et al., 2020) has shown that despite significant commonalities, women's experiences of unpaid care work vary considerably within and among countries and across age, ethnicity, colour, class, and other dimensions of inequality (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1996; Davis, 1990; hooks, 1981). For example, in many low-income countries, especially in rural areas, clean water, sanitation, and energy are inaccessible (Karimli et al., 2016). In these areas, women and girls spend a significant amount of time collecting water and fuel (Ferrant et al., 2014). While these services are common in high-income countries, most women in these countries spend unpaid hours caring for their children and elderly relatives unless they are outsourced (Charmes, 2019). Indeed, current research shows that unpaid care work is mostly transferred to women from more disadvantaged groups and countries (Abel & Nelson, 1990; De Henau et al., 2016).

Thus, considering this differentiation, the challenge of creating a care policy that can be applied worldwide and for everyone becomes more evident (Crenshaw, 1991; Walby et al., 2012). On the other hand, it is still possible to identify the most significant structural factors contributing to forming gendered unpaid care work based on extensive empirical and theoretical feminist research (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; İlkaracan, 2016). Although not all-encompassing, this approach provides a solid basis for further developing more inclusive feminist political instruments (Kızılırmak et al., 2022), considering differences based on region and group. For this purpose, as discussed earlier, this thesis has classified these structural factors under five groups: patriarchy and social reproduction; agency-oriented arguments and neoliberal approach; employment and economic gender inequality; social care inequality; and intersectional gender inequalities (Crenshaw, 1989; Fraser, 2003; Pateman, 1988; Pearson & Elson, 2015; Waring, 1999).

Once these categories of structural constraint have been identified, a feminist analytical framework is necessary to analyse their projections and policy equivalents in daily life. This framework is also important to explore and analyse specific contexts and to generate policy

implications for supporting the transformation process of gender relations. A few approaches in feminist literature can be used as an analytical tool for this purpose and further discuss the policy context.

One of these feminist approaches is the *four pathways* approach, coined by Cantillon and Teasdale (2021) to examine the most significant factors, or *pathways*, influencing and shaping the disproportionate allocation of unpaid care work and hindering the empowerment of women. With a particular focus on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), this approach suggests that these *pathways*, which are *access to and opportunities in, the labour market; social and cultural norms; social care infrastructure; and the legal and institutional environment*, intersect with the social, political, and economic context of the region. In addition, according to Cantillon and Teasdale (2021), they also shape and are shaped by country-specific characteristics.

The importance of focusing on each of these areas stems from the purpose of presenting social and individual practices in a more comprehensive, more systematic, and interrelated structure. Given that the focus of most research is predominantly on women's labour force participation (Addabbo et al., 2013; Bruegel, 1979; ILO, 2022), this methodological understanding provides the opportunity to explore gender relations with a care lens and support the policy-making process in a more holistic way that aligns with feminist demands (Chatzidakis et al., 2020). This thesis employs the *four pathways* approach as an analytical framework to analyse the oppressive sources of women's unpaid care work and discover the potential areas for supporting transformation in the relevant cultural and socio-economic environment.

In fact, the *four pathways* approach (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) arises from the same branch of critical feminist literature on social policy as other similar approaches (for example, the *purple economy* approach, which presents the links between caring for people and caring for the environment, and to provide a framework for a vision of the purple economy (Ilkcaracan, 2016)). Although the reasons behind the choice of the *four pathways* approach as an analytical framework in this thesis are to be set out further in the methodology chapter, two prominent reasons can be mentioned. The first reason for this is that *pathways* in the framework are mainly compatible with the structural constraint factors compiled from the literature within the scope of this thesis. On the other hand, the *four pathways* approach currently focuses on a region that includes Turkey, one of the case studies of this thesis. This framework provides a helpful guide to examining public policies and norms and changing them to address the unequal

distribution of unpaid care work. It identifies critical aspects of the system gendering unpaid care work and uncovers leverage points to transform them. In this respect, it lays the groundwork for developing a more comprehensive framework by being tested with the cases of Turkey and Italy.

Further to conceptualising the structures of constraints of gendered unpaid care work, feminist critique pointed out the policy solutions to the gendered inequalities. This branch of feminist economics challenges the biased division of labour by drawing attention to the sphere of reproduction and the undervaluation of certain economic activities in households (Toğrul & Memiş, 2011). Indeed, many studies (Addati et al., 2018; Budlender, 2010; Elson, 2017; Honneth, 2003; ILO, 2022; Pearson & Elson, 2015, 2015) have shown that recognition, reduction and redistribution of care work positively affect not only economic stability but also the well-being of women, families and communities. In particular, women's right to make decisions and their representation as "caregivers" and also "producers" (Elson, 2010, p. 202) in public decision-making processes is vital for establishing gender equality. Remunerating care workers fairly and rewarding their work is also of utmost importance, taking into account gendered economic inequalities (Addati et al., 2018). This economic philosophy (Ilkcaracan, 2016) is based on the 3Rs -*recognise, reduce, and redistribute* unpaid care work- approach of Elson (2017), which was further developed as the 5Rs, by adding *representation* (Rost et al., 2020) and *reward* of care workers (Addati et al., 2018).

The 5Rs approach (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020) refers to the reorganisation of care work. This reorganisation includes a series of systematic and planned activities that begin with recognising care as a human right by economic and social policies (Fineman, 2017). In order to achieve and sustain this goal, States must restructure the social, economic and political context of care to recognise, reduce and redistribute the burden and costs, redefine care responsibilities, and make fair distribution among men, women, families and the state (Elson, 2017; Ferrant & Thim, 2019; Razavi, 2007). For this reason, there is a need for practical feminist tools that will support this process and enable comparison between different contexts and situations. Integrating the two approaches mentioned above, namely *four pathways* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) and the 5Rs (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020), this thesis aims to provide such an alternative tool to present the gendered unpaid care work picture as "coherent" (Waring, 1999, p. 39) as possible. The next chapter will provide feminist justifications behind the practical use of these approaches in the thesis to compare the case studies and how to develop them as an integrated framework further.

### **3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH**

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This chapter introduces the research methodology of this comparative case study that examines gendered unpaid care work in Turkey and Italy. The broad question this study explored was what the main structural factors are embedded in the neoliberal order and patriarchal and hierarchical relationships and how they contribute to perpetuating the gender inequality and sexist status quo of unpaid care work.

With this exploration, this thesis aimed to provide a macro-scale comparison of women's unpaid care work experiences in Turkey and Italy based on their socioeconomic consequences. In doing so, the principal objective of this thesis was to bring an alternative understanding and interpretation of the social, economic, political, and regional conditions that produced gendered unpaid labour. Therefore, this thesis employed the *four pathways* and *5Rs* approaches to case studies for the first time to discover and highlight mediating factors that enable or eliminate the gendered structure around care. The combination of these approaches, the *integrated analytical framework*, produced the *gendered unpaid care work index*, which is the original contribution of this thesis. This *index* focused on the key areas to support the transformation of gender relations and care work and provided a foundation for policy implications. In this context, this chapter will discuss in depth the philosophical justifications for the research questions, the rationale for the choice of the feminist model applied to the case studies, and the applicability of the case study approach for this study.

#### **3.1. REASONINGS BEHIND THE FEMINIST ANALYSIS**

##### **3.1.1. Research Questions and Feminist Methodology**

Unpaid care work, as described so far, is officially classified as non-market work, is not included in the income calculations of countries, and is invisible to policymakers (Gilman, 1911; Reid, 1977; Waring, 1999). Therefore, it remains a critical barrier to gender equality and women's economic and social empowerment. The extent of the gender gap in unpaid care work reflects the gendered division of labour, the persistence of gender stereotypes and the naturalisation of women's involvement in care (Hartmann, 1979).

Feminist critique of gendered unpaid care work pointed to the intertwined structural dimensions that surround it, which this thesis brought together under five headings as:

patriarchy and social reproduction; agency-oriented arguments and neoliberal approach; employment and economic gender inequality; social care inequality; and intersectional gender inequalities. In this context, this inquiry aimed to explore how these dimensions function individually and collectively to construct the gendered existence of care. Therefore, to provide a more holistic approach to understanding the interrelated macro-level determinants of the gendered structure of unpaid care work, this study focused on Turkey and Italy cases to explore the following questions:

- 1) How do cultural, political, and legal structures function and shape unpaid care work in Turkey and Italy?
- 2) What are the peculiarities and similarities in cases creating or perpetuating gendered hierarchical relations?
- 3) Is the current situation in these dimensions leading to:
  - a) Transformation of unpaid care and advancing gender equality or,
  - b) Reinforcement and perpetuation of status quo and dismantling the transformative potential of gender equality?
- 4) Whether the actions of governments that touch the legal, economic, and social fields contribute to gender equality or strengthen the gendered structure by eliminating the transformation potential of gender equality?

The feminist methodology provides a valuable framework for exploring these complexities surrounding gendered unpaid care work (Webb, 1993). Using a feminist lens, the research can be grounded on the recognition of gender inequalities and power dynamics that shape the experiences of individuals, particularly women, in various social contexts (Fonow & Cook, 1991). The emphasis on gender as a central category of analysis allows this thesis to highlight gender as a crucial factor in understanding unpaid care work (Addabbo et al., 2008; Günlük-Şenesen et al., 2017; Nussbaum, 2000b). This perspective not only emphasises the gendered nature of care work in this thesis but also seeks to challenge and deconstruct the traditional gender roles and norms perpetuating the unequal division of labour (Addati et al., 2018; Chopra & Nazneen, 2016; Elson, 2017; Folbre, 2006). The feminist methodology begins this by acknowledging the existing power disparities embedded in social structures and relations (Ackerly & True, 2020). Thus, by examining the power dynamics underlying unpaid care work (Folbre & Hartmann, 1989; Pateman, 1988), research can better explore and interpret how gender inequalities are perpetuated and reproduced and identify potential *pathways* for change (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021).

The feminist methodology also encourages reflexivity and recognition of the researcher's positionality in the research process (Travers, 2001). Thus, researchers who are transparent about their own biases, assumptions, and values can make their findings more robust and less susceptible to distortion (Ackerly & True, 2020; Fonow & Cook, 1991). Feminist research often uses an intersectional lens to highlight how gender intersects with other social categories such as race, class, and ethnicity (Crenshaw, 1989). This perspective provides a more nuanced understanding of unpaid care work, as it acknowledges that women's experiences may differ according to their particular social position and identity (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1996). Feminist research also fosters emphasising the lived experiences of women and other marginalised groups to make their voices heard (Davis, 1990; hooks, 1981). Focusing on women's daily experiences of unpaid care work in Turkey and Italy, the case studies aim to provide valuable insights into women's perspectives, challenges, coping strategies, motivations, and the broader social contexts that shape their experiences (Hankivsky, 2014). Given the commitment of feminist methodology to social transformation and civic and political activism (Connell, 1987; Maynard, 1995), this study aimed to examine gender unpaid care work through a feminist lens, identifying barriers to gender equality and suggesting potential strategies to challenge and transform the status quo (Pateman, 1988). In short, this study, from the perspective of feminist methodology, aimed to bring gendered unpaid care work to the forefront by recognising power imbalances and intersectional inequalities and providing an *integrated framework* to support this transformation.

### **3.1.2. Research Model**

The variable of main interest in this thesis was gendered unpaid care work in Turkey and Italy. These two Mediterranean countries, my home country, Turkey, and the current home of my research activities and relations with academia, Italy, similarly rank behind their peers regarding gender equality and fair distribution of unpaid care work. In order to observe and examine this variable, in accordance with the projections of the structural constraints<sup>19</sup>, the present study employed the *four pathways* framework - *access to and opportunities in the labour market; social and cultural norms; social care infrastructure; and the legal and*


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<sup>19</sup> Patriarchy and social reproduction; agency-oriented arguments and neoliberal approach; employment and economic gender inequality; social care inequality; and intersectional gender inequalities.

*institutional environment*- of Cantillon & Teasdale (2021) as an analytical model that guided the case studies.

One of the reasons behind this choice was related to the focus of this study. The present study aimed to explore the role of the interlinked structural constraint factors gathered from the feminist literature on forming gendered unpaid care work and present them in a more holistic and practical framework. In doing so, the ultimate aim of this thesis was to provide a practical feminist tool that emerged from existing feminist knowledge to support the policy-making process for transforming gender relations. This tool emerged as a *gendered unpaid care work index* at the end of the analysis of two case studies, Turkey and Italy, that made these factors visible in the country contexts. This *index* combined the implications from the *four pathways* analysis with the potential policy solutions that emerged under the *5Rs* approach - *recognise, reduce, and redistribute* unpaid care work and *representation and reward* the care workers - (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020).

*Figure 1: Structural Constraints in Feminist Critique and Four Pathways*




Given the similarities of the *four pathways* approach (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) with the structural constraints to which feminist literature refers (Figure 1), this model facilitated the analyse and compare the country contexts. In addition, the *four pathways* approach is devised with specific emphasis on the country context of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, a region that includes Turkey. Therefore, this framework provided an effective tool for



understanding and exploring the specific contexts of Turkey and Italy; and how they compare. Accordingly, by testing with country cases, these *pathways* provided an opportunity to develop a more integrated framework incorporating the *5Rs* approach.

Cantillon & Teasdale (2021) argue that there are embedded elements in each of these areas that shape gender relations and, thus, unpaid care work (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021). Such elements regarding the *labour market* include women with children and youth unemployment; gender segregation in the labour market; informal work; rural life, agriculture, and migration. These features in terms of *social and cultural norms around gender roles* also include social and legislative changes and violence against women and girls. *Social care infrastructure* relates to childcare infrastructure and eldercare, while the *legal and institutional environment* covers social protection systems and employment measures (Figure 2).


*Figure 2: Embedded Elements in Original Four Pathways Model*



Source: Cantillon & Teasdale (2021)

On the other hand, putting together the feminist knowledge and the empirical and theoretical evidence on Turkey and Italy, this thesis modified the pathways and the embedded variables in each *pathway*. However, all these modifications were made by adhering to the philosophy of *four pathways* and enriching the content rather than changing it or diminishing its scope (Figure 3). The main reason for this modification was to bring together variables that can be observed both in Turkey and Italy without losing focus on the structural factors of gendered unpaid care work. In doing so, the intersectionality of many variables in the case of Turkey and Italy came to the fore (Figure 3).

*Figure 3: Embedded Elements in Modified Four Pathways Model*



Source: Cantillon & Teasdale (2021)

For instance, in terms of *employment opportunities and labour market regulations* for women, this *pathway* involved education; household structure; motherhood; age and generation impacts; and informal work as the most significant elements in cases. While the “women with young children” variable of the original model was embedded in the ‘motherhood’ category to discuss the other aspects of having children, “youth unemployment” was included in the ‘age and generation impacts’ to explore and also analysed the impacts of old age and socioeconomic disparities based on age and generation. The modified *pathway* in the thesis also included the category of ‘household structure and income’, different from the original model, to highlight the intersectional relationship between living with a partner, children, and with low income and its impact on gendered unpaid care work. Similarly, to observe “gender segregation”, this thesis used the category of ‘education’, which provides a broader discussion foundation of where gendered occupational differentiation begins. This category also addressed employment by sector and education level and the role of states in this issue through the transfer of public resources. At the same time, ‘informal work’ remained common in both the original and modified models. Although it was hard to find relevant descriptive statistics on the “rural life, agriculture and migration” for Turkey and Italy, as working in agriculture is often an integrated issue to informality in Turkey, this issue was included in the ‘informal work’. However, intersectional discussion of this issue, together with migration, remains a challenge without available data. Nevertheless, all the variables in the first *pathway* allowed us to understand and compare how Turkey and Italy compare in terms of the intersectional relationships of these variables. Since the modified *pathway* was different

from the original model, this thesis also modified the names of the pathways to highlight these changes.

Similarly, the “social and cultural norms” *pathway* in the original model transformed into *neoliberal and patriarchal socio-political normative structure* that focused on ‘political discourse’ and ‘cultural norms’ to capture gender-based violence, gender roles and expectations, and socio-political and cultural atmosphere. The title of this *pathway* also included ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘patriarchy’ to emphasise their role in the gender roles and gendered unpaid care work, as feminist critique showed us. Another difference between the original and modified model is that the latter here addressed the socio-political aspects and discourse, leaving the legislative structure to the next *pathway*. This distinction allowed focusing on discourse and attitude, thus showing how in both cases, Turkey and Italy, gender relations are used as a political tool and associated with cultural, ethnic, and religious grounds to polarise people.

*Legal and institutional normative structure* addressed specific laws and gender equality efforts or the absence of these activities under three categories. While the first of these, ‘gender equality laws and conventions’, concentrated on the legal infrastructure, the ‘human rights’ perspective examined the legal structure from this lens. Civic and political ‘feminist movements’ were also added to the analysis to highlight their importance in the political and legal transformation. Therefore, the modified *pathway* differed from the “legal and institutional environment” in the original model, which specifically focused on the employment measures and social protection systems in this *pathway*. Instead, the new *pathway* in this thesis focused on the legal framework for gender equality, including employment, leaving social protection to the *social care system and dynamics* to offer a more holistic and meaningful framework.

Finally, the last *pathway* evolved to a broader one than the original model. In order to discuss and emphasise the role of the government, this pathway addressed ‘income and wealth inequality’, ‘social care expenditure’ and ‘tax policies’. As income differences were an important element that intersects with gendered disparities, including unpaid care work, involving these variables in the analyses allowed addressing both income inequality itself and the functioning of the state in this way. Apart from these, this *pathway* analysed the ‘national healthcare system’ and ‘childcare system’ through the human rights approach to care instead of focusing only on “eldercare” and “childcare” as in the original model. Lastly, to emphasise the dynamic and systemic structure around social care, the title of this pathway was modified to the *social care system and dynamics*.

### 3.1.3. Researcher

As explained earlier, the overall aim of this study was to contribute to the critical discussion of the impacts of neoliberal and patriarchal relations and government policies on gendered unpaid care work and on functions of societies through a comparative case study using existing feminist analytical tools and approaches. Thus, in this thesis, the choice of methodology was feminist, which guided the proceeding of the theoretical discussions and analysis (Harding, 1987). This choice stemmed from my personal experience of the investigated social phenomenon as a middle-class woman in a country with high rates of gender inequality, male violence, gender bias, and conservatism (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022c). On the other hand, although Turkey represents the lower band in gender equality, there is not a completely gender-equal country in the world (EIGE, 2022; Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c; WEF, 2019) makes my relationship with the subject more meaningful.

From a feminist perspective, this interactive relationship between the researcher to the researched represents the emancipatory foundations of feminist methodology (Acker et al., 1983). As used in this study, emancipation means “the eventual end of social and economic conditions that oppress women and the achievement of a free society” (Acker et al., 1983, p. 424). In this respect, feminism represents both a theory and a practice. Thus, using the opportunity provided by feminist research, this study aimed to examine the forms and sources of domination and oppression regarding gendered unpaid care and contribute to the gender transformations in these fields (Ackerly & True, 2020; Mills et al., 2010). As the feminist methodology allows us to appear not as an anonymous voice of authority but as a “real, historical individual with concrete, specific desires and interests” and act on the potential of emancipating resources, even for ourselves, it enables explanations to be more purified of distortion from unexamined beliefs and behaviours of the researchers themselves (Harding, 1987). In other words, the views and behaviours of the researcher, which must be open to critical scrutiny, are part of the empirical evidence in terms of the claims advanced in the research results, no less than what has traditionally been defined as relevant evidence (Harding, 1987, 1995; Hartsock, 1998). Introducing this “subjective” element into the analysis increases the objectivity of the research and decreases objectivism by not hindering such evidence from the public (Ackerly & True, 2020; Harding, 1987).

Recognising that there is no such thing as a problem without a person distinguishes the feminist approach from mainstream or traditional approaches (Harding, 1987; H. Roberts, 1981; Webb, 1993). Therefore, using the feminist approach as philosophy and ideology (Ackerly & True, 2020; Fonow & Cook, 1991), this thesis was deliberately located on an individual experience within society and history embedded in a set of social relations that generates both possibilities and limitations for emancipatory transformations (Acker et al., 1983). In doing so, this thesis aimed to *reflect* as clearly as possible the case under investigation (Travers, 2001). Reflexivity mentioned here means, as Fonow and Cook (1991, p. 2) describe, “the tendency of feminists to reflect upon, examine critically, and explore the nature of the research process analytically”.

On this basis, the present study brought together the theoretical discussions and approaches of feminist economics on the household as the sphere of production and reproduction (Pearson & Elson, 2015), where women’s unpaid care work is exploited, stigmatised and undervalued (Waring, 1999), without pacifying or ignoring women’s power of resistance and act, by referring to different channels for political change, and most importantly, by constructing a feminist perspective on how these areas relate to one another (Hartsock, 1998). Therefore, this study aimed to explore gendered experiences in different contexts using feminist research principles and to provide an alternative feminist approach to support the transformation of gender relations (Punch, 1998; Webb, 1993). In order to discover potential transformations in question at individual, organisational, institutional, or political levels (Hartsock, 1998; O’Hagan, 2013), this thesis employed, integrated and further developed existing feminist tools and approaches (Addati et al., 2018; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Chopra & Nazneen, 2016; Elson, 2017; Ilkcaracan, 2016; Rost et al., 2020). The ultimate goal was to translate them into practical tools that can be used to identify challenges and emancipatory policies and actions at the different levels mentioned above (Hartsock, 1998; O’Hagan, 2013).

## **3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS**

### **3.2.1. Case Study Method**

This research used the comparative case study method to understand better gendered unpaid care work, a complex social phenomenon. This study method effectively facilitated the holistic understanding of the complexities of the social phenomenon under investigation (Bryman, 2012). The comparative case study approach also helped to construct explanations

for similarities and differences or to gain a more significant awareness and deeper understanding of the social reality of gendered unpaid care work in different cultural, socioeconomic and political contexts (Bryman, 2012; Outhwaite & Turner, 2007).

Using the comparative case study method, this thesis sought to uncover patterns and variations in how women's unpaid care work persisted and developed over generations (Barrett, 1980; Hartmann, 1979; Walby, 1990). The primary motivation for using the case studies was to explore the social, historical, cultural, political, and economic factors that influence the perpetuation of gendered unpaid care work and how these factors interact with each other to shape this phenomenon. Conducting the study through a comparative case study also enabled the identification and analysis of the critical perspectives, beliefs, values, norms (Braunstein et al., 2020; Hipp & Bünning, 2021), expectations or aspirations (Evans, 2013) that govern gendered unpaid care work, as well as the power dynamics and structural forces that contribute to its survival (Pateman, 1988).

This approach allowed a comprehensive examination of the complex relationships between individual experiences, societal expectations, and structural factors (Yin, 2009), using both qualitative and quantitative data sources offering a multidimensional perspective (Travers, 2001). The comparative case study method also facilitated comparing and developing theoretical insights (Outhwaite & Turner, 2007) that could contribute to a broader understanding of gendered unpaid care work (Bryman, 2012; Harding, 1987). Expanding on this discussion, this thesis suggested that there are specific policy and action areas that transform or perpetuate gendered unpaid care work. This hypothesis is explored through mainstream and feminist household production literature and two empirical and comparative case studies in Turkey and Italy.

The first reason to focus on these countries to understand how women's unpaid care work shaped and survived for generations was due to personal motives. While Turkey, where I spent my childhood, youth, and 'early' adulthood as a middle-class woman, is my homeland, Italy represents my recent academic foundation. However, Turkey and Italy have other similarities, as well as peculiarities. This includes power imbalances in gender relations that attract attention and provide reasons for comparative research (Addabbo, 2017; Gimenez-Nadal & Molina, 2021; İlkaracan & Memiş, 2021).

First of all, these two Mediterranean countries, one EU member and the other long-standing candidate, generally represent higher gender inequality rates, with paid and unpaid

work being no exception (EIGE, 2022; Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c; WEF, 2019). In addition, Turkey and Italy represent conservative/corporatist states along with Southern European countries such as Spain and Greece (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Gimenez-Nadal & Molina, 2021; Kongar & Memiş, 2017).<sup>20</sup> From this perspective, welfare regimes in Turkey and Italy are similar in placing the family at the centre regarding welfare service provision, associating households with these services (Donà, 2022; İlkkaracan, 2012). This understanding of welfare also points to the existence of patriarchal foundations of state in these countries (Pateman, 1988; Waring, 1999).

On the other hand, Turkey is distinguished by highly fragmented, hierarchical and corporatist health and pension systems for ‘formally employed’ heads of families (Dedeoğlu, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kongar & Memiş, 2017). Southern European and Turkish welfare systems, in the post-1980 period, began to separate as the first one prioritised social inclusion and reduction of inequalities by reflecting the impact of the EU, while the latter reflected the influence of the IMF and World Bank with neoliberal structural adjustment policies (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010; Kongar & Memiş, 2017). Notwithstanding this differentiation, gender equality in these two countries lags behind their peers, and there is a significant gap to close, especially in terms of unpaid care work.<sup>21</sup> Given these similarities and peculiarities of Turkey and Italy, the comparative case study approach enabled explaining the links of socioeconomic, political, legal, and cultural structures to gendered unpaid care work comparatively.

This approach also allowed exploring how government interventions, socioeconomic and political adjustments and a range of individual and collective decisions emerge in women’s real-life experiences (Yin, 2009). In doing so, the comparative case study analysis emphasised the women’s roles and experiences in different socio-cultural contexts, hence the diversity of

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<sup>20</sup> It is worth noting here that Esping-Andersen has much been criticised by feminist scholars. He set out welfare categorisation to address the relationship between work and welfare, where work is defined as paid work and welfare as policies that allow, encourage, or discourage the decommodification of labour. The worker Esping-Andersen has in mind was also male. However this structure overlooked the importance of unpaid work and the fact that primarily women in families play a large role in doing this unpaid work (Lewis, 1997; A. Orloff, 1996; A. S. Orloff & Laperrière, 2021).

<sup>21</sup> According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2021:

Turkey ranks 133<sup>rd</sup> among 156 countries in gender equality, 140<sup>th</sup> in economic participation and opportunity, 101<sup>st</sup> in educational attainment for women, 105<sup>th</sup> in health and survival, and 114<sup>th</sup> in their political empowerment.

Italy, on the other hand, ranks 63<sup>rd</sup> overall, 114<sup>th</sup> in economic participation and opportunity, 57<sup>th</sup> in educational attainment, 118<sup>th</sup> in health and survival and finally 41<sup>st</sup> in women’s political empowerment.

For further information see WEF Report (Accessed 7 May 2022).

gendered unpaid care work and the commonalities and differences between cases (Acker et al., 1983; Harding, 1987)

The relevance of focusing on this social phenomenon stems from the feminist concerns about the dramatic situation of unfair allocation of care work both among men and women and also states and households (Razavi, 2007). The units of analysis that enabled and guided the investigation of this phenomenon (Yin, 2009) in Turkey and Italy were borrowed from the extensive feminist literature. As mentioned earlier, previous feminist literature has revealed that women's unpaid care work and relations around it have been shaped mainly through *four pathways*. Therefore, this study used these areas as the main units of analysis to examine gendered unpaid care work from a critical feminist perspective. Nevertheless, gendered unpaid care work remains a much more comprehensive social phenomenon beyond what this study could cover. However, to provide as 'holistic' understanding as possible and to broaden this knowledge, this study, by using existing feminist approaches, constructed an integrated model that combines the areas contributing to gendered unpaid care work and the policy tools that can be used against it within the same model. The following sub-section will present the model which emerged as a result of the rich feminist literature and the original analytical approach of this study.

### **3.2.2. An Integrated Analytical Framework: From 4 Pathways to 5Rs and Gendered Unpaid Care Work Index**


The *integrated analytical framework* that guided the case studies of Turkey and Italy provided a much broader perspective than has been used so far to explore and analyse the situation of gendered unpaid care work. The first part of this framework, as detailed above, consists of four interrelated *pathways* and their respective subcategories. In the second part, which refers to the findings and analysis chapter of the thesis, the *integrated analytical framework* emerges with mediators and necessary policy actions in light of data from case studies with the integration of the *5Rs* into the model. This framework is critical for linking the existing gendered constraint structures and policy practices to the actions which enable the recognition, reduction and redistribution of unpaid care work and the representation and reward of paid and unpaid caregivers.

At the end of this process, the *gendered unpaid care work index*, which is the original contribution of this thesis, ranked the performance of the case studies according to the fifteen



policy dimensions critical to transforming gendered unpaid care work. The *index* allowed countries to be compared in a standardised and systematic way and benchmark and evaluate policy implementation and areas for improvement. Using a simple metric, this *index*'s purpose was to distil complex information and facilitate communication and understanding of performance data. Figure 4 indicates the model and included variables in detail. Although the empirical and non-empirical literature provides us with these variables, it does not offer much information about the mediators or barriers of each of these variables in a broader perspective and how they relate to each other. In addition, no previous study used the *four pathways* and *5Rs* approaches together in a case study. This thesis attempted to fill these gaps. Using these approaches as an integrated model, the thesis explored and interpreted how Turkey and Italy compare according to the final *gendered unpaid care work index*. However, some variables and contexts remained uncovered. In order to unveil them, comparative case studies will remain critical in demonstrating how these components work interrelatedly to create gendered unpaid care work.

Figure 4: From Four Pathways to Gendered Unpaid Care Work Index



### **3.2.3. Data**

This study used different data sources of national and international statistical databases to reveal the political, social, economic, and cultural environment that underlies the unequal burden of unpaid care work. For this purpose, relevant data from national statistical offices and the EU, OECD and UN databases were used to measure, calculate, and understand gender disparities in terms of variables of interest. In addition, the data from the archive, including relevant literature, policy documents, reports, strategic plans and government programmes, and legal provisions, were used in this study (see Table 21). These resources provided a wealth of information on various aspects of gendered unpaid care work, such as time use statistics, labour force participation rates, and the distribution of care responsibilities among different demographic groups.

Throughout the study, Turk Stat and Istat were the primary data sources. The fact that the methods used by both countries and the way of providing and reporting data are compatible with the EU facilitated the data collection and interpretation process. However, data from international organisations were used when there was a lack of data in the national statistical institutes. In addition, the latest national time-use data from 2014-15 and 2013-14 were used to analyse time-use data in Turkey and Italy. This data includes information about the socioeconomic characteristics of households and individuals, the time spent in productive and non-productive activities, and the context in which the activities are carried out (Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c). Modelling time in this way shows the interdependence of paid and unpaid work in the household. This approach may also indicate the effects of inadequate social and physical infrastructure, policies and legal regulations on time allocated to unpaid care work.

This thesis chose to use publicly available descriptive data for several reasons. First, the data provided a solid basis for contextualising the case studies within broader social, economic, and political trends. This allowed us to compare country profiles at a broader level and identify potential patterns and disparities in the cases. Using existing secondary data sources also allowed for drawing on the expertise of established research institutions and government agencies that have developed rigorous methodologies to collect and analyse a wide range of datasets, including gendered unpaid care work. The case studies combined these descriptive empirical data with theoretical and qualitative findings to provide a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of gendered unpaid care work. For example, qualitative data from

observations and empirical and theoretical research, reports, and policy documents, as well as national time use statistics to show the overall gender gap in unpaid care work, illustrate the specific experiences, motivations, and challenges in gendered care work. Combining these data sources, case studies provided a richer and more detailed account of the current status of gendered unpaid care work and possible policy solutions. However, as the following subsection will elaborate, several limitations were encountered.

### **3.2.4. Limitations**

Some limitations of this study should be noted here. First, there is an obvious limitation in being able to review relevant literature, mainly in English and Turkish. This is due to the language barrier caused by my beginner-level Italian, which, most of the time, prevented fluent reading and understanding of Italian policy documents and other relevant literature. In order to overcome this challenge, I consulted the sufficiently large archive in English for comparison and double-checked with the empirical data and records. In addition, while I should state that any errors that may arise in this regard are my own, having a native Italian-speaking supervisor prevented any critical misinterpretation.

There is also the time limitation. Although time is a common asset for everyone, its use differs depending on many factors (Waring, 1999), which is the starting point of this study and is also one of its limitations. During the research and writing of this thesis, which also included the pandemic period, my time-use changed depending on many factors, which caused the characteristics and scope of the research to change; even the subject of it to transform to include the time-use. Therefore, the limited time was a barrier to reading and analysing the extensive and immense literature and relevant policy, plan, and strategy documents. To overcome this limitation, I reviewed the literature and policy documents within the relevant feminist framework used in this study. On the other hand, this framework itself is not comprehensive enough to explore and analyse the highly complex structure of gendered unpaid care work.

It should also be noted that time-use surveys also have limitations. For example, the scope and quality of time-use data tend to differ from one survey to another, making it problematic to compare countries and even in the same region. Similarly, while some time-use surveys are nationally representative, others, such as rural or urban areas, may be more limited in scope. The interval and classification of the activities covered and the level of detail also vary between surveys (for example, capturing and capturing time intervals of 15 minutes or 30

minutes). However, the fact that the time-use data of Turkey and Italy were completely comparable facilitated the case studies. Another conceptual concern regarding time-use data is capturing and measuring simultaneous activities, which is multitasking. Some surveys allow participants to report both primary and secondary activities. Nevertheless, secondary activities are often not continuously reported or analysed (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Ferrant & Thim, 2019; Rost et al., 2020).

The *four pathways* framework also has its own limitations. First, this framework provided an analytical guide to analyse the socioeconomic, political, legal and institutional environment surrounding unpaid care work and suggest policy interventions. However, it is not comprehensive enough to cover all the elements present for practical policy proposals. In order to overcome this, this thesis enriched and modified the *four pathways* and combined them with the *5Rs* approach. On the other hand, the *framework of Rs* also continues to develop with new additions (Rost et al., 2020).

Moreover, the attitude against the attempt to estimate all kinds of labour's economic comparison to only include in the GDP has some reasonable justifications, as discussed in the literature review chapter of this thesis. It is also true that there is a risk of feminist economic tools being used for non-feminist and mainstream purposes. On the other hand, this approach provides a feminist perspective that underlines the need for transformative public policies and infrastructure, including technological changes, to reorganise the care between men and women, families, and the state (Addati et al., 2018; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Elson, 2017; MacGregor et al., 2022). Therefore, no matter how much this framework expands, the main objective will be to create a feminist policy change and transform oppressive power structures. To this end, this thesis aimed to facilitate the potential for policymakers to deliver policies for change and transformation.

Finally, the focus of this study on women's unpaid care work can also be interpreted as a limitation. Although there is undeniable evidence (Bandelli, 2017; European Union, 2015; Ferrant & Thim, 2019; Ilkkaracan et al., 2021; Kongar & Memiş, 2017) that the devaluation and stigmatisation of care work significantly affect women and girls, available data and studies in the literature are still insufficient to reveal the relationship of women from different backgrounds with unpaid care work. In addition, despite significant commonalities, women's experiences of unpaid care work vary considerably within and among countries and across age, ethnicity, colour, class, and other dimensions of inequality (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1996; Davis, 1990; hooks, 1981). The different positions of individuals and communities, in terms of

capabilities, resources and bargaining powers, are both the cause and the consequence of this deviation (Appelbaum et al., 2002). Thus, unpaid care work practices diverge depending on gender and socioeconomic and personal circumstances. More specifically, those working in low-paid care work experience serious difficulties, as they carry out most of the paid workload, in addition to the unpaid care work they undertake for their family members and communities (Rai et al., 2014). Therefore, intersectionality, which reveals that the discriminations encountered are not homogeneous and may arise from different social conflicts, is crucial to understanding gendered power relations not only as manifestations but also as interactive systems (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1996; Crenshaw, 1988; Hankivsky, 2014). However, intersectionality remains very limited in this study.

## 4. UNPAID CARE WORK IN TURKEY

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So far, this thesis has set the theoretical boundaries with the discussions on the main variable of interest, gendered unpaid care work. These theoretical debates include its neglect by economists and decision-makers despite its critical contribution to economies and societies and also the counter-reaction of feminist economists and activists to make it visible (Fineman, 2017; Folbre, 1994; Reid, 1977; Waring, 1999; Weedon, 1987). They also point to certain deeply intertwined dimensions of the gendered unpaid care work, under *four pathways* (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Bruegel, 1979; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Ilkcaracan, 2017; Pearson & Elson, 2015). On the other hand, this extensive literature has also shown the need for a more comprehensive approach (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Ilkcaracan, 2016) that provides a broad macro-level perspective for understanding the peculiarities and similarities and possible policy solutions for case studies. In this context, the present chapter, together with the next one, aims to produce outputs for the *integrated analytical framework*, which will present an alternative approach to fill this gap.

Turkey is one of the countries with high gender inequality rates worldwide (WEF, 2021), and gender relations practices are mostly shaped according to traditional norms (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022c). Turkey is also characterised by placing the family at the centre of welfare provision, linking households and women with care, and highly fragmented hierarchical and corporatist health and pension systems for ‘formally employed’ heads of families (Kongar & Memiş, 2017). In such an environment, women’s labour force participation rate remains very low compared to men and other OECD countries (OECD Stat, 2020). In addition, the working life for women entering the workforce is significantly shorter than for men (Turk Stat, 2021b). Thus they accumulate less, and their access to social rights remains limited (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). With these aspects, Turkey represents a neoliberal, conservative and patriarchal social welfare understanding, which provides social assistance measures to assign women a ‘dependent beneficiary role’, not a ‘primary beneficiary’ as a labour market participant (Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010). This situation also gives an idea about the conservative and traditional official attitude towards gender roles. However, improvements have been achieved in education, labour force participation rates, and thus gender gaps in income and pension in Turkey (Turk Stat, 2022c). Nevertheless, gender inequality still remains a major problem. On the other hand, gendered unpaid care work restricts access to education, employment, and social rights, especially for

low-income women (Turk Stat, 2021a). At this point, the determination of gender roles through family-state partnerships increases the socioeconomic vulnerability of women. This situation, which is also reflected in the figures of domestic violence (MFSS, 2014), points to a gender equality problem that goes beyond employment and income.


In this context, this chapter draws upon each of the *four pathways* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) to examine unpaid care work in the country context of Turkey. The following section introduces unpaid care work in Turkey and its current situation according to the latest available data. Then it focuses on the *four pathways* mentioned above to separately analyse the relevant elements related to gender roles and their reflection on labour markets, government policies of practices, legal and institutional structure, and the social care dynamics in Turkey.

#### **4.1. CURRENT SITUATION AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF UNPAID CARE WORK IN TURKEY**

One of the most striking consequences of the globalisation of the world economy for women has been the increasing entry of women into the labour market (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Bruegel, 1979; Luxton, 1997). This transformation shifted the production, which was in pursuit of more cheap labour input, towards low-income countries and increased the female employment rate in these countries, especially in the export sectors (E. Chen, 2013; M. A. Chen, 2001; Hart, 1973). The general findings in Turkey show that, unlike the rest of the world, there is not much change in female employment rates in export-oriented production in the manufacturing industry. The female employment is mostly concentrated in marginal, precarious, and flexible forms of work (Dedeoğlu & Şahankaya, 2016; Kızılırmak et al., 2022). According to OECD data, women's labour force participation in Turkey is very low compared to peer countries worldwide (Figure 5). Women's labour force participation rate (35 per cent) is also far behind that of men (72 per cent). In addition, with the Covid-19 outbreak, the labour force participation rates both for men and women decreased to 68 and 31 per cent, respectively (Turk Stat, 2021b).




**Figure 5: Labour force participation rate of women, OECD, 2020 (15-64-year-olds)**



Source: [OECD Stat](#), 2020

**Figure 6: Reasons for not participating in the workforce of women in Turkey, 2020**




Source: (Turk Stat, 2021b)

In Turkey, women are often excluded from the workforce due to the unpaid care work burden they bear; and the data confirm this. Unpaid care work is the most relevant reason for women not participating in the labour force, with 47.2 per cent (Figure 6). As a matter of fact, according to the latest time-use data, for the period 2014-15, women in Turkey spend at least


13 per cent of their daily time on unpaid care work. On the other hand, it is quite surprising that this is also in line with the average time spent in unpaid care work in high-income countries, which ranges from 12 to 15 per cent (Figure 7).

*Figure 7: Average time spent per person daily on unpaid care work in G7 and Turkey (as % of total daily time spent)*



Source: For Turkey, calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, TURKSTAT; for G7 countries, [OECD Stat](#)

*Figure 8: Average activity time per person by the type of activity (in hours), 2021<sup>22</sup>*




\*: This category includes sleep, eating and unspecified personal care activities.  
 \*\*: Includes travel as part of/during the main or secondary job and work-seeking activities.  
 \*\*\*: This category does not include volunteering and therefore differs from the "total unpaid care work" category below.

Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, Turk Stat

According to the time-use data in Turkey, while women spend more time on unpaid care work and less on paid work, this is the reverse for men. Time spent only on domestic work is 4.6 hours for women and almost an hour for men. On the other hand, while women spend 1.3 hours on paid work and related activities, this is higher, with 4.4 hours for men (Figure 8).

<sup>22</sup> Working and work-related activities or employment and related activities also include the time spent for job-seeking activities. Thus, this time is calculated also for non-employed people.

*Figure 9: Women’s average activity time per person by the type of activity and employment status (in hours), 2014-2015*




Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, Turk Stat

The theoretical and empirical literature (Del Boca, 2022; İlkaracan, 2012; Kongar & Memiş, 2017; OECD, 2019b) show that the physical and emotional care of family members is the most time-consuming and binding factor for women. Thus, the caring responsibilities that women “have to” carry on in Turkey undermine their opportunities to receive an education, work in a decent job, develop their cognitive, physical, artistic and other abilities, or enjoy their leisure time as much as men (Nussbaum, 2000b; Sen, 1979).

Although the time spent in unpaid care work decreases with the increase in paid working hours, unpaid care work still continues to have a large share in women’s daily activities. Accordingly, while unemployed women spend more time in unpaid care activities with 5 hours, employed women undertake 3.5 hours of unpaid care work in addition to their 4.5 hours of paid work (Figure 9). On the other hand, employed men allocate only 46 minutes to unpaid care, while unemployed men spend just over an hour (Figure 10). It is worth noting here that it is also possible to underestimate the amount of unpaid care work performed, as caring for people is often carried out simultaneously with other activities. This means, for example, that someone might be supervising the children while doing the laundry, cooking, or gardening. Engaging in simultaneous activities or multitasking often results in heavy time use by doing two or more things at the same time and more unpaid work and fatigue for those who provide it (Addati et al., 2018; Rost et al., 2020). Considering the superiority of women in terms


of the unpaid time they spend and the tasks they undertake at home, it is quite possible to predict that multitasking affects women the most (Figure 11).

*Figure 10: Average time spent on unpaid care work by gender and employment status, 2014-2015 (in hours)*



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, TURKSTAT

*Figure 11: Breakdown of daily hours spent in different unpaid activities by gender (aged 15 and over), 2014-15'*



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, Turk Stat; [OECD Stat](#)

In order to illustrate this more clearly, Table 4 shows the average time spent by women and men in paid employment, unpaid care work, and childcare proportionally and disaggregated by gender and employment status. According to these figures, women work more than men in total, regardless of their employment status. On the other hand, the difference is more evident for the unemployed population, where unemployed women work almost 3.4 times more than unemployed men (Table 4). Thus, regardless of their employment position,


women devote more time to unpaid housework and volunteer activities, while men spend more time in employment, education, sports and outdoor activities, and hobbies (Figure 12).

*Table 4: Average activity time per person by the type of activity, gender, and employment status, 2014-2015 (in hours)*

	Paid Work	Unpaid Care Work (including childcare)	Childcare <sup>23</sup>	Total Work	Women to Men Ratio of Total Work
<b>Total</b>					
Women	01:16	04:35	01:01	05:51	1.11
Men	04:24	00:53	00:10	05:17	
<b>Employed</b>					
Women	04:32	03:31	00:40	08:03	1.12
Men	06:25	00:46	00:10	07:11	
<b>Non-Employed</b>					
Women	00:04	04:59	01:10	05:03	3.36
Men	00:22	01:07	00:10	01:30	

Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, TURKSTAT

*Figure 12: Average activity time per person by the type of activity, gender, and employment status, 2014-2015*




Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, TURKSTAT

In fact, the importance of access to quality institutional care during the period when everyone was confined to their homes due to the Covid-19 outbreak became even more evident with its negative impact on households, especially women. Due to the income inequality between households and regions, the pandemic has increased the burden on women. In this

<sup>23</sup> These figures refer to the main activity. Therefore, it does not include childcare carried out in conjunction with other activities or as multitasking.

period, although the contribution of men to housework has increased with working-from-home arrangements, their contribution has decreased with the return to the physical working environment (Figure 13).

*Figure 13: Change in the unpaid care work time by gender before, during, and after Covid-19*



Source: Illustration based on Time-Use Survey, 2018, 2020 and 2021, KONDA

In this context, recognising the total time value of unpaid care work can help understand its significance for the functioning of communities and also the economy and emphasise the value of the ‘currency of time’ (Rost et al., 2020). In Turkey, unpaid care work constitutes 47.6 per cent of the total working hours spent by men and women and paid work accounts for 52.4 per cent. Women spend *46.2 billion hours* on unpaid care work and *12.3 billion hours* on paid work. On the other hand, the time men allocate to paid work is higher, with *44.7 billion hours* compared to *5.6 billion hours* for unpaid care work. In total, women’s working hours comprise the majority of total working hours at 53.8 per cent, with a high share of unpaid care work (Table 5).

*Table 5: Annual total work hours in Turkey by gender, 2014 (in billions of hours)<sup>24</sup>*

	Women	Men	Total Work Hours	Women’s Share in Total Work Hours (%)
<b>Paid Work (52.4%)</b>	12.3	44.7	57.0	21.6
<b>Unpaid Care Work (47.6%)</b>	46.2	5.6	51.8	89.2
<b>Total Work Hours</b>	58.5	50.3	108.8	53.8

Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, TURKSTAT

<sup>24</sup> For this calculation weekly working hours were converted to monthly and then annual working hours, regarding 30 days a month/7 days a week = 4.286 weeks per month. Similar calculation is available in Gündüz and İlkkaracan’s (2019) study on Turkey’s unpaid care economy estimation, for 2006.

This situation constitutes a major obstacle to women’s socioeconomic empowerment when the rights that can be gained are considered. In other words, women are deprived of the social and economic rights they can earn in the wage labour market by spending time in unpaid care. Indeed, a study conducted in 2014 market conditions reveals that unpaid care workers should be paid 15,840 liras per month for household chores such as cooking, cleaning, psychological counselling for spouses, children, neighbours, friends and child care (Şentürk, 2016). Considering the gross minimum wage was 1071 liras for the same year, the wage level indicates the importance of unpaid care work (Turk Stat, 2015). On the other hand, there is a clear gendered division in housework, even if men are engaged in household activities. As can be observed from Table 6, women, both employed and non-employed, spend the highest time on food management, including meal preparation, serving, and related activities. Household chores and childcare follow this for employed women. These activities also take the highest amount of time for unemployed women. For employed men, shopping and childcare are the most time-devoted unpaid work categories. On the other hand, while time devoted to childcare is higher for employed men than unemployed men, this rate for both employed and unemployed women does not significantly change. However, as noted earlier, it is crucial to consider that time spent on activities such as childcare, including supervising, tends to be underreported among women due to multitasking bias. Thus, in this case, women may be dealing with childcare, among other things, which may increase the time allocated (Table 6).

*Table 6: Time distribution in unpaid care work by gender and employment status, 2014-2015 (15+ age and % of total time spent)*


	Total		Employed		Unemployed	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Unspecified household and family care	0.6	1.9	0.5	1.4	0.8	2.0
Food management	17.0	44.9	15.1	46.5	19.5	44.5
Household upkeep	11.4	23.0	10.7	21.8	12.4	23.3
Laundry, ironing, and handcraft	0.9	6.9	0.8	6.2	0.9	7.1
Gardening and pet care	18.8	3.1	15.0	3.7	23.9	2.9
Construction and repairs	5.2	0.2	5.9	0.3	4.2	0.1
Household management	25.0	5.1	25.8	5.6	24.0	5.0
Shopping and services	0.6	0.1	0.8	0.1	0.4	0.1
Childcare	17.2	14.1	23.1	13.4	9.1	14.2
Adult care	3.3	0.9	2.2	1.1	4.8	0.8

Source: Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, TURKSTAT

The fact that unpaid labour occupies such a prominent place in daily life and is the element that brings together the production and the reproduction sphere has also provided a reason for the mainstream economy to understand its economic value. Figure 14 shows the

estimated value of the total hours devoted to unpaid care work for Turkey (Gündüz & İlkkaracan, 2019) and G7 countries (OECD, 2019b).<sup>25</sup> In Turkey, for 2006, the total hours devoted to unpaid care work corresponded to 29 per cent of the GDP in terms of opportunity cost, while 22 per cent with replacement cost (Gündüz & İlkkaracan, 2019). For G7 countries, it ranges from 41 per cent for Canada to 66 per cent for Germany in terms of opportunity cost (see Figure 14). It should come as no surprise that the consequences of opportunity cost, using average wages for the entire workforce, are often higher than the replacement cost, using salaries paid to workers in domestic activities (such as cleaners, housekeepers, babysitters etc.)(van de Ven et al., 2018).

*Figure 14: Value of labour costs attributed to time spent producing unpaid care work in G7 and Turkey, 2014-2015*



Source: Calculations for Turkey (Gündüz & İlkkaracan, 2019, p. 496, Table 3) and G7 countries (OECD, 2019b, figure 1.4)


As noted thus far, unpaid care work is crucial socially and economically, but it is also a huge burden for women and girls. On the other hand, the density and structure of this burden vary according to different stages of the life course. As shown in Figure 15, women in Turkey, throughout their lives, lag behind their male peers in employment. Women never reach the same level of employment as men, and the most equal period is the 15-24 age period, when men spend almost three times more time in employment than women. On the other hand, women's unpaid care work responsibilities are always higher than men's, which is most significant in the 25-34 age range, where the time women devote is almost seven times that of

<sup>25</sup> Although the data represent different years, it still suggests an overview of the relative economic significance of the unpaid care "economy" in these countries. The study of Gündüz & İlkkaracan (2019) uses generalist wage replacement approach, while the study investigating G7 countries (OECD, 2019b) uses specialist wage approach. For further discussions on measuring methods of unpaid care work see (Becker, 1965; Chadeau, 1985; Hawrylyshyn, 1976; Suh et al., 2020).



men. This age period also coincides with starting a career and also childbearing and raising in Turkey (Turk Stat, 2015). Although this ratio decreases in older ages, the share of unpaid care work never becomes equal between men and women. Similarly, the proportion of time spent on employment never becomes equal or favouring women (Figure 15).


*Figure 15: Women/Men ratio of average daily time spent on unpaid care work by age groups in Turkey, 2014-2015*



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, TURKSTAT


The amount of time allocated to care work also differs depending on income and education status. Figure 16 shows the change in the time devoted to unpaid care work, employment, and education across different income categories in Turkey. While the time spent on education does not indicate a significant difference, time allocated to employment and unpaid care work is sensitive to income level. Employment and job-seeking time also increase with the increased income level while time spent on unpaid care work decreases. This may indicate the ability of high-income households to outsource unpaid care work. Low-income households spend more time on unpaid care work and less on employment, implying that most women, as the primary performer of this work in these households, stay outside the paid labour market (Figure 16).

**Figure 16: Average activity time per person by the type of activity and monthly household income group, 2014-2015 (10+ age, in hours)**



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, TURKSTAT

**Figure 17: Average time spent on unpaid care work by gender and education levels, 2014-2015**



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2014-2015, TURKSTAT

Focusing on the impact of education alone indicates that the time gap in employment activities diminishes with the increase in education level; nevertheless, it does not reach the level of men. Meanwhile, unpaid care work activities always stay very high for women and do not decrease until higher education levels. While women with high school or vocational education spend more than five times more time on unpaid care work than men, this declines towards the higher education level. Therefore, despite the positive impact of education on women’s time allocation, the significant gendered time gap in employment and unpaid care work always remains (Figure 17).

*Figure 18: Population by age groups and gender over the years, Turkey*



Source: (Turk Stat, 2021b)

In response to such a gendered division of labour, women tend to reconcile their work and family lives with the solutions they find to increase their presence in the public sphere (Braunstein, 2012; Karamessini & Rubery, 2014). The most common of these solutions concerns motherhood, a socio-economically binding period for women, especially when institutional social care services is lacking (Hanson & Hanson, 2011; Keck & Saraceno, 2013). Women, in recent years, have tended to advance their careers and delay motherhood, reduce the number of children, or not prefer motherhood, with the increase in self-investment in their education (De Henau et al., 2016; Turk Stat, 2021a). An obvious consequence of this is the change in population structure. Indeed, the data (Turk Stat, 2022c; UN, 2022) show that the population, and thus the workforce, is older than in the past ten years and will get older (Figure 18). On the other hand, the growing population and ageing societies are other problems concerning unpaid care labour of women, especially in the countries such as Turkey, where elderly care is predominantly carried out by families and based on women's unpaid work (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010; İlkkaracan et al., 2015). All of these are related to many areas that interact with each other, from social and cultural norms to neoliberalising and radicalising state structures, gaps in legal protection and political representation, and ultimately social care dynamics that do not provide care in a collective organisation and, more importantly, as a right. The following section will address each of these issues and explore these relationships and how they collectively form or perpetuate the gendered unpaid care work.

## **4.2. FOUR PATHWAYS OF GENDERED UNPAID CARE WORK IN TURKEY**

### **4.2.1. Employment Opportunities and Labour Market Regulations**

Although Turkey is one of the most industrialised countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with only 32.8 per cent of women in the workforce compared to 70.3 per cent of men, it has one of the largest gender disparities in the labour force participation globally (OECD, 2021b; Turk Stat, 2022c). These figures contrast sharply with the increase in female labour force participation that has accompanied industrialisation in many countries in the global South since the late 1970s (Kongar & Memiş, 2017).

Unpaid care work, as shown in the previous section, is the most relevant reason for women in Turkey who are unable to or unwilling to participate in the workforce (Turk Stat, 2021b). While women generally take on more domestic responsibilities than men, homemakers who do not work in a paid job shoulder the highest burden in unpaid work to care for the elderly, disabled, sick and children in Turkey (KONDA, 2021; Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). Additionally, women's paid labour salaries are lower than their male partners, and women's unpaid labour is higher even if they join the labour market, regardless of their education level, income and age (Turk Stat, 2022c). As in the rest of the world (EIGE, 2022; WEF, 2021), in Turkey (Dedeoğlu, 2000; Turk Stat, 2021a), the gendered career choices also result in the concentration of women in low-income occupations in the service sector and create job queues that affect the functioning of the labour market (M. Gregory, 2011; Hartmann, 1976; OECD, 2018; Turk Stat, 2021a). In other words, women are mostly employed in fields where the income is considerably low and that overlap with their 'domestic responsibilities' such as education, hospitality, healthcare, childcare, housekeeping and the like, while men work in high-income industrial jobs and managerial positions (Arulampalam et al., 2007; European Commission, 2018; M. Gregory, 2011).

Table 7 shows that for 2021, more than 63 million of the population is 15 years or older. Women make up 10.5 million of the active population or, in other words, the labour force, while men constitute the majority, with over 22 million. On the other hand, despite the low level of participation in the labour force, the unemployment rate is much higher among women (Table 7). considering that more than 20 per cent of working women work as unpaid family

workers, mainly in the agricultural sector, high unemployment level becomes the tip of the iceberg. For men, this rate is 4.5 per cent (Turk Stat, 2022). On the other hand, youth unemployment is similarly higher for women. Given that the young population, neither in employment nor in education or training, is also higher for women, it is clear that women lag behind men at all stages of their lives. Indeed, inequality is also evident in women's extraordinarily short working lives of 19 years compared to 39 years for men (Table 7).

*Table 7: Labour force status by gender in Turkey, 2021<sup>26</sup>*

	Women	Men
The population aged 15 and over (thousands)	32 172	31 533
Labour force (thousands)	10 560	22 156
Labour force participation (%)	32.8	70.3
Unemployment (thousands)	1 554	2 364
(%)	14,7	10.7
Non-agricultural unemployment rate (%) *	18.4	13.9
Youth unemployment (15-24 age) (%)	28.7	19.4
15-24 age NEET** (%)	32.4	17.5
Duration of working life*** (year)	19.1	39.0

\* Data is available for 2020

\*\* Neither in employment nor in education or training

\*\*\* Data is available for 2019

Source: (Turk Stat, 2022)

As pictured above, the production sphere in Turkey, which has a gendered structure, significantly affects women's access to education and social protection services, their income level and thus their connection with social and economic rights through their employment status (Turk Stat, 2022). The most important reason why women's labour force participation in Turkey is so critical is that the coverage of the social security system, which will be discussed in detail later, depends on the employment situation (Turk Stat, 2022c). Therefore, when women do not participate in the paid labour market or work informally, they face forgone social protection (Elveren, 2008; Pailhé et al., 2019; Yaman-Öztürk, 2010). On the other hand, insufficient leave policies do not allow parents reconciling work and life in Turkey (Devlet Memurlari Kanunu, 1965, Article 104). In this case, even if women enter the workforce, this inadequacy contributes to shorter working hours or interrupted labour market participation and less individual funding, thereby reducing the accumulation of pension entitlements. Thus,

<sup>26</sup> Turk Stat, in 2021, changed the definition of "work" to ensure the compliance with the international standards in definitions and concepts. For further details see [Turk Stat's report](#). (Accessed 15/08/2022)

women's unpaid care work follows them with its long-term effects (Addabbo, Rodríguez-Modroño, et al., 2015a; Berik et al., 2009; Bettio & Verashchagina, 2014; Farrell, 2005).

All these areas present critical dimensions of gender discrimination that must be examined and resolved. Therefore, within the limited scope of this thesis, the remainder of this section will focus on gender differentiation in specific areas as outlined in the methodology chapter (see Figure 4). These areas include gendered differentiation in education, motherhood as an important determinant of women's interaction with the labour market, together with household structure, generational impacts, and age, and finally, informal work. At the point where all these structures intersect with family, state and society relations, care as a human right is at the centre (Folbre, 2006; Reid, 1934; Waring, 1999). For this reason the following sub-section will analyse the collective impact of the above-mentioned relevant factors.


#### **4.2.1.1. Education**

In Turkey, education plays a vital role in social inequality and is expected to strengthen the upward mobility of socio-economically disadvantaged individuals (European Commission, 2021; Ministry of National Education, 2021). While the most low-educated people are neither in employment nor in education, employment rates are positively correlated with educational attainment (Turk Stat, 2022c). Education level is also positively correlated to women's labour force participation rates. On the other hand, it is also related to the care burden of women (Turk Stat, 2016, 2022c; Turk Stat & Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2022). The fact that unpaid family work and self-employment are more common among women with only primary education (Acar Erdogan & V. Del Carpio, 2019) gives an idea about the relationship between unpaid care work and education (Turk Stat, 2022).

The high cost of education in Turkey also contributes to this diverse and unequal structure in accessing education and opportunities afterwards (Turk Stat & Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2022). According to Turk Stat data, in 2021, 12.7 per cent of men and 10.6 per cent of women aged 15 and over had to leave their education (including university) against their will due to economic reasons or educational failure, to contribute family income, educational failure or because their families did not allow them (Turk Stat & Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2022). Among these, economic reasons stand out for 61.8 per cent of men and 36.4 per cent of women (Turk Stat, 2016). Indeed, the socio-economic situation of households directly affects education opportunities in Turkey. According to OECD (2021c), while the number of young adults in tertiary education in Turkey has doubled over the past

decade, nearly half of the young adults have not even finished high school. This education gap summarises the educational inequality in Turkey. As Figure 19 below shows, household contribution to education is significant in Turkey, which accounts for about 20 per cent of total expenditures, while government expenditures cover 69 per cent of the expenses (Figure 19). In this case, when the family income is not enough to cover the part burdened on the households, families tend to interrupt or even cut their children’s education (OECD, 2019c; Turk Stat, 2016).

*Figure 19: Education expenditure by financial source, 2012-2019 (%)*




Source: [OECD Stat](#)

On the other hand, while education expenditure per student in public education institutions is higher on average across OECD countries than in private institutions (OECD, 2019c, 2021c), in Turkey, total expenditure per student on primary to tertiary education in public institutions remain very low compared to private institutions (Ministry of National Education, 2021; Turk Stat, 2022c). In addition, Turkey’s expenditure per student in primary to tertiary institutions is still low (Figure 20) compared to the OECD average. However, public expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product has increased in recent decades, with much of the increase concentrated in higher education institutions (OECD, 2019c, 2021c). The project of establishing a university in every city, which emerged after the 1980s but gained momentum in the last ruling period, has been effective in this increase (Yalçıntaş & Akkaya, 2019). On the other hand, the very low level of investment in early childhood education and primary education compared to higher education supports the argument that education expenditures arise out of political concerns, not as part of a comprehensive education policy


(Figure 20). As will be discussed later in the following sections, limited investment in children’s early education is one of the most critical factors that keeping women out of the labour market (Del Boca et al., 2020; Folbre, 1994; İlkaracan, 2012).

**Figure 20: Total public expenditure by the level of education, 2012-2019 (million euro)**



Source: [Eurostat, Education Expenditure Statistics, 2022](#)

**Figure 21: Net enrolment rates by level of education (% of relevant population), 2020**



\*: Gross rate; \*\*: [Eurostat](#); \*\*\*: [Eurostat](#)

Source: [UNESCO](#); [Eurostat](#) and [Turk Stat](#) Education Statistics, 2022

On the other hand, declining general education expenditures at the government level and increasing burden for households with limited resources (Figure 19) are forcing especially low-income families to decide when children should start education and which children should be given priority (Ekiz Gökmen, 2017; Kızılırmak et al., 2022; Ministry of National Education, 2021). Indeed, not surprisingly, Figure 21 indicates that while enrolment rates remain very limited in the early childhood education period in Turkey, the significant drop in the enrolment rates in the upper secondary education level, which refers to the 14-18 age period, is particularly critical for girls, as child marriage is a well-known fact for Turkey (Femicides Platform, 2022; Turk Stat, 2022d). On the other hand, boys at this age leave their education mostly for economic reasons (Turk Stat, 2016). The drop-out later at 18-24 age period again may suggest the building of a family for women and participation in the workforce for men are the forcing reasons (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). In addition, regional differences contribute to inequalities in education. The overall low enrolment rates in eastern Anatolia become even more striking considering that the majority of the 0-19 age group in Turkey is concentrated in these regions (Turk Stat, 2016). The lack of access to education in areas where the population needs it most reflects the paradox of the education system in Turkey (Taşkın Alp, 2016). In these regions, the enrolment rates of children from families with many




children and low levels of education are low, and child marriages are higher (Turk Stat, 2022d). This creates a vicious circle around gender and class roles; girls take their mothers' place in the reproductive sphere and share the burden of care, while boys become responsible for the management of the household as head of the family instead of their fathers (Dedeoğlu, 2000; Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Pateman, 1988).

On the other hand, the intermittent “4+4+4” (primary, lower secondary and upper secondary) education structure that started in 2012 added another dimension to this problem. In fact, after this change, compulsory education was increased from 8 to 12 years ([Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı](#)). However, in practice, the intermittent nature of this system has allowed families, especially those who do not want to support the education of girls, to restrict their children's access to school (Taşkın Alp, 2016). On the other hand, intermittent education allowed transitions to religious schools and home-schooling (Ministry of National Education, 2021), especially in the lower secondary school period. Moreover, despite the increase in enrolment rates, high absenteeism rates point to a lack of supervision (Taşkın Alp, 2016; Turk Stat, 2016). On the other hand, insufficient data on this issue makes it difficult to analyse it correctly and to produce effective policies. Especially in rural areas and provinces, inadequacies arising from physical conditions are reflected in the schooling rate of children (Ministry of Development, 2018). The lack of quality education in public schools, on the other hand, necessitates private lessons and courses in the transition to university, which increases the education expenses of households (Taşkın Alp, 2016; Turk Stat, 2016) and poses a threat in terms of social exclusion of children from low-income families increasingly. Nevertheless, education in Turkey still has an important role to play in the social movement.


Indeed, although for each level of education, the employment rate of men is higher than that of women, women with higher education have a higher chance of being employed. Women are mostly employed in higher education levels which varies by around 60 per cent. While the employment rate at the primary school level is around 30 per cent for women, it rises to 70 per cent for men (Figure 22). Indeed, a large proportion of men in total employment have secondary education and less education. In comparison, women with higher education are significantly less likely than men to enter the labour market. One explanation is that unless the benefits outweigh the costs of working, educated women are less likely to enter the workforce. This is because women in Turkey complete their education at a time that coincides with their most childbearing period (Turk Stat, 2022c) and therefore have to weigh childcare costs and other non-cost factors against the wages they can earn (Acar Erdogan & V. Del Carpio, 2019).

Figure 22: Employment rates by gender and educational attainment, 25-64 years, 2012-2021 (%)



Source: [OECD Stat, Education and Training Statistics, 2021](#)

Figure 23: Employment by sector and gender (%), 2012-2019



Source: [World Bank, Labour Force Statistics](#)

Gendered segregation in career choice plays a vital role in women's employment in different sectors and wage levels (Turk Stat, 2022c). Figure 23 above shows that women are mostly employed in the service and agriculture, while men are employed in the service and industry sectors. However, agricultural workers are decreasing significantly, and workers are shifting to the service sector (Figure 23). On the other hand, due to the gendered educational

and occupational polarisation, women's representation in the industry remains limited (Figure 23). This biased segregation results in women's concentration in education, social services, health, wholesale, and retail services in Turkey. However, according to Turk Stat (2022c), while women predominantly are in less-paid positions regardless of the sector, men in the same industry generally work in higher-paying managerial positions (Addati et al., 2018; Chopra & Nazneen, 2016; İlkaracan & Memiş, 2021).

This gendered segregation in education is also effective in the limited representation in the public sphere. As a result, it transforms the public sphere and politics into a male-dominated environment based on gender roles. Indeed, while the political representation rate of women in Turkey was 17.4 per cent in 2021, the representation rate of men reached 82.6 per cent. The representation of women in local governments, on the other hand, decreases further to 2 per cent. Although the representation of women has increased to these levels over the years, Turkey ranks 112<sup>th</sup> among 146 countries (see WEF [GGG report](#)). This score is not surprising given the almost non-existent presence of women in ministerial positions in forty years (Turk Stat, 2022c).

#### **4.2.1.2. Motherhood**

One of the main reasons two-thirds of women in Turkey are unable or unwilling to enter the workforce is unpaid care work, including childcare and elderly care. (Turk Stat, 2022c). Analysis of women's labour force participation status by age shows that women are willing to work at a young age when they finish their education, and usually withdraw from working life when they have children and tend to return when their children are older (Ministry of Development, 2018; Turk Stat & Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2022). If women are married or living with a partner, there is a positive relationship between their care responsibilities (ILO, 2022) and a negative with participation in the labour market (ILO, 2020, 2022).

Therefore, as will be discussed in detail in the social care section below, the lack of institutional care services in Turkey, especially in early childhood care and preschool education (Ministry of National Education, 2021), restricts women's labour supply and hinders the continuity of women in employment (Ministry of Development, 2018). Women who cannot access institutional care services and lack the financial resources to cover the expenses of outsourcing this service tend to decrease the birth rate (Turk Stat, 2021b), reduce their working hours (Turk Stat, 2021b) or consult the kinship to be able to handle both care and work

(Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). Data also confirms that early childhood care in Turkey is predominantly provided by mothers and relatives, neighbours, and caregivers (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022c). In addition, the fact that the social security system and health system are based on employment and provide services to citizens with contributions that vary according to income levels makes women dependent on their fathers, husbands and sometimes their sons, who are generally working members of the family (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Elveren, 2008; Yilmaz, 2017).


*Figure 24: Ratio of child population aged 0-17 in the Total Population, 1935-2080*



Source: [Turk Stat, Statistics on Child, 2021](#)

In Turkey, the average number of children a woman had during her fertile period was 2.38 in 2001 and decreased to 1.70 in 2021. This shows that fertility remains below the population replacement level of 2.10 (UN, 2022). Similarly, while the crude birth rate, the number of live births per thousand population, was 20.3 per thousand in 2001, this rate decreased to 12.8 in 2021 (Turk Stat, 2022a). This is in line with the data on the child population aged 0-17 in Turkey, which declines in the 1980s and is expected to decrease until 2080, also confirms this (Figure 24). In this decrease, the child population between 0-9, which covers the early childhood development period, is predominant. However, it still constitutes a significant part of the child population. In 2021, the ratio of the child population aged 0-9 to the total child population was 55 per cent (Turk Stat, 2022d).

**Figure 25: Births by mother's age group and mother's educational level at first birth, 2020**




Source: (Turk Stat, 2022c)

As seen in Figure 25, the mother's education level is also effective in the age group in which being a mother is preferred. Overall, women with secondary-level education are in first place in the birth rate for 2020, and women with a higher education degree follow them (Turk Stat, 2022c). On the other hand, women in Turkey mostly prefer bearing a child in the 25-29 age period. Women with higher and secondary education are more likely to become mothers in this period. This period also coincides with the period of graduation and starting a career. Thus, for women with higher education, the period of motherhood also shifts towards later ages, mostly 30-34 years old, and slightly 35-39 period (Figure 25). At this point, providing adequate and quality childcare is critical to women who are willing to enter the paid labour market and have children at the same time (Bulgarelli, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022d). This is of utmost importance in countries like Turkey, which maintain traditional gender roles (Sancar, 2011) and where social rights are linked to employment status (Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010). Given this, while becoming a mother and working in a paid job creates a double shift for women in Turkey (Kongar & Memiş, 2017), kinship support and charity unions become indispensable, intensifying traditional and religious ties. The following subsection will further present the impact of these conventional tendencies on women's employment through the household structure and gendered unpaid care work relationship.

### 4.2.1.3. Household Structure and Income

Worldwide, women’s unpaid care burden and access to the labour market are highly correlated with the number of family members and children living in the household and their interrelationships (ILO, 2020, 2022). Indeed, the data show that Turkey is no exception to this. According to Figure 26, women and men are influenced in different directions by certain situations. For example, while living as a couple with children seems to restrict women’s labour force participation, men benefit from the highest levels of labour force participation. On the other hand, in households with children under the age of 6, women living with their children alone are most likely to join the workforce, while the situation of men does not seem to change as much as women. The direct impact of the presence of young children can be observed in the increase in the labour force participation of women living without young children (Figure 26).

*Figure 26: Labour force status by household types in Turkey, aged 25-54, 2021 (%)*




Source: [ILO](#) and [Eurostat](#) Labour Statistics

The figures for Turkey are in line with the general pattern observed worldwide. Accordingly, while there is a significant decrease in women’s labour force participation from living alone to living with a partner and to living with a partner and children, the labour force participation of men is gradually increasing. In other words, while living with a spouse decreases women’s labour force participation rate, having children decreases it even more. However, it is vice versa for men (EIGE, 2022; ILO, 2020, 2022; WEF, 2021). On the other hand, in the case of extended families, two conflicting influences come into play. First, extended family households can increase women’s unpaid work related to elderly care while also having family members who can share care responsibilities and allow them to participate

in the labour market. Even today, in Turkey, which is dependent on family-based elderly care, the first option seems to be valid because living in an extended family with elderly relatives decreases the labour force participation of women (Labour Special Commission, 2018; Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022c).

*Figure 27: Labour force participation by marital status and gender, aged 25-54, 2011-2021*



Source: [ILO](#) Labour Statistics

Marriage also indirectly affects women’s labour force participation choices, both through household structure, as discussed above, and government tax and income policies (Özdiler Küçük, 2016; Tax Special Commission, 2014). In this context, it is quite interesting to observe how labour force participation preferences move in opposite directions for women and men based on their marital status. In other words, while women’s labour force participation rate has been higher and increasing gradually in recent years for single women, including widowed and divorced, the opposite is true for men (Figure 27).

On the other hand, even the highest labour force participation rates of single women do not reach the level of men. Although labour force participation rates are higher among single, widowed, and divorced women overall, due to the peculiarities of the social security system in Turkey, the lowest levels among them are observed for widowed women (Turk Stat, 2022c). The highest employment rate for men, on the other hand, is among married men, which may indicate that men are liberated from their unpaid care burden when they get married by shifting the burden to their spouses (EIGE, 2022; ILO, 2020; Turk Stat, 2022c).

The data which Figure 27 presents is also in line with the female poverty rates, which indicates that the poverty rate of women in single households is lower when their marital status is divorced and unmarried compared to the female-headed single households where women had lost their spouses (Ministry of Development, 2018). According to the Ministry of Development (2018), in 2015 alone, 21.9 per cent of single adult households with at least one dependent child where women were in charge and whose spouses had died were in poverty. A study (Zacharias et al., 2014) on the poverty of households in Turkey revealed that although 24 per cent of households in Turkey were officially classified as poor, this rate rose to 35 per cent when including the time required to carry out productive household activities necessary to maintain a basic standard of living. This means that the population in poverty is much higher than the official figures, and women in these households, in particular, have less time for education, work and leisure (EIGE, 2022; WEF, 2021). Moreover, the fact that households in poverty have fewer resources to distribute among family members and that social, cultural and political norms put boys and men in a higher priority creates a vicious circle of gender inequality (Appelbaum et al., 2002; Karimli et al., 2016).

#### **4.2.1.4. Age and Generation Impacts**

Age is an important determinant of women's relationship with the labour market, with generational implications. This generational divergence also includes the change in income from one year to the next over their lifetime and the income change between generations (Arulampalam et al., 2007; Azcona et al., 2021; Ilkkaracan et al., 2021). In this sense, the analysis of age in relation to gender inequality may be helpful to highlight trends of gendered unpaid care work across generations.


To begin with, as discussed earlier, in the 15-24 age group who are neither in employment nor in education, the unemployment rate is much higher for women than men ([see Table 4](#)). Moreover, the age period at which women are most fertile also often coincides with the beginning of their careers, and if the government does not have enough protection to keep them in employment, it will force them to abandon their careers altogether (Brilli et al., 2016; Gündüz & Ilkkaracan, 2019). Therefore, the data evidence that boys and girls experience the gendered structure of the social, cultural and economic environment based on their gender roles from a very early age (Turk Stat, 2022c).

According to data (Turk Stat, 2022d), the number of children under 17 engaged in economic activity has decreased slightly in almost a decade. The limited decline may indicate




that the reasons why children drop out of school and enter the workforce early have not been eliminated. Indeed children continue to participate in the labour force, most of the time informally (Turk Stat, 2016), to help the household’s economic activity, learn a profession, and contribute to household income. Household poverty, ineffective supervision and sanctions are reasons for continuing child labour practices (European Commission, 2020). Similarly, Turk Stat data show that mainly, the labour force participation level of children living in low-income and low-education families is higher (Turk Stat, 2022d). This is not surprising given the proportion of children living in non-employed households, corresponding to 2 million 432 children (Turk Stat, 2022d).

**Figure 28: Children engaged in economic activities by age group, gender, and reason of working, 2019 (%)**



**Figure 29: Percentage of children engaged in economic activities by gender and reason of working, 2019 (%)**



Source: (Turk Stat, 2022d)

On the other hand, together with child labour, unpaid care activities of children are the most important reason for socio-economic differentiation among children. Indeed, data also indicates this. Unpaid care activities at home, with 49 per cent, are the most relevant reason for being inactive or, in other words being in the NEET population (Acar Erdogan & V. Del Carpio, 2019; Turk Stat, 2016). While 65.5 per cent of working boys and 66 per cent of working girls continue their education, more than 60 per cent of girls under the age of 17 who do not attend school are engaged in unpaid care work (Turk Stat, 2022c). This result is similar to the relevant reason for being outside of the labour force in Turkey, which is 47 per cent, as shown in the previous section. In addition, disaggregating the data by gender reveals that while girls aged of 5-14 in the workforce mainly engage in household activity, for the 15-17 age period,

the most relevant reason is learning a profession. Similarly, for boys aged 5-14, helping with household activity is the first reason, while engaging in economic activity to build a skill for a job is more typical for 15-17 aged boys (Figures 28 and 29). Child marriage is also another factor related to this. In 2021, 13 139 girls and 770 boys aged 16-17 were married (Turk Stat, 2022d). Thus, regardless of gender, child labour has an adverse impact on access to the children rights including education, social protection and right to a childhood. Nevertheless, this impact is heavier for girls (Turk Stat, 2022d).

*Figure 30: Old age pension holders by gender, 2008-2020*



Source: Turk Stat, Social Protection Statistics, 2020


Adding women’s care responsibilities in older ages to the differentiation starts at an early age; women’s working life becomes inevitably much shorter than that of men. This situation also causes women to have a weak relationship with the social security system (Turk Stat, 2022). As the population ages, this relationship becomes more crucial than before. As shown in Figure 30, while men are most likely to benefit from the social protection system with old age pensions (74 per cent) after they retire from a paid job, women primarily receive a survivors’ pension (93 per cent) after losing their husbands. Not surprisingly, the level of old-age pension for women is very low, at 26 per cent (Figure 30).

#### 4.2.1.5. Informal Work


Although undeclared work is not defined by law in Turkey, it means not reporting the days or wages of the persons participating in employment by working in legal jobs to the

relevant public institutions ([SGK](#)). Despite the significant decrease, the informal sector remains a major source of employment in Turkey.

*Figure 31: Persons who are not registered to social security institution due to main job by gender, 2005-2021 (%)*



*Figure 32: Unregistered person rate to social security institution by sector, 2005-2021*



Source: (Labour Special Commission, 2018); [Turk Stat, Labour Statistics, 2021](#)

Informal workers, including unpaid family workers, tend to be female, older, and less educated (Tax Special Commission, 2014; Turk Stat, 2021a; Yılmaz, 2016). As the level of education increases, informality in the market decreases (Turk Stat, 2021a). However, informality is higher for women than men at all education levels. Therefore, it can be said that there is a significant relationship between being a woman, working in the informal sector and being socio-economically disadvantaged. This also means that not only unpaid domestic and care work but also most of the paid work of women do not count in the official statistics (Acar Erdogan & V. Del Carpio, 2019).

Indeed Figure 31 above, representing the informality rate in Turkey, indicates that informality is a significant problem, particularly for women (Figure 31). On the other hand, informality is higher in agriculture (Figure 32), particularly seasonal agriculture, where women's labour is intense, and almost all those working as unpaid family workers are women (Ministry of Development, 2018). The data confirm this: 94.1 per cent of women working in the agricultural sector are unregistered, while only 17 per cent of men in the same sector are in this situation (Turk Stat, 2021a). In this sense, the employment of low-educated and low-income women concentrates in agriculture mostly as unpaid family worker and the lack of adequate policies make them more vulnerable (Ministry of Development, 2018; Turk Stat, 2022c).

### **4.2.2. Socio-Political Normative Structure**

The gender equality argument in Turkey has a long history. After the republican reforms based on the experiences of the 19<sup>th</sup> century women in this territory, the image of the modern woman became a reflection of the competing forces in the society through “traditional-religious” and “modern-westernised” images (Ekin Akşit, 2008; Sancar, 2011; Sancar & Bulut, 2006). Although the first three decades of the young republic enabled women to get education together with men and engage in positive sciences, music, and art, following the example of the West (Durakbaşa, 1998), some went further, for instance, by gathering under a political party and demanding women’s suffrage. However, the limits of the rights granted to women at that time could not reach this point, and this movement was suppressed (Cakir, 1997). Nevertheless, ‘woman issue’ has been a critical component of the early Republican social modernisation process and an obstacle to the country’s development (Durakbaşa, 1998; Ekin Akşit, 2008; Kandiyoti, 1997). On the one hand, Turkey’s modernisation period is positioned in a modern family-centered structure that focuses on the role of women as wives and mothers (Sancar, 2011; Yelsalı Parkmaksız, 2012). On the other hand, the emphasis on modernisation paved the way for expressing political symbols in women’s bodies, identities, and images for various political purposes (Durakbaşa, 1998).

Therefore, the socially limited, non-economic and non-political status of women has led to the underrepresentation of women in the labour market and political decision-making processes (Sancar & Bulut, 2006, p. 6). In recent years, the emphasis on the position of women in the family and the role of motherhood has been particularly influential in the developments in gender equality policies. In this context, this chapter aims to present the socio-political and cultural tenets and public discourse that determine assigned gender roles and perceptions, thus gendered unpaid care work in Turkey. The first part will focus on the country’s socio-political normative position, which has accumulated in the political atmosphere surrounding gender equality activities in recent years, focusing on the AKP (Justice and Development Party- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which has been in power for over 20 years. The second part concentrate on the normative cultural structure that shapes gender roles and contributes to their perpetuation.

#### **4.2.2.1. The Political Discourse and Its Impact on Gender**

AKP has been in power for over 20 years now. It is possible to divide this period into four phases, which had a tremendous social, economic, and political impact (Öniş, 2015). The first period, 2002-2007, was characterised by rapid economic recovery and growth supported by a favourable global economy, with positive democratisation reforms and improved foreign relations (Ayata & Tütüncü, 2008; Aytaç & Elçi, 2019). The second phase refers to the period of the 2007-2011 recession in terms of economic performance and democratisation. Turkey lost momentum in economic indicators during this period (Yeldan, 2009); democratic reforms were halted when the formal negotiation process with the EU attained a dilemma (Bakıner, 2019). In addition, this period is a stage in which critical conflict between AKP and the military and judicial elite becomes evident (Akçay, 2018; Kaya, 2015). As a result, in the 2011-2016 period, the economic performance considerably deteriorated, and increasing authoritarianism and problematical relations with neighbours came to the fore (Adaman & Akbulut, 2021). Finally, the separation of Erdogan and the religious Gulen movement, which started around 2013 and peaked with the coup attempt in 2016, has marked the past seven years.

As AKP captured and voiced the ‘revolts’ of different groups such as local capitalists, liberal intellectuals, urban poor, and oppressed minorities, Erdogan’s regime switched from political Islam to social Islam and building Islamic democracy (Begumhan Bayhan, 2020; Tansel, 2018). Under his regime, some measures were employed to alleviate the impact of austerity and privatisation practices to keep working-class and precarious workers within the voter base. All these efforts maintained and broadened the electoral base of AKP and shifted the conflict between capital and labour to different elements of the ruling elite (Akçay, 2018; Kaya, 2015).

During the first years, AKP took some steps in democratic and civil rights reforms (Dağı, 2005). Throughout its reign, the AKP had given two opposite signals about its position on Islamic democracy. In its discourses, from 2002 until 2010/2011, AKP defended the non-authoritarian secularism practices (Çınar, 2018) and the importance of Turkey’s compliance with the European Union’s political norms (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016). Despite its discursive claims about universal inclusivity, the AKP’s very selective democracy approach, and the large gap between discourses and practices (Adar, 2013), Erdogan and his party initially adopted more delicate and non-polarising rhetoric, which represented hope for a genuinely moderate Muslim political power; and this gradually faded. The first period also involved localising gender

equality under state feminism (Tabak et al., 2022). After the AKP came to power, the demands of conservative religious women gradually settled into the mainstream. Demands to be able to dress, receive education, and work in the public sphere, exercise their citizenship rights without being transformed into a political identity, echoed in the AKP's agenda. On the other hand, this collaboration of the state only with conservative feminists focused on the family on a moral basis, excluding sexual rights, extramarital relationships, gender-based violence, abortion and LGBTIQ+ rights (Durak, 2021; Sancar, 2011). In particular, since at least the 2011 elections, the AKP has moved away from further democratisation and impaired the current electoral democracy in Turkey (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016). It has adopted the populist vote maximisation strategy that does not allow other dissident views in the socio-political arena (Çınar, 2018). This was accompanied by a one-sided, imposing, moral and aggressive political style, and secular lifestyles worsened if they were not intervened. This political progress decelerated firstly in the 2010s, and the symptoms of a strict and polarising authoritarian regime began to appear in 2013, one of the three pillars of AKP, together with populism and developmentalism (Adaman & Akbulut, 2021). This period included criminalising political opposition in parliament and social movements, suppressing freedom movements, and restricting workers' organisations (Adaman & Akbulut, 2021; Ayata & Tütüncü, 2008).

Indeed, the practices of AKP populism were based in part on a policy of resentment that encouraged the projection of hatred against groups or communities viewed as privileged and exclusionary or potentially treacherous (Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün, 2017; Kandiyoti, 2016). AKP's discourse on gender issues, which ascends on "othering and exclusion" (Kandiyoti, 2012), is the result of a new mode of patriarchy- different from republican, religious, and liberal- points out the gradual retreat of women's from social and economic spheres, dissemination of the conservative discourse on women's rights and discontentment with feminist demands (Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2011). In this context, AKP and Erdogan have been using the issues of gender and sexuality not only to change the agenda of masculine politics, which includes economic, military, and legal and ethnic matters but also to regulate sexual and reproductive realms (Korkman, 2016; Mutluer, 2019). This attitude is in line with the intersecting rationalities of neoliberalism and neoconservatism of this period.

The change in the discourses of Erdogan and AKP has been decisive in the policies that ascribe a fundamental position in society to the gender roles of men and women and the institution of the family (Durak, 2021; Sancar, 2011). This definition refers to Sunni-Muslim

and heterosexual families.<sup>27</sup> “The ideal family” metaphor of the AKP has often reiterated that women’s first duty should be shaped within the home, around the husband and children. From this perspective, the family is the most sacred entity, and its corruption can never be tolerated.<sup>28</sup> State-affiliated religious institutions have also been influential in reinforcing the importance of the family and the separate roles of the woman and the man in this structure. According to the family understanding of the AKP, in line with the Presidency of Religious Affairs, men are entitled to ensure the continuation of family and kinship, bear the responsibility of women, raise proper female children, protect themselves and their families’ honour and take the financial burden. In contrast, women must be humble, altruistic, and obedient. From this perspective, divorces are a “social disaster” and should be avoided (Korkut & Eslen-Ziya, 2018).

The discursive path followed by Erdogan and AKP, thus, has been based on embedding conservative gender norms in social policies, which in turn relies on women’s gradual regression from the production and finance spheres and their transformation into a less visible entity in the reproduction sphere (Pearson & Elson, 2015).<sup>29</sup> In this sense, AKP’s selective democracy (Adar, 2013) and discursive construction of social policy via politico-religious authority (Korkut & Eslen-Ziya, 2018) influence gendered unpaid care work and its allocation, as well as unorthodox and secular gender identities, lifestyles, even freedom of expression and enforcement of human rights.

In the face of all this, there is a strong [feminist movement](#) in Turkey that has not yet found a source to represent oneself in the political arena but does not give up on its demands

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<sup>27</sup> “Give birth at least three children so that our young population does not decrease” R. T. Erdogan, 7 March 2008. See [here](#)  
In 2012 Erdogan also said he considers the abortion as murder and here is no difference between killing a baby in the womb and killing after birth. See [here](#)

He also said that gender equality was against nature: “Sometimes, here they say ‘men and women equality.’ But ‘equality among women’ and ‘equality among men’ is more correct. However, what is particularly essential is women’s equality before justice”; “Equality is turning the victim into an oppressor by force or vice versa. The important thing is to be equivalent rather than equal. You cannot make men and women equal because this is against nature.” R.T. Erdogan, 24 November 2014. See [here](#)

“The woman will be chaste [...] She will not laugh with everyone.”, Bulent Arinc (Former Deputy Prime Minister), 2014 see [here](#); “Why should the child die if its mother is raped? What is its sin?... What is the fault of the child when mother commits adultery? Let his mother suffer, let the mother kill herself.”, Melih Gokcek (Former Mayor of Ankara), 2 June 2012” see [here](#).

<sup>28</sup> Most recently, an anti-LGBTIQ+ hate rally, also known as the “Great Family Gathering,” held on 18 September 2022, at Istanbul Sarachane Park, where Pride Marches have been banned for years, and almost all actions of the opposition have been blocked and suppressed by police attacks. All government media organisations supported and broadcasted this as a public announcement. This may be regarded as evidence of how AKP and Erdogan use gender issues to both change the political agenda and organise the society against gender equality issues.

<sup>29</sup> “Mothers all over the world have a motherhood career that no one else can have. Mothers should not focus on any career path other than motherhood”; Mehmet Müezzinoğlu (Former Minister of Health), 1 January 2015, see [here](#).

for gender equality. These include many feminist organisations that organise protests, prepare follow-up reports, and provide material/moral support against issues such as gender-based violence, intimate violence, women’s political representation, lack of legal protection of LGBTIQ+ rights, and the like.

#### **4.2.2.2. Cultural Norms**

Caring responsibilities are deeply embedded in culturally constructed social norms that regard motherhood as a ‘privilege’ but, at the same time, the very nature ‘nature’ of women, discouraging equal responsibilities in family and gender roles (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1996; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Sancar & Bulut, 2006). In other words, the perception is that it is the primary duty of men to provide and women care for the family (Folbre, 1994).

Gender norms in Turkey are no exception to this. The “family institution” is positioned to have significant implications regarding cultural gender norms in Turkey, especially for women in early marriages, forcibly maintaining abusive relationships and giving birth to children in these relationships (Turk Stat, 2022c, 2022d). Women’s presence in oppressive marriages and defining their roles inside the home cause their reproductive rights to be suppressed, cyclically affecting their lives (Femicides Platform, 2022). On the other hand, almost 18 per cent of the population in Turkey gets married younger than 17 (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). In 2021, 2.3 per cent of the total marriages were of young girls who married at the age of 16-17. As discussed earlier, child marriages are higher in eastern Turkey, reaching 10.1 per cent of total marriages (Turk Stat, 2022d).

Traditional gender norms also resonate with women’s relations with social protection rights. In Turkey, women are predominantly associated with the social security system through survivors’ pensions, as shown earlier (Karadeniz & Yılmaz, 2017; Turk Stat, Social Protection Statistics, 2020). An important reason is that women’s employment in paid jobs remains low due to women’s roles and responsibilities in the private sphere and the system, which is designed to connect women to social insurance through men (Turk Stat, 2022c, 2022d). Early and forced marriages are also effective in this, especially in terms of disrupting the education and training lives of girls and causing a decrease in schooling rates (Turk Stat, 2022d).

The role of women as a mother, or the “motherhood career” of women (see footnote 28), as commonly used in both political and social discourse in Turkey, is given great importance in both traditional and modern society (Durak, 2021; Sancar, 2011). The reason is




that the child is considered the most crucial element that defines the family and kinship (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). Indeed, according to the latest data of Turkstat (2022d), about 90 per cent of the population aged 15 and over in Turkey considers that the child completes the meaning of being a family and 83 per cent believe that children make couples closer. While 94.4 per cent suppose that raising a proper child is considered a “social duty” for the nation and the country, 73 per cent regard it as a requirement of the religion. More than 80 per cent considers children to increase their reputation and should take care of parents at older ages. Almost 70 per cent believe that a child financially supports the family once they have a job.

In this context, the distribution of responsibilities at home also reveals the gendered positions of men and women in public and private spheres. Almost 90 per cent of household chores such as cooking, ironing, laundry, dishes, sewing, food-tea-coffee service, tidying, and cleaning are under the responsibility of women. On the other hand, men, who are representatives of the household in the public sphere, pay the bills, make minor repairs and renovations, and shop with over 70 per cent (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). The gendered division of labour, publicly and privately, links women only to the sphere of reproduction and unpaid care work, contributing to their invisibility in the production sphere and risk of poverty and social exclusion (Turk Stat, 2022d).

The division at stake leads to job segregation and minimum visibility of women at decision-making levels and transfers assigned responsibilities from generation to generation (M. Gregory, 2011; Nussbaum, 2000b; Sen, 1979). In Turkey, like their mothers, girls from an early age take more responsibility for the domestic workload (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). The traditional understanding that providing service is a part of the gender role of women and receiving assistance is a part of gender role that of men continues as a legacy from generation to generation (Başak et al., 2013). In this case, at every point where women are in contact with the public sphere, the female identities determined for them come to the fore. They are projected as undertaking a mission of maintaining the social order, especially with their position in the family through their mother’s identity (Ekin Akşit, 2008; Elçi, 2012; Kandiyoti, 2012; Sancar & Bulut, 2006). While the role of women is defined with clearly demarcated borders, in such an oppressive environment, male violence has become one of the biggest problems facing women in Turkey with masculine politics and judicial practices (Femicides Platform, 2022; OECD, 2022b). Thus, the ‘proper female’ image legitimises the exclusion of ‘others’ who do not fall into this category, and even justifies male violence (Akalin

& Ayhan, 2022; Femicides Platform, 2022; Kandiyoti, 2016). Figure 33 shows that, among OECD countries, Turkey has the highest rate of women who have been subjected to physical or sexual violence by men throughout their lives. In Turkey, 38 per cent of women expressed that they had experienced physical and/or sexual violence from an intimate partner at some time in their life (OECD, 2022b) (Figure 33), while 35.5 per cent of women do not feel safe when walking alone at night in their neighbourhood (Turk Stat, 2022c). Suspicious femicides are also on the rise. In 2021 alone, 280 women were murdered, and 217 women died suspiciously (Femicides Platform, 2022).

*Figure 33: The percentage of women experienced physical and/or sexual violence from an intimate partner at some time in their life, OECD countries, 2019*



Source: (OECD, 2022b)

On the other hand, although domestic violence decreases as the education level of men and women increases (Institute of Population Studies, 2014; Turk Stat, 2022c), more than a quarter of women with a high school education and one-fifth of women with a university or higher education have been exposed to physical and/or sexual violence (Institute of Population Studies, 2014). Marital status is the main feature that has the greatest impact on the level of violence. While 38 per cent of ever-married women in Turkey have experienced physical and/or sexual violence at some point in their lives, the level of physical and/or sexual violence experienced by divorced or separated women is 75 per cent, which is twice the violence among all women. This suggests that violence itself may be the reason for divorce (Institute of Population Studies, 2014). Moreover, intimate partner violence has also increased tremendously with the Covid-19 pandemic. Especially being married and unemployed, having children, low marital/relationship satisfaction, increased workload at home, and the negative

impact of quarantine rules were effective (Adibelli et al., 2021; Akalin & Ayhan, 2022; Femicides Platform, 2022). In this interrelated complex structure, the inadequacy of legal regulations and law enforcement practices to protect women is one of the biggest reason. Therefore, the next section will focus on the legal structure and its impact on gender roles.

### **4.2.3. Legal and Institutional Normative Structure**

In Turkey, there is a long-standing and complicated commitment and policy development process to ensure gender equality, which started with the early Republican era reforms legalisation of co-education for boys and girls (1924), liberalisation of divorce for women (1926) and right to vote and to be elected (1934). On the other hand, modernisation definition over women's identity has created political discussions around traditional/modern and religious/secular separation according to women's appearance (Durak, 2021; Durakbaşa, 1998; Ekin Akşit, 2008; Kandiyoti, 2016; Sancar & Bulut, 2006). In the following period, gender equality rights in Turkey settled in the same axis after the EU candidacy and the gender equality agenda in the international arena. With CEDAW- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women-<sup>30</sup> in particular, in 1985, the gender equality argument gained momentum in Turkey.

The ratification of CEDAW in Turkey, publicly announced the political commitment to abolish discrimination based on gender and to recognise the human rights and fundamental freedoms of women in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or other fields based on equality between men and women (GDSW, 2012). In 1990, the Presidency on the Status and Issues of Women<sup>31</sup> was established under the Prime Ministry as the national mechanism stipulated by CEDAW (Kanun Hükmünde Kararname/422, 1990). However, with continuous restructuring, the institution to which the organisation is affiliated has been changed, and in 1994, its legal basis was removed. GDSW, operating without a legal basis for ten years, was restructured in 2004 and regained legal assurance (GDSW, 2008). Finally, GDSW was brought under the Ministry of Family and Social Policies umbrella in 2011 (Decree-Law No. 633, 2011). In accordance with Article 18 of the CEDAW, States are required to submit periodic country reports to the CEDAW Committee every four years. Turkey submitted its first report in 1990, the Second and Third Consolidated Reports in 1997, and the Fourth and Fifth

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<sup>30</sup> Entered into force on 03.09.1981.

<sup>31</sup> Over the years, the name of the institution was changed to the General Directorate on the Status of Women (GDSW).

Consolidated Country Reports in 2005 (GDSW, 2012). In addition, due to its candidacy since 1999, Turkey joined the EU's Gender Equality Program in 2003 and aimed to follow the Employment Strategy.<sup>32</sup> In parallel with these developments at the international level, legal changes have also been made at the national level.

In Constitution, the principle of gender equality in Turkey was strengthened with the amendments mainly in in the first half of 2000s. In 2004, Article 10, stating that “Women and men have equal rights. The state is responsible for ensuring the realisation of this equality.” was added to the constitution. In 2010, at the end of the second paragraph of this article: “...measures to be taken for this purpose cannot be interpreted as contrary to the principle of equality.” has been added. Article 41 also legally assures the *family* regarding it as “the foundation of Turkish society” and declares that “it is based on equality between spouses.” In addition, in 2004, “International agreements duly put into effect have the force of law. It is not possible to apply to the Constitutional Court on the claim that they are unconstitutional.” phrase was added to the constitution. Thus, international agreements were taken under constitutional guarantee (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, 1982).

On the other hand, New Civil Code, in 2002, changed the provision “husband is the head of the family” to “each of the spouses represents the marriage union” (Article 188). While the right to represent the marriage union in the old law belonged to the husband, except in some cases, the representation of the marriage in the new Civil Code was given to both spouses. This new law also included articles regulating issues such as custody, alimony payments, inheritance, property management, marriage age and adoption with a gender equality perspective. For example, according to the old Civil Code, the livelihood of the house and children belonged to the husband, while the New Civil Code changed this to “spouses participate in the expenses of the union with their labour and assets in proportion to their power.” (Article 186) (Türk Medeni Kanunu, 2001).

The New Labour Law, which entered into force on June 10, 2003, regulated non-discrimination regarding fundamental human rights in the employer-employee relationship for any reason, including gender, under the “equal treatment principle” (Article 5). The other two important changes in the new labour law are the introduction of provisions on sexual harassment in the workplace (Article 24) and the extension of women's maternity leave to a total of 16 weeks (Article 74). Another change is the abolition of the provision that prevents

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<sup>32</sup> See [GDSW](#) for Action Plans.

women from working at night in the industry to provide equal job opportunities for men and women (Article 73) (İş Kanunu, 2003).

In the Penal Law, the definition of woman, which was included in the draft law but was later removed from the definitions section, made a distinction between married and single women based on virginity (Article 6). On the other hand, with the new law, “forced rape” and “forced harassment” (instead of chastity in the old law), “sexual offences” are regarded as crimes against sexual immunity under the heading of crimes against individuals. In the case of sexual assault against the spouse, a penal sanction including the qualified version of the sexual assault crime has been introduced. Still, the investigation and prosecution have been the subject of the complaint of the aggrieved spouse (Article 102). The concept of sexual harassment in the workplace has been defined, and the qualified forms of sexual harassment have been determined. Accordingly, abuse of influence arising from the hierarchy and service relationship or sexual harassment against a person by taking advantage of the working in the same workplace is punished with a heavier penalty than the basic form of the crime (Article 105) (Türk Ceza Kanunu, 2004).

Apart from these, there are regulations on gender equality or positive discrimination in other laws such as the Code of Obligations, Income Tax Act, Occupational Health and Safety Act, Civil Servants Law and so on (GDSW, 2012).

As a signatory to CEDAW, Turkey has included the regulation against discrimination against women. However, in the years following CEDAW, it has been recognised in the international arena that CEDAW itself does not contain specific regulations on violence against women, which has devastating consequences for women, societies, and economies (Council of Europe, 2012).<sup>33</sup> In 1992, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women adopted General Recommendation 19 on violence against women.<sup>34</sup> In this process, regionally valid conventions on violence against women have also emerged. The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention), opened for signature in May 2011 in Istanbul, was the first legally binding document in this field in Europe (Council of Europe, 2012). This convention has been opened for signature by 47 member states of the Council of Europe as well as non-member

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<sup>33</sup> See [UN Women](#) for further information, Accessed 02/10/2022.

<sup>34</sup> See [CEDAW](#) for further information, Accessed 02/10/2022.

countries. Turkey, one of the first signatories of the Convention, signed the Convention on 11.05.2011 but announced the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on 22.03.2021.<sup>35</sup>

To eliminate gender-based violence, after Istanbul Convention, the government in Turkey enacted the [Law on The Protection of The Family and The Prevention of Violence Against Women](#) entered into force in 2012 to protect women, children, family members and people who are victims of persistent stalking, who have suffered or are at risk of violence. This law has also enabled the establishment of “Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centres (ŞÖNİM)”, where support and monitoring services are provided for the prevention of violence and the implementation of protective and preventive measures, and services to be provided by the centres were regulated. In addition, the Ministry of the family prepares National Action Plans for Combating Violence Against Women, which started before the Convention ([2007-2010](#), [2012-2015](#), [2016-2020](#), [2021-2025](#)). Apart from this, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies prepared the [Women’s Empowerment Strategy Document and Action Plan \(2018-2023\)](#) and the 5-year “[Action Plan on the Prevention of Violations of the Human Rights Convention](#)” in 2014. Finally, the [11<sup>th</sup> Development Plan \(2019-2023\)](#) has included that social awareness-raising activities will be accelerated to prevent violence against women. Nevertheless, Turkey remains behind the EU and OECD in the provision of the legal and institutional framework on the gender equality. This requires consistent commitment and resource allocation of the governments for the construction of a solid, socially protective, and care-friendly institutional structure. On the other hand, the final [2023 Budget Law](#) did not include any special regulation regarding gender equality and women. To this end, the next chapter will focus on government revenue and expenditure activities and social security that affect gender roles.

#### **4.2.4. Social Care System and Dynamics**

This final section is devoted to the government’s role as the provider of social protection and welfare as well as the actor that manages production, allocation, and reproduction. In this sense, as will be discussed below, the government’s income and expenditure policies function as instruments of socio-economic segregation as well as gendered redistribution. This section starts with providing an overview of income and wealth inequality, tax, and expenditure

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<sup>35</sup> See [Council of Europe](#), Accessed 02/10/2022.

policies. Finally, the final two sub-sections will present Turkey’s national healthcare and childcare system, one of the most relevant services to gendered care work.

#### 4.2.4.1. Government’s Role on Gendered Socio-Economic Segregation in Turkey

##### 4.2.4.1.1. Income and wealth inequality

The government’s tax and expenditure policies and income and wealth inequalities created directly and indirectly through these instruments affect the boundaries around care services and, thus, the gendered division of unpaid care. Therefore, before presenting the social care infrastructure in Turkey, it is worth looking at the situation of monetary inequality and its impact.

*Table 8: Gini coefficient, disposable income and poverty rates by years in Turkey*

	1994	2004	2007	2009	2010	2011 <sup>§</sup>	2012	2013	2014	2015	2017	2018
Gini (market income, post taxes and before transfers) <sup>*</sup>	..	..	..	..	0.477	0.427	0.422	0.416	0.423	0.429	0.502	0.492
Gini (disposable income, post taxes and transfers) <sup>**</sup>	0.491	0.430	0.409	0.411	0.417	0.403	0.399	0.390	0.398	0.404	0.409	0.397
P90/P10 disposable income decile ratio <sup>***</sup>	6.9	6.5	6.2	6.3	6.5	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.9	5.7	5.4	5.4
Poverty rate post taxes and before transfers, Poverty line 60% <sup>†</sup>	..	..	..	..	0.286	0.280	0.271	0.265	0.264	0.270	0.327	0.335
Poverty rate post taxes and transfers, Poverty line 60% <sup>††</sup>	0.235	0.243	0.24	0.268	0.266	0.266	0.257	0.247	0.251	0.252	0.217	0.214

<sup>\*</sup>, <sup>\*\*</sup>: In the OECD data, the Gini coefficient for market income refers to income before taxes and transfers. However, data for Turkey from the Household Budget Survey refer to the income post taxes and before transfers.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>: The ratio of the upper bound value of the ninth decile (i.e., the 10% of people with the highest income) to that of the upper bound value of the first decile.

<sup>†</sup>, <sup>††</sup>: The share of people with an equivalised disposable income (before and after social transfers) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers. Figures represent the percentage of the population.

<sup>§</sup>: After 2011, OECD data include a more detailed breakdown of current transfers received and paid by households. The household income definition is also revised to include the value of goods produced for own consumption as an element of self-employed income.

Source: [OECD Stat](#), [Euro Stat](#)

The reason behind is that the resource allocation of government affects the distribution of income, wealth and power. It has the ability to direct this resources to the disadvantaged segments and use it in a way to transform the structure of gender relations. Indeed, data show that, income and wealth inequalities favouring the rich and more advantaged classes worsen the conditions of women and girls towards the lower classes (Atkinson, 2014; Blyth, 2013;

Piketty, 2014; Roubini & Mihm, 2010). As shown in Table 8, the Gini coefficient<sup>36</sup>, which shows the income inequality in Turkey for different years, changes slightly after the transfer payments from the government to households. This means that even after the transfer payments, inequality in terms of disposable income does not change significantly. For example, for the last two years, in Table 8, while income inequality in terms of the Gini coefficient was around 0.5, this value regresses to 0.4 after government transfer payments, which still represents higher income inequality levels. On the other hand, although there is some progress in the convergence of the highest and lowest incomes (P90/P10 ratio)<sup>37</sup>, this change is relatively slow, and state interventions do not seem to improve this direction significantly.

On the other hand, in Turkey, the poverty level after taxes and transfers fluctuates between 20-25 per cent of the total population for the years represented above. The resilience of the post-tax and post-transfer poverty rate also indicates that the curative effect of transfers and progressive taxation for social justice is not functioning well in Turkey (Table 8). In addition, the proportion of women and children in the poor population is higher. Considering over 2.4 million children living in non-working households (Turk Stat, 2022d), the fragile situation of women and children in low-income families becomes even more evident.

#### 4.2.4.1.2. *Tax policies*

In addition to Turkey's polarised income segments, taxes tend to be levied indirectly rather than directly. The most significant impact of this preference is that indirect taxes which mostly includes consumption taxes, finance the government expenditures rather than taxes on wealth and high-income. As a result, the low-income families, where people have to spend most of their income on basic consumption becomes disadvantaged compared to higher income families. In addition, since there is not a specific tax credit or allowance regulation exempting the childcare and basic expenses from taxation (Özdiler Küçük, 2016), the reliance on indirect taxation further discriminate women in low income households and makes it irrational to participate in the labour force (OECD, 2018; Özdiler Küçük, 2016).

As shown in Figure 34, while the indirect taxes on consumption, expenditures and transactions have a trend of increase, fluctuating around 65-70 per cent of total tax revenue,

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
<sup>36</sup> The Gini coefficient represents a value in the interval of 0-1; where '0' denotes perfect equality while '1' denotes maximum inequality. The data for Turkey both market income and disposable income represents the income after tax.

<sup>37</sup> In this method, incomes are first ordered from smallest to largest. Then, the income level of 90 percent of the population is compared with the income level of 10 percent of the population.



direct taxes on income, profit and property tend to decrease. Significantly, after 2002, during the ruling party AKP period, the gap between these income sources widened considerably. The low share of wealth taxes in general government tax revenues indicates that this is the last resort in financing government expenditures (Figure 34). The percentage of indirect taxes in total tax revenues in Turkey is well above the EU average of 35 per cent for 2019 (European Union, 2021).


*Figure 34: Share of direct, indirect and wealth taxes in total tax revenue (%), Turkey, 1999-2022*



Source: [Presidency of Strategy and Budget, Turkey](#)

As for income tax, if taxation through withholding is excluded, the taxation of real persons is not effectively implemented in Turkey. The prevalence of taxation through withholding causes individuals to be unaware of the taxes they pay from their income, resulting in these taxes being perceived as a burden by employers (Tax Special Commission, 2014). Nevertheless, income tax accounts for most of the total general government tax revenue, over 33 per cent, as shown in Figure 35. Goods and consumption taxes follow it with 32.2 per cent. Regarding income tax, Figure 36 can give an insight into who bears the tax burden the most. Accordingly, personal income tax constitutes a significant share exceeding 55 per cent, and a large part of it is withheld at source.


**Figure 35: The structure of general government tax revenues in Turkey, 2000-2020**



Source: [OECD Government Revenue Statistics](#)

The most obvious outcome of this situation is that the tax burden does not effectively change according to the differences in income level (Tax Special Commission, 2014). As a result, government tax policies significantly reduce the welfare of low- and middle-class households. The adverse effects of these practices are felt more in families where uneducated and unemployed individuals are the majority (Turk Stat, 2022d). Given that women in poor households are often out of the workforce, they are more likely to be adversely affected by these tax policies (Ministry of Development, 2018; Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019).

**Figure 36: Decomposition of taxes on income, profits and profits**



Source: [Ministry of Treasure and Finance](#)

On the other hand, although the severity of the disadvantage varies mainly depending on the education level and income group, the effective tax rate<sup>38</sup> of working women is higher when the income level differences between women and men are considered (Tax Special

<sup>38</sup> The percent of the income that an individual or a corporation pays as tax.

Commission, 2014; Ministry of Treasure and Finance). If we include social security contributions to this, the situation of women in Turkey worsens towards lower income groups. Furthermore, the wage difference has a limited effect on tax differentiation in the service sector, where women work predominantly (Yılmaz, 2016). Thus, tax revenue data of Turkey shows that the tax system in Turkey does not consider solvency and individual factors.

#### 4.2.4.1.3. *Government expenditure*

Redistributive tax policies, together with the social protection expenditure, are critical in redistributing power centralised in a particular class, social segment or gender as political and economic power. It is also critical for establishing social justice (Piketty, 2014; Tax Special Commission, 2014). A standard international approach to analysing government redistribution activities is disaggregating government spending by key functions. From Figure 37, it is possible to comprehend the resource allocation of government levels in Turkey and EU-27 countries to ten different public service categories.


Social protection expenditure of the government in Turkey, including social funds,<sup>39</sup> comprise 30.4 per cent of total government expenditure. This is behind the EU-27 average of 41.3 per cent. In Turkey, health expenditure ranks fourth at 12.8 and education ranks fifth at 9.2 per cent. That is, in Turkey, the government spends more on operating costs than on healthcare and education. On the other hand, in the EU, after social protection expenditure, health is the second most spent item, with 15.1 per cent of total spending (Figure 37). It is also possible to observe and analyse the decentralisation level of public services. Although decentralisation has advantages, such as a better understanding of the needs and priorities of the local citizens, it also causes differentiation in public services when political conflicts affect the amount of resources allocated to local governments (Aydemir-Uslu, 2017). This differentiation may cause inequality of opportunity, especially in rural areas and especially for women and girls. In this sense, the fact that central government expenditure on education is proportionally higher than the general government spending seems as a positive sign which implies the standardisation of the opportunities in education to some level. However, the dominance of the central government in educational spending does not directly lead to equalisation of the educational standards throughout the country. In rural areas, women and

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<sup>39</sup> The general government sector consists of central, state, and local governments and social security funds controlled by these units. Data on the distribution of government spending by both level and function can be an indication of the extent to which key government activities are decentralised to local governments ([OECD Data](#) Accessed 27/08/2022).

girls, in particular, face discriminatory norms and are excluded from education. On the other hand, as discussed earlier, education expenditure on the private institution is higher in Turkey, unlike the OECD average (OECD, 2019c, 2021c).

*Figure 37: Government expenditure by function (COFOG) (% of total) <sup>40</sup>*




Source: [Ministry of Treasury and Finance](#)

Source: [Euro Stat](#)

It is also noteworthy that the general government expenditures in Turkey are very low compared to the GDP levels and lag behind the EU. With the recent outbreak, overall government spending in the EU accounted for more, at 53 per cent of GDP, than the previous year (46.5 per cent). This occurred due to the Covid-19 pandemic and increases in total spending (Figure 38). However, government expenditures as a share of GDP seem unaffected by this health crisis in Turkey (Figure 38). While general government spending in the EU before and after the Covid-19 period fluctuates around 46 per cent and 51 per cent of GDP, this rate is about 32 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively, in Turkey (Figure 38).


<sup>40</sup> Functional classification of government spending allows us to separately observe and analyse the total amount of money spent on key government functions. For further information on Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) see [Euro Stat](#) (Accessed 25/08/2022).

**Figure 38: General and central government expenditures as share of GDP (%), 2018-2021**




Source: [Turk Stat](#); [Euro Stat](#)

**Figure 39: Health, education and social protection expenditure as % of total government expenditure, 2011-2021**



Source: [Ministry of Treasury and Finance](#); [Euro Stat](#)

**Figure 40: Government social assistance spending, % of GDP, 1990-2019**



Source: [OECD Stat](#)

On the other hand, Turkey also stays behind the EU in terms of the broad definition of social welfare expenditure. Figure 39 above shows the total social welfare expenditure on education, health and social protection of Turkey and the EU countries. In comparison, social welfare spending represents 65.8 per cent of total government expenditure for EU-27, representing 55.1 per cent of the total spending in Turkey for 2020 (Figure 39). According to the OECD data, focusing only on social assistance spending such as social insurance, government social spending represents 12 per cent of the GDP in Turkey, while this ratio for the OECD average is 20 per cent for 2019 (Figure 40).

*Table 9: Distribution of expenditures on social protection by type of benefits\*, 2020*

	EU-27		Turkey	
	% of GDP	% of total	% of GDP	% of total
(1) Sickness/Health care	8.8	29.1	3.4	26.5
(2) Disability	2.2	7.3	0.4	3.2
(3) Old age	11.7	38.6	6.0	46.6
(4) Survivors	1.7	5.7	1.5	11.3
(5) Family/Children	2.5	8.3	0.6	4.8
(6) Unemployment	2.2	7.3	0.9	6.9
(7) Housing	0.4	1.3	0.0	0.0
(8) Social exclusion and n.e.c.**	0.7	2.4	0.1	0.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>12.9</b>	<b>100</b>

\*: Figures in the table may not add up to totals due to rounding.

\*\*: Not elsewhere classified

Source: [Euro Stat](#)

Moreover, a closer look at the distribution of the expenditures only on social protection by disaggregating by the benefit type reveals that social spending on old age pensions, which is higher in Turkey, occupies most of the government spending on social protection in the EU and Turkey. In this sense, government expenditure patterns have been shaped mostly by demographical factors rather than socio-economic conditions. Following old age expenses, sickness and health care are the second for both (Table 9).

Considering the ageing population in Turkey and the EU, it is not difficult to predict that the old-age pension will be a greater burden on the government budgets in the recent future. While there is a growing trend towards increasing retirement ages and raising eligibility requirements, these practices do not offer a temporary solution but are particularly affecting women whose careers have been interrupted and who have difficulty qualifying for retirement. In addition, providing social security coverage according to employment status is the soft spot of the system in Turkey. Very limited protection in terms of unemployment and disability and providing assistance based on citizenship status also increase the unpaid care burden of households, thus women, leaving a huge gap in social protection.

In this context, social allowances are critical to redistribute income and wealth and establish gender equality. However social protection regulations, such as one time birth allowance ([Doğum Yardımı](#) - 300 liras for the first child, 400 liras for the second child, 600 liras for the third and subsequent children, and is provided for Turkish citizens), provision of social support to people who do not receive any income within the scope of [Social Assistance and Solidarity Encouragement Law](#), income support for foreigners who meet the requirements

under [Social Cohesion Assistance](#) and the like (see [Section 6.4](#) for detailed information), remain significantly limited not only for establishing gender transformative social care system but also redistribution of resources and enabling income and wealth equality in Turkey.

#### **4.2.4.2. National Healthcare System in Turkey**

Healthcare service is provided in Turkey through the individual and public funds accumulated in the [Social Security Institution \(SGK\)](#). This system covers employed persons, including civil servants; self-employed persons; and full-time household workers.

Although the implementation of the AKP's [Transformation of Health](#) (Sağlıkta Dönüşüm Programı) after 2003 has increased the coverage of the health system by introducing public general health insurance together with the standard health insurance service package, the obligation to be associated with the system through employment status and to pay contributions when benefiting from health services leaves the majority of women dependent on their working husbands and sons. The reform included restructuring social security institutions under a single institution<sup>41</sup>, unbundling the delivery and financing of health services, limiting the presence of public institutions in the health sector as much as possible, and ensuring the entry of non-public institutions (Ministry of Health, 2003). On the other hand, Turkey has made remarkable progress in terms of the health status of the population since the early 1980s. Key health indicators such as infant mortality rate, life expectancy and maternal mortality have improved significantly. Table 10 shows that in 2021, the average life expectancy reached 73 for men and 79.1 for women. The infant mortality rate fell to 9.1 in 2019 and 11.1 in under five years. (Table 10).

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<sup>41</sup> Before this, SSK (Social Insurance Institution), BAG-KUR (Social Security Organization for Self-Employed) and Emekli Sandığı (Social Security Organization for Civil Servants) were the social security institutions.

*Table 10: Health indicators for selected years, Turkey, 1980-2021*

		1980	1990	2000	2010	2012	2015	2017	2019	2020	2021
Life expectancy <sup>a</sup>	Women	66.2	71.4	75.3	78.2	78.8	79.8	80.3	81.0	79.1	79.1
	Men	59.4	64.4	68.6	71.9	72.5	73.5	74.0	74.7	72.8	73.0
Mortality rate (per 1000 live births) <sup>b</sup>	Infant	89.7	55.5	30.9	15.5	13.6	11.1	9.8	8.6	8.1	-
	Under 5 years	127.9	74.2	38.0	18.1	15.8	13.0	11.4	10.1	9.5	-

Source: a: [UN World Population Prospects](#); b: [UNICEF Child Data](#)

The health system in Turkey, with the 2003 reform, was transformed into a blended mode of public and private health services. With the inclusion of the private sector and private investment, the lack of public investment in this sector was eliminated (Yilmaz, 2017). However, this transformation brought along other problems and left some others unresolved (Turkish Medical Association, 2003). Among those problems, the differences in access to quality healthcare services and outcomes in health indicators, such as infant mortality, between rural and urban areas are concerning. The World Health Organization states that these differences can be attributed to low socioeconomic conditions and the prevalence of the low education levels (WHO, 2011). Due to these socio-economic differences, Turkey is one of the OECD countries where the gap between the lowest and highest income groups in terms of unmet needs is the highest. In 2019, the difference between the two groups was over 5 per cent (OECD, 2021d), and the presence of the public is critical to eliminate this segregation (İlkkaracan et al., 2015).

*Table 11: Hospital bed numbers by sector, 2021*

	Ministry of Health	University	Private	Total
Number of hospitals by sectors	908	68	571	1547
%	59	4	37	100
Hospital beds (per 1 000 people)				3.01
Intensive care beds (per 100 000 people)				39.8


Source: (Ministry of Health, 2022); [OECD Health Statistics](#); [Eurostat Health Statistics](#)

However, Turkey is also one of the OECD countries that allocates the lowest share to health in total government expenditures (Figure 41), accounting for around 10 per cent of




public expenditures, along with Mexico, Greece and Hungary (OECD, 2021d). While public hospitals constitute the majority (Table 11), in 2020, Turkey, with an average of 3 hospital beds per 1000 people (Turk Stat, 2022b), represented the lowest band of the OECD along with Italy, Latvia, Poland, and Greece (OECD, 2021d). This is also in line with the increase in the out-of-pocket health expenditure of households. Figure 41 shows the trend of the health expenditures of the central government and households, which have been moving upward since the late 1990s. The financial gap between government allocation to the health system and the ageing population's needs increases household expenditures on health (Figure 41). Turkey also spends less than 0.2 per cent of its GDP on delivering long-term care services, which again places it in the lowest band among OECD countries for long-term care, along with Mexico, Chile and Greece (OECD, 2021d). This may indicate that long-term care in Turkey mainly relies on informal care provided by unpaid family members (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2017).

*Figure 41: Health expenditures of central government and households, Turkey 1999-2020*




Source: Turk Stat, Health Expenditure Statistics, 2020

*Figure 42: Out-of-pocket household health expenditure as percentage of total health expenditure in Turkey, 1999-2020*



Source: (Turk Stat, 2022b)

*Figure 43: Number of persons per physician and total number of visits per physician, annually, Turkey, 2009-2020*



Source: (Turk Stat, 2022b)


On the other hand, while public resources devoted to health have increased due to Covid-19 (Figure 41), these increases have generally been smaller than subsidies to businesses affected by the recession (Addabbo et al., 2013; Elson, 2010; Karamessini, 2014; Pearson & Elson, 2015). Although household health expenditures have increased significantly over the years, the percentage of out-of-pocket payments of households in total household expenditures remained at 1.3 per cent for 2019, below the OECD average of 3.1 per cent (OECD, 2021d). Household expenditure comprised 16 per cent of total health expenditures in 2020 (Figure 42). One reason in the limited level of household expenditure on health compared to other OECD countries may be that Turkey has the lowest healthcare prices compared to other OECD countries (OECD, 2021d). However, this increasingly competitive structure, in which health is represented as a commodity, inevitably puts pressure on health workers. Indeed, Turkey's healthcare system is characterised by high annual visits and the number of patients per doctor (Figure 43). In this sense, health policies in Turkey, while reducing the quality of the service received, endanger the social rights of health workers. As a result, interruptions in the health system due to insufficient resource allocation and inefficient health governance require families and communities to fill this gap. It is no longer a secret that women play a leading role in this. On the other hand, insufficient management of the system also worsen the situation of healthcare workers, most of whom are women.

#### **4.2.4.3. Early Childhood Care in Turkey**

In Turkey, pre-primary education is not compulsory, and children begin compulsory education at the age of 5.5. Childcare facilities in Turkey are divided into two periods: 0-3 age

groups, which include public and private kindergartens (kreş) and 3–5,5 age group childcare. The latter is under the control and responsibility of the national government. These facilities include nursery classes (ana sınıfı) for aged 4-5,5 in the primary school premises and nursery schools (bağımsız ana okulu) as independent childcare facilities for children aged 3-5,5. Today there are 2 894 public kindergartens, 19 226 school which has nursery class on their premises, and 2 338 public institutions but not affiliated with the Ministry of National Education, which may require a fee and other expenses. 2 252 of them for 4-6 age and includes care services dependent to the Presidency of Religious Affairs. There are also 6 520 private pre-school education institution (Ministry of National Education, 2021).

*Figure 44: Enrolment rates in early childhood education and care services (% of the population aged 3-5)*



Source: [National Education Statistics, 2020/21](#)

Turkey’s preschool enrolment rates remain significantly low, as childcare facilities are limited and optional. Moreover, after the Covid-19 pandemic, this rate fell below its previous levels. Only 1.2 million of the more than 6.1 million children aged 0-5 are involved in early childhood education (Ministry of National Education, 2021). On the other hand, approximately 1.3 million women left the labour market due to childcare in 2016, and about 275 thousand women did not join the workforce to look after their children (Karadeniz & Yılmaz, 2017). Nevertheless, as female employment rates increase, more children attend preschool education (Figure 44). Still, this increase depends on women to decide whether the employment provides adequate wages to receive childcare rather than providing childcare themselves (Acar Erdogan & V. Del Carpio, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022c). In fact, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies (2019) data reveals that early childhood care in Turkey is predominantly provided by mothers and women relatives, neighbours, and caregivers. In 88 per cent of households with young children at preschool age, mothers take care of the children, and in 6 per cent grandparents care for them. The rate of care for children before school age by caregivers at home is 1 per cent. In addition, only 11 per cent of children aged 3-6 attend kindergarten. In the Northeast, Middle East and Southeast Anatolia regions, the mother’s childcare responsibility reaches 96-97 per

cent. While the rate of paid caregivers is low in all regions, the highest rate is in the Aegean region, with 3 per cent (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019).

On the other hand, the obligation to open a daycare or kindergarten in workplaces depends on employing more than 150 women (Regulation, RG:16.08.2013, 28737, 2013), which in practice has no value. Although Turkey has a majority of small businesses employing less than 9 workers, this regulation encourages enterprises not to reach the legally binding level to avoid their obligations (Koray, 2011). A one-time birth allowance ([doğum yardımı](#)) also is not enough to cover the expenses of having a child. To compensate for this government enacted a regulation in [Income Tax Law \(Art 23, par. 16\)](#) to exempt the benefits provided by employers to female employees for nursery and day-care services from tax, provided that they do not exceed 15 per cent of the monthly gross amount of the minimum wage for each child. The government also regulated the exemption of day-care facilities from income and corporate tax for 5 taxation/accounting periods from their operation (see [here](#)).

Although these are positive improvements in the redistribution of care burden on women, neither of these policies is enough to organise childcare in a more gender-transformative way. They lack effective involvement of the public sector in childcare provision. In addition, regulations entitling women with only 16 weeks paid maternity leave, and fathers with optional 10 days leave (Decree Law 29882, 2016) are far from being care-friendly. Although they shift the childcare burden more to women, they do not provide leave for a sufficient period. Since also childcare facilities do not offer solutions to this, women are left with dilemmas around work and childcare. On the other hand, public policies investing in early childhood education are critical to eliminating gender inequalities and breaking the poverty chain between women and girls (Bulgarelli, 2020). A recent study (İlkkaracan et al., 2015) on Turkey analyses the impact of investment in early childhood care and preschool education. It indicates that along with ensuring quality and adequate care provision, public investment in this field generates more than 3 times the number of direct jobs (64.4 positions) than the expansion of construction (21.3 positions).

However, rigid stereotypes and designing care services according to them perpetuates the perception on the responsibility of women in childcare. According to the latest data of Turk Stat (2022d), 42.3 per cent of men and 36 per cent of women think that having a child negatively affects the social, educational and professional life of the mother, while 18 per cent of men and 14 per cent of women think that this applies to fathers (Turk Stat, 2022d). Considering the childcare services of the government in Turkey, having children has many

disadvantages for women in terms of their attributed social roles. Lack of early childhood care services causes lower employment rates of women and to be connected to social rights through their marital partners. In such an environment they face the risk of poverty, especially in older ages.

### **4.3. CONCLUSION**

In Turkey, gender equality arguments and efforts dating back to the early Republican era, aimed to modernise women and families to build a developed nation-state, in early forms (Durakbaşa, 1998; Kandiyoti, 2012; Sancar, 2011). Although the rights remained limited around the roles of women as mothers and wives and the emphasis on modern female identity led to the definition of the political agenda through the female body where old and new images of women constantly clash, reforms in this period increased the presence of women in the public sphere (Durakbaşa, 1998; Ekin Akşit, 2008; Kandiyoti, 1997). On the other hand, today, Turkey is a country where women's labour force participation remains very low and women's total working time, paid and unpaid, is much higher than that of men. Although women work more, their connection to social rights remains very limited; they face poverty and social exclusion, particularly in older ages (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022c).

Nevertheless, gender equality policies and institutional structure have been on the agenda in Turkey, particularly with the ratification of CEDAW in 1985 and the candidacy to the EU in 1999. However, the long-established modern/traditional religious/secular conflict has continued to influence the gender equality rhetoric and policies. In this context, the last 20 years in Turkey marked a new era in the gender equality movement (Korkut & Eslen-Ziya, 2018; Toğrul & Memiş, 2011). This is because a period in which demands for gender equality and human rights increased and some legal reforms were made in the international arena coincides with a religious, conservative, and populist political period (Sancar, 2011). Although Turkey has been part of the international conventions on gender equality, such as the Beijing Platform, CEDAW and Istanbul Convention (withdrew in March 2021), and has shown interest in achieving gender equality, it later shifted to a tool to change the political agenda and to organise society according to traditional and conservative gender roles (Kandiyoti, 2012).

Indeed, the political discourse developed only on the role of the mother and their moral responsibilities, without recognising the value of women's unpaid work and dealing with the

consequences of their separation from the production sphere, confined women in the reproduction sphere. As evidenced through current data, policies and legal practices, government in Turkey leaves women alone, who are increasingly impoverishing and becoming insecure and vulnerable in the hierarchical gender relations that are further radicalised. Indeed, social welfare policies are not enough to redistribute the care burden on women, and the gradual abolishment of the public sector from education, health, and social care increases the burden of gendered unpaid care. Thus, women become more dependent on assistance from family members or voluntary contributions from non-state institutions or individuals (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010; Dedeoğlu, 2000).

Given all this, it is likely to conclude that the normative-politic structure in Turkey undervalues women's unpaid care work by adhering to socio-economically conservative patriarchal values. In this context, it is important to discuss the hierarchical relations and dynamics on which gendered unpaid care work is located and the possible political solutions analytically and comparatively. This is what the analysis section is aimed at after collecting the outputs in Italy in the next section.

So far, the *four pathways* approach has allowed us to explore and analyse gendered unpaid care work concerning structural factors. On the other hand, this approach leaves a gap in linking pathways to possible solutions and observing potential areas in policy change to support gender transformation. More clearly, a comparative tool is needed to point to *four pathways* and the critical policy areas to *recognise, reduce and redistribute* care work and *represent and reward* caregivers. Therefore, after discussing the other case, Italy, this study will integrate the four pathways approach with the *5Rs* to provide a better tool for comparison, which is the *gendered unpaid care work index*.

## 5. UNPAID CARE WORK IN ITALY

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In Italy, with a “sub-protective” and “familialistic” welfare system, the care of children, the elderly, the sick and other dependent members are almost entirely entrusted to families and volunteers (De Henau et al., 2016; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Istat, 2019b). At the EU level, Italy is one of the furthest away from the balance in working time between men and women. The causes mostly lie in the low female employment rates, the scarce sharing of domestic workloads by men and the strong cultural resistance to overcoming gender roles, which indeed still continue to be transmitted from generation to generation, especially in the southern regions and in the less educated segments of the population (Istat, 2019b). However, with a more equitable sharing of domestic responsibilities than in the past, positive signs have been noted in the division of care work; thus, many women have reduced gender differences with men in their working hours. These developments have increased women’s negotiation power and, at the same time, reduced the time they spend on care work. Yet, reallocating tasks within couples and also between households and the state is not enough, and exogenous pushes are needed to facilitate women’s access to the labour market and provide more accessible care services (EIGE, 2022; Istat, 2019b).

Although unemployment rates between men and women differ slightly, the Italian labour market presents broader and more significant gaps when considering the relevant categories of people who are not actively looking for work. The gender gap is enormous, considering those who are not job seekers due to family commitments and caring obligations. Examining the causes of inactivity leads us to assume that these individuals will work if the determinants of inactivity are removed in these two cases (Istat, 2019b, 2022c, 2022d). In particular, policies to promote work-life balance may facilitate the labour market entry or reintegration of women who are inactive for family reasons related to their gender roles (Amici & Stefani, 2013). In terms of the time dedicated by the employed to paid work, Italy is slightly above the EU average. It ranks last, together with Spain and Greece, for the availability of free time and time dedicated to home and family care. In Italy, 41.8 per cent of workers in 2014 worked atypical hours. With this rate, Italy is among the EU countries with the highest non-standard working hours (Istat, 2019b, 2022d).

The characteristics of labour markets, the regulatory framework, for example, flexible working opportunities, the facility to leave to care for a family member, and the availability of care services, make it possible to distribute family responsibilities and thus reconcile working


hours with the daily living (Istat, 2019b). In this sense, it is important to reveal the factors that shape gendered unpaid care work and significant gender inequalities by following external and internal factors in Italy. For this reason, this chapter examines unpaid care work and related structural elements within the same framework applied to Turkey in the previous section. Following the introduction section, which presents the current situation of unpaid care work in Italy, this chapter follows the *four pathways* of gendered unpaid care work to explore the relevant elements in each category in Italy.

## **5.1. CURRENT SITUATION AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF UNPAID CARE WORK IN ITALY**

Italy has traditionally been characterised by high gender disparities in the labour market and conservative gender roles that place most of the domestic work and childcare on women (Istat, 2019b). When paid jobs in the labour market and unpaid care work at home are considered together, comparative data show that Italian women work more than Italian men and women and men in most European countries (Del Boca et al., 2020). Recent data from Eurostat showing time spent in total work confirms this (see [here](#)). Moreover, care responsibilities are the second most important reason for Italian women who are not joining the workforce, with 28.9 per cent, after retirement, which is 40.3 per cent. On the other hand, Italian men are primarily out of the workforce when they retire (53.4), when they are in education or training (14.6) or laid off (13.5) (Figure 45).




**Figure 45: Reasons for not participating in the workforce, 15-64 years, Italy, 2021 (percentage of the population outside of the labour force and willing to work)**



Source: [Eurostat LFS](#)

**Figure 46: Average daily hours in the main activities by gender (as hour, aged 15 and over), 2013-14'**



\*: This category includes sleep, eating and unspecified personal care activities.

\*\* : Includes travel as part of/during the main or secondary job and work-seeking activities.

\*\*\*This category does not include volunteering and therefore differs from the "total unpaid care work" category below.

Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, [Istat](#)

According to the latest time-use data<sup>42</sup> in Italy, an average of 15.2 per cent of the daily time is spent on unpaid care work per person. An analysis of the total hours worked by gender

<sup>42</sup> The latest time-use data for Italy is for the 2013/2014 period. For further information see [Istat.it](#).

reveals that in Italy, the time devoted to unpaid care work is significantly higher for women. While women spend 4.6 hours daily on home and family care, men only devote 1.8 hours (Figure 46). When we add volunteering and other unpaid activities, this becomes 5.1 hours for women and 2.2 hours for men. While routine housework is the most time-consuming activity for women at 3.4 hours (Figure 47), childcare is the most engaging given its multitasking nature, indicating that it is often carried out together with other activities (Del Boca et al., 2020; Razavi, 2007).


*Figure 47: Breakdown of daily hours spent in different unpaid activities by gender (aged 15 and over), 2013-14'*



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014; [OECD. Stat](#); [Istat](#)


Women’s employment status is also effective in the amount of time devoted to unpaid care work. While employed women spend 3.7 hours daily on home and family care, unemployed women spend 5.1 hours. Employed women also devote less time to volunteering, social life, sports and outdoor activities and personal care (Figure 48).

**Figure 48: Women’s average daily hours by type of activity and employment status, 2013/14’ (in hours)**



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, [Istat](#)

**Figure 49: Average daily hours spent on unpaid care work by gender and employment status, 2013/14’ (in hours and minutes)**



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, [Istat](#)

On the other hand, even women’s employment does not reduce the time they devote to unpaid care work to the level of men. Figure 49 shows that working men spend 1h 26 minutes on unpaid care work while working women devote 3h 41’ of unpaid labour. While this increases to 5h 06’ for unemployed women, it remains at 2h 06’ for men (Figure 49). In

addition, for couples living together, the situation is shaped according to the employment status of both partners (Istat, 2014, 2018, 2019b). In Italy, the male breadwinner-female homemaker model has declined constantly since 1988. Limiting the observation to the couples in which the woman could potentially be part of the labour force (15-64 years), dual-income couples rise to 40 per cent, while those in which only the man has a paid job are still 32.5 per cent. Nevertheless, in all these scenarios, women's unpaid care work continues to dominate household production in Italy (Istat, 2019b). Comparing the total work of women and men, including all paid and unpaid work, reveals that women in Italy work 1.23 times more than men overall. Similarly, while this difference is 1.12 for employed women, it is highest at 1.63 for unemployed women (Table 12).

*Table 12: Average activity time per person by the type of activity, gender, and employment status, 2013-2014 (in hours)*

	Paid Work	Unpaid Care Work (including childcare)	Childcare <sup>43</sup>	Total Work	Women to Men Ratio of Total Work
<b>Total</b>					
Women	01:35	04:36	00:24	06:11	1.23
Men	03:14	01:46	00:11	05:00	
<b>Employed</b>					
Women	04:35	03:41	00:34	08:16	1.12
Men	05:55	01:26	00:18	07:22	
<b>Unemployed</b>					
Women	00:17	05:06	00:47	05:24	1.63
Men	01:12	02:06	00:14	03:18	


Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, [Istat](#)

The analysis of daily activities by gender confirms that while men mostly devote their time to paid work, hobbies and games, social life and entertainment, and volunteering and helping people outside the family, the concentration of women and their activities within the family network dominates domestic relations (Figure 50). On the other hand, care activities and unpaid household production comprise 60.6 per cent of the total output (Table 13). According to ISTAT (2019b), in 2014, 10.8 per cent of the unpaid work referred to the care of children and adults (7.7 billion hours of work produced for a value of 60.3 billion euros) and 4.9 per cent aimed at people from other families through volunteering and informal aid activities (3.53 billion hours equal to approximately 27.5 billion euros). Organised volunteering, in particular, generates 837 million hours valued at 6.5 billion euros. In

<sup>43</sup> These figures refer to the main activity. Therefore, it does not include childcare carried out in conjunction with other activities or as multitasking.

comparison, 2.7 billion hours, equivalent to 21 billion euros, are produced for informal aid aimed at non-cohabiting family members and other families (Istat, 2019b). In this production process, as seen in Table 13, the share of women in the total work is significantly higher than that of men. Overall, women contribute 71.4 per cent to unpaid care work and 34.6 per cent to paid work. (Table 13). These figures show that mostly women and volunteers spent more than 68 billion hours, equal to 1.5 times that of paid work hours, in direct and indirect care of the most vulnerable people in Italy. Women, who remain the fundamental pillar of Italian family well-being, alone held most of this work at the expense of their greater participation in the paid labour market (Istat, 2019b).

*Figure 50: Average daily hours per person by the type of activity, gender, and employment status, 2013-14'*



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, [Istat](#)

*Table 13: Annual total work hours in Italy by gender, 2014 (in billions of hours)*

	Women	Men	Total Work Hours	Women's Share in Total Work Hours (%)
<b>Paid Work (39.4%)</b>	15.3	28.9	44.2	34.6
<b>Unpaid Care Work (60.6%)</b>	48.6	19.5	68.1	71.4
<b>Total Work Hours</b>	63.9	48.4	112.3	56.9

Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, [Istat](#)

Gender differences are evident in all household production functions, particularly domestic chores. Women produce 96.8 per cent of the amount of work in clothing management

(laundry, ironing, etc.) and a little more than 72 per cent for activities within the food management functions (Istat, 2019b). Indeed, as shown in Table 14, these activities consume the most time for women, especially unemployed women who bear most of the burden. Even if women are employed, they continue to carry a more significant responsibility than men (Table 14).


*Table 14: Time distribution in unpaid care work by gender and employment status, 2014 (15+ age and % of daily hours)*

	Total		Employed		Unemployed	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Food management	1.7	7.3	1.4	5.4	1.7	7.1
Household upkeep	1.2	5.4	1.0	4.1	1.5	6.2
Laundry, ironing, and handicraft	0.1	1.7	0.1	1.1	0.1	1.6
Gardening and pet care	1.5	0.6	0.8	0.4	1.6	0.4
Construction and repairs	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.0
Household management	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1
Shopping and services	1.6	2.2	1.2	1.8	1.9	2.6
Childcare	0.8	1.7	1.3	2.4	1.0	3.3
Adult care	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1

Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, Istat


Moreover, with the Covid-19 pandemic, this huge burden has increased significantly. A recent study (Del Boca, 2022; Del Boca et al., 2021) revealed that working women spend more time on housework and childcare than their spouses. According to the results of the study, the time women spared for care work increased to 3 hours a day during the pandemic and to 6 hours for childcare (including time devoted to children’s education). On the other hand, men spent 1h 30’ on housework and 3h 54’ on childcare during the pandemic, making up almost half of the time women allocate. In addition, the difference in responsibility levels has not differed much after the pandemic (Figure 51). One critical factor here is that women working during the pandemic have lost the option of childcare, many of which were provided by grandparents before the pandemic. Thus, mandatory social distancing and the closure of day-care facilities increased the burden on women (Del Boca et al., 2020).

**Figure 51: Change in the unpaid care work by gender before, during, and after Covid-19 in Italy, 2019-2020<sup>44</sup>**



Source: Illustration based on (Del Boca, 2022; Del Boca et al., 2021)

**Figure 52: Women/Men ratio of average daily time spent on unpaid care work by age groups in Italy, 2014**



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, [Istat](#)

On the other hand, considering the distribution of daily working hours of women and men by age groups, although the rate increases in favour of women towards older age groups, it is always below zero. That is, women have never been able to catch up with men in paid employment. However, the situation of unpaid care labour is the opposite. Women continue to devote more time to unpaid care work than men throughout their lives. Although it decreases towards older age, women continue to spend 1.9 times more time around age 65 (Figure 52). Nevertheless, limited improvements and economic challenges have led more women to join

<sup>44</sup> Sample represented in the study includes only working women (Del Boca, 2022; Del Boca et al., 2021).

the paid workforce. However, the absence of social and financial safety nets for those who want to become parents in Italy is causing the workforce to age as women join in paid labour and reduce their role in social reproduction (Figure 53). According to data (Eurofound, 2017), the proportion of employed people aged 50 and over has increased significantly from 24 per cent to 31 per cent in 10 years. Moreover, there has been a steady decline in the proportion of workers under 35. It declined from 35 per cent of the workforce in 2005 to 30 per cent in 2015 (Eurofound, 2017).

*Figure 53: Population by age groups and gender 2011-2021, Italy*




Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, [Istat](#)

On the other hand, inequalities in access to education, and hence in income and wealth accumulation, resulting from opportunity inequality, leave vulnerable segments of society unprotected. These result in the social and economic exclusion of disadvantaged women who are socially delegated care work, while more advantaged women can join the workforce (Addabbo et al., 2008; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Günlük-Şenesen et al., 2017; Nussbaum, 2000b). Observing the trend of unpaid care work compared to employment and education across different occupational levels may give an idea of how this rate changes across different income groups. Although women spend less time in employment in all levels, this ratio decreases towards blue-collar and family workers (Figure 54).




**Figure 54: Women/Men ratio of average daily time spent on unpaid care work, employment, and education by occupation groups in Italy, 2014**



Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, Istat

On the other hand, unpaid care work moves in the opposite direction of employment. While blue-collar and family worker women spend more time in unpaid care work, this rate decreases towards middle management and managerial levels. Assuming income levels also move with professional levels, this could indicate less income and, therefore, less opportunity to outsource care work. When evaluated together with the ratio of working hours, it becomes more likely to suggest that women working in lower-paid jobs reduce their working hours and spend more time on unpaid care work since they lack access to formal and informal care facilities. Finally, although there is no significant difference between occupational groups regarding the time spent on education, women allocate more time to education than men at all levels (Figure 54). That also may indicate that women who invest more in their personal development than men will enter the paid workforce more, reducing their reproduction responsibilities at home (Karamessini & Rubery, 2014).

**Figure 55: Women/Men ratio of average daily time spent on unpaid care work and employment by education levels, Italy, 2014**



Source: Source: Calculated based on Time-Use Survey, 2013-2014, Istat

Indeed, when the time allocated to employment and unpaid care work is analysed according to education levels, it can be observed that as the education level of women increases, employment time also increases. The time spent in employment at the higher education level is the closest to equal, with 0.8. On the other hand, the time that women devote to unpaid care work first increases at lower secondary education level - which may be due to the increasing influence of the amount of time women spend on childcare, including their education, as education levels increase- and then decreases to 2.2 until tertiary education level. Again, this may indicate that women with higher education levels have higher incomes and more opportunities to take advantage of paid opportunities for childcare and outsourced care (Figure 55). However, this does not change the fact that women spend at least twice as much time on unpaid care at all levels and never reach the same level of paid employment as men.

## **5.2. FOUR PATHWAYS OF GENDERED UNPAID CARE WORK IN ITALY**

The previous section presented the context of gendered unpaid care work in Italy and the disadvantaged position of women compared to men in paid and unpaid work. Accordingly, women in Italy spend more time in unpaid care work and less in paid employment, regardless of their employment status, similar to Turkey. In order to understand the background of this result in the wider macro level context within which it is situated, this section aims to explore each *pathway* in Italy. Using the findings from the analysis of existing data and research, the principal aim of this exploration is to reveal the social, economic, political, and cultural structure perpetuating gendered unpaid care work within the framework of *four pathways*. These results will allow identifying the similarities and differences in Italy based on the results in Turkey, and potential patterns and deviations in terms of *four pathways* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) and *5Rs* (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020) while creating the *gendered unpaid care work index*.

### **5.2.1. Employment Opportunities and Labour Market Regulations**

Italy is behind the OECD (52.4) and EU (51.7) averages in the labour force participation rate of women, with 40.1 per cent for the population aged 15 and over (Table 15). Italy is the fourth country with the lowest female labour force participation rate among OECD countries, after Turkey, Mexico, and Chile, respectively. The gap between female and male labour participation rate is 18.2 points for the population aged 15-64, which is among the largest in high-income countries.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> See [OECD Stat](#) Accessed 02.12.2022.

*Table 15: Labour force statistics by gender, Italy, 2021*

	Women	Men
Population aged 15 and over (thousands)	26 530	24 776
Labour force (thousands)	10 641	14 280
Labour force participation (%)	40.1	57.6
Unemployment (thousands)	1 131	1 236
(%)	10.6	8.7
Agricultural employment rate (%) *	2.4	5.0
Youth unemployment (15-24 age) (%)	32.8	27.7
15-24 age NEET** (%)	18.8	19.1
Duration of working life (year)	26.9	36.0

\* Data is available for 2019

\*\* Neither in employment nor education or training. Data is available for 2020.

Source: [World Bank](#) and [Eurostat](#)

On the one hand, women in Italy have increased their labour force participation over the years and contributed to the reduction of inactivity. Nevertheless, the fact that women are actively discouraged from seeking work, especially in the south of Italy, leads to an increase in the potential workforce that is inactive but not looking for a job and stating that they are available to work (Addabbo, Rodríguez-Modroño, et al., 2015b). Similar to Turkey, also in Italy, although women have lower labour participation rates than men, their unemployment rates are higher by 1.9 points than that of men. Although women have a slightly lower level of NEET population, they have higher youth unemployment rates and lag behind men in terms of working years (Table 15).

The workforce figures, where women lag behind men, represent the tip of the iceberg. As the data in the previous section show, the most significant factor in the disadvantaged position of women is the gendered division of labour. However, it is important to understand how and through which channels these social roles are included in daily life in different contexts and affect women's presence in the public and private spheres. In order to explore these structures in the Italian case, the rest of the section will follow the same path applied to Turkey. As the literature and data show, education, parenthood, household structure and income accumulation, age and generation, and informal working conditions are among the factors that impact employment and, thus, gendered unpaid care work. For this reason, each of these factors will be investigated below.

### 5.2.1.1. Education


Cross-country evidence shows that education and training tend to be positively correlated with skill levels and employment (Acar Erdogan & V. Del Carpio, 2019). However, overall educational achievements are relatively low in Italy compared to other high-income EU countries (OECD, 2018). Moreover, many individuals who belong to the discouraged younger adults with limited work experience and inactive mothers with care responsibilities and without any past work experience mostly do not achieve an upper secondary degree. According to the data (OECD, 2018), in Italy, 32 per cent of discouraged youth and 46 per cent of inactive mothers have a lower secondary degree, while 5 per cent and 9 per cent of these groups, respectively, only completed primary school.

On the other hand, Italy is among the countries with the lowest investment in education in the EU. Education spending in Italy in 2019 was well below the EU average, both as a share of GDP (3.9 vs 4.7 per cent in the EU) and overall government spending (8 vs 10 per cent in the EU). Government spending on tertiary education (8 per cent of total spending) was half the EU average (16 per cent), which again was the lowest in the EU. However, the share of spending allocated to pre-primary, primary and secondary education (36 and 47 per cent, respectively) was above the EU average (33 and 39 per cent, respectively) (European Commission, 2021). However, Italy's investment in education, with 4.1 per cent of GDP in primary to tertiary education institutions, was also one of the ten lowest countries <sup>46</sup> in the OECD for 2018. On the other hand, Turkey (5.07 per cent) was over the OECD average (4.88 per cent) (OECD, 2021c).

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<sup>46</sup> These countries were Ireland, Luxemburg, Russia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, and Italy (from the lowest). See OECD [Education at a Glance](#) Accessed 02.12.2022.


Figure 56: Education expenditure by financial source, 2012-2019 (%)



Source: [OECD Stat](#)


Trends in education expenditure by financial sources confirm the low level of government expenditures. Despite a downward trend in household education expenditures, they continue to share 13.4 per cent of total education expenditures in Italy for 2019. However, in contrast to the decreasing trend in household expenditures, central and general government expenditures have an upward trend (Figure 56). The upward trend of the government expenditure on education after 2015 may be due to the *la Buona Scuola* (Good School) reform, which was introduced in 2015, including performance-based remuneration components for teachers, a 3-year “digital school plan” to modernise the digital infrastructures of Italian schools, measures for strengthening the school-to-work transition and reorganisation of the pre-school education system (OECD, 2018). All these measures are especially important for women who are inactive and mothers with no previous work experience. However, it can also apply to discouraged young adults and inactive mothers with limited work experience who would benefit from career guidance (Addabbo, Rodríguez-Modroño, et al., 2015b; European Union, 2015; OECD, 2018). In addition, the provision of education in public or private institutions affects the distribution of resources among education levels and types of institutions. In 2019, Italy spent the most on secondary and primary education, while early childhood was the lowest (Figure 57). Regarding annual expenditure per student in educational institutions, higher education is the first for the reference period, followed by secondary and primary education, respectively (Figure 58).

Figure 57: Total public expenditure by the level of education, 2012-2019 (million euro)



Source: [Eurostat, Education Expenditure Statistics, 2022](#)

Figure 58: Total education expenditure per student 2012-2019 (relative to GDP per capita, %)




Source: [OECD Stat, Education Expenditure Statistics, 2022](#)

Excluding higher education expenditure from primary to tertiary education, Italy was above the OECD average for 2018 in terms of expenditure per student. However, in 2018, Italy invested less than the OECD average at the tertiary level. Finally, expenditure per student in public education institutions was higher than in private institutions, which was in line with the trend of the OECD average (OECD, 2021c). On the other hand, according to the OECD (2018), the average skills of Italian citizens are low compared to other European countries. Italy

represents the lowest level of education in the EU, with around 40 per cent of the working-age population having a secondary education level.

*Figure 59: Net enrolment<sup>47</sup> rates by level of education, 2020*



\*: Gross rate; \*\*: Eurostat; \*\*\*: Eurostat

Source: UNESCO; Eurostat and Istat Education Statistics, 2022


In addition, only 17 per cent have a tertiary education degree, again the lowest in the EU. Indeed, figures confirm that the drop-out level is highest at the secondary education level. In terms of tertiary entrants, women have a higher share (80.6 per cent) than men (59.2 per cent) (Figure 59). OECD data (2022a) also reveals that women were more likely (35 per cent) than men (23 per cent) to achieve tertiary education in Italy, which is again in line with the OECD average trend. On the other hand, upper secondary school drop-outs (10.4 per cent for girls, 15.6 per cent for boys) (Figure 59) are more likely to be in the NEET population (OECD, 2016), which constitutes the majority of discouraged young adults with limited work experience (OECD, 2018). Moreover, The NEET population of the 25-29 age group in Italy is significantly higher (31.5 per cent) than the EU average (18.6 per cent)<sup>48</sup>. Additionally, school drop-outs have increased dramatically with the Covid-19 pandemic, disproportionately affecting Southern regions, women, and non-Italian citizens (European Commission, 2021; Fiaschi & Tealdi, 2022).

<sup>47</sup> It is obtained by dividing the number of students of a theoretical age group enrolled in a specific level of education by the population in that age group.

<sup>48</sup> See Euro Stat Accessed on 02.12.2022




*Figure 60: Employment rates by gender and educational attainment, 25-64 years, 2012-2021 (%)*



Source: [OECD Stat, Education and Training Statistics, 2021](#)

On the other side, the data show that Italy’s university graduates, albeit few, are struggling to find jobs. Moreover, the difference between the earnings of university graduates and those of less educated people is minimal compared to other EU countries (European Commission, 2015). Women, in particular, experience fewer employment opportunities at every educational level. While employment rates of university graduate men reach more than 85 per cent, this rate is around 75 per cent for women. The fact that women with the same education level are less employed than men is also valid for other education levels. For example, women’s employment rates at lower than secondary education fluctuate around 34 per cent, while for men, this is around 65 per cent. Women do not reach these levels even in upper secondary education (Figure 60). In this sense, gender differences in the distribution of academic fields are also significant.

*Figure 61: Employment by sector and gender (%), 2012-2019*



Source: [World Bank, Labour Force Statistics](#)


In most OECD countries, women tend to be underrepresented in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)(OECD, 2021c). This situation also applies to Italy. In higher education in Italy, women represent 27 per cent of new entrants to engineering, manufacturing and construction programs and 14 per cent in information technologies. In education, a sector traditionally dominated by women, this rate is 92 per cent, while men are represented by 23 per cent (OECD, 2018). This educational segregation also resonates with employment: women are represented much higher in the service sector (including occupations such as housekeeping, nursing, and teaching), with 85 per cent in 2019, compared to 60 per cent for men. In the industry sector, women are barely present at 13 per cent, whereas men have higher representation at 35 per cent (Figure 61).

It is possible to observe this segregation also in the political representation. Politics in Italy remains a sector male dominated, and women's presence is very limited in this field. Nevertheless, women occupied 36.2 per cent of the seats in Parliament in 2021, which is above the EU27 average of 32.5 per cent (Istat, 2019a, 2022a). Considering the socio-economic structure surrounding gender roles, this result is promising. On the other hand, at the regional level, this rate drops to 22.3 per cent and remains below the EU27 average of 34.6. Overall, the proportion of women in decision-making bodies is almost 17 per cent (Istat, 2019a, 2022a).

### 5.2.1.2. Motherhood

One of the most important reasons women are more economically inactive than men is the difficulties reconciling work and gendered care responsibilities. Therefore, in addition to the childcare services, flexible working arrangements are vital for women with young children (Hanson & Hanson, 2011; Pailhé et al., 2019); however, it is not very common in Italy (OECD, 2018). Life reconciliation, meaning the balance between work, family life, social activities, and personal needs, determines individual well-being and self-realisation (Istat, 2019b). However, control over working hours or access to flexible working is low, especially for women (EIGE, 2019). At this point, strategies that will bring together many aspects of life are necessary, in particular, to reduce the care burden on women. These strategies should enable individuals to move between different dimensions without giving up or creating a disadvantage in one dimension (Istat, 2019b). Arrangements that do not reconcile work and family life create a definite and permanent polarisation between the reproductive role of women and the productive role of men (Pearson & Elson, 2015). Working women respond to this situation by reducing their working hours or quitting their jobs. Even then, compliance margins are likely limited, and adverse effects are higher, especially for the first child (Mencarini & Tanturri, 2004). Thus, the third route women increasingly take is to delay having children or not have children at all (Euro Stat, 2022). This route is becoming more common in Italy (Figure 62).

*Figure 62: Ratio of child population aged 0-17 in the Total Population (%), 2012-2080*




Source: [UN, Population Projections, 2022](#)

Indeed, women in Italy appear to have fewer children when they are young and more with age. Figure 63 shows the increasing importance of fertility over the age of 30 in Italy. Since 2017, the fertility rates of women under 30 have decreased, while the fertility rates of

women aged 30 and over have been steadily increasing. The age group with the highest fertility rate in 2020 is 30-34. The fertility rate over 35 is also increasing (Figure 63).

*Figure 63: Births by mother's age group, 2017-2020*



Source: [Istat Population Statistics](#)

In addition, Italy is notable for its very low fertility and the strong persistence of gender asymmetry in regulating time and family duties, as shown in the previous section. This seems to perfectly exemplify the theories so far discussed in the kind of Mediterranean model of gender inequality in which women generally work more. Women typically have less free time than men. In the first three years of children, women often turn to grandparents for childcare or babysitter services at home (Mencarini & Tanturri, 2004). Thus, non-flexible working arrangements, together with inadequate social care services, force women mostly to be economically inactive. In fact, it is possible to observe that developed countries with very low fertility have less equal gender systems compared to countries with relatively high fertility (for example, Southern countries versus Northern European countries) (De Henau et al., 2016; EIGE, 2022; Mencarini & Tanturri, 2004; OECD, 2022a).


According to ISFOL data (2015b), 53 per cent of working mothers and 24.3 per cent of working fathers in Italy are worried about their career prospects. The same survey indicates that around 25 per cent of working mothers in Italy remain out of the labour market within two years of pregnancy, which increases with the number of children. In addition, the drop-out rate among women in the southern regions is higher than in the northern regions. This situation can be interpreted as an indicator of cultural differences between the southern and northern regions

regarding the role of motherhood in society (ISFOL, 2016; Keck & Saraceno, 2013; OECD, 2018). On the other hand, given the absence of centre-based formal childcare and short school days for older children, grandparents play a vital role in childcare. In Italy, grandparents provide regular childcare for 81 per cent of dual-income families with children (UN, 2015). Recent research (Bulgarelli, 2019; Del Boca et al., 2020; Euro Stat, 2022) also confirms that the presence of grandparents is often a critical factor in the decision to have a child and a mother’s likelihood of pursuing a career (UN, 2015).

### 5.2.1.3. Household Structure and Income

Since the distribution of responsibilities based on gender roles differs among different types of households, understanding how women’s employment varies in these households and at different income levels is crucial to develop different strategies for different situations. In Italy, 40 per cent of households have dual-earner, and in 32.5 per cent, only a male partner works, while in 8.2 per cent of them only women work (Figure 64).

*Figure 64: Employment situation of couples living together in Italy, 15-64 years old, 2014*




Source: (Istat, 2019b)

A glance at the household structures and employment levels reveals that the men’s labour force participation in Italy does not differ as much as women’s according to family status. In particular, the presence of children seems to be an important factor in women’s labour force participation. Women living with their partner, children and other elderly relatives have the lowest labour force participation rates. Given the family-centred care traditions in Italy, it is not surprising that female labour force participation is highest in single-person households. On the other hand, extended family households reduce women’s and men’s labour force participation in Italy. This effect may be due to increased elderly care in extended families, as


well as the sharing of their financial resources among household members. Overall, the change in household structure and the presence of children do not reflect the labour force participation of men. In each scenario, men continue to participate in the workforce at much higher rates than women, implying that the burden of care is shifted to female household members (Figure 65).

*Figure 65: Labour force status by household types in Italy, aged 25-54, 2020 (%)*



Source: [ILO](#) and [Eurostat](#) Labour Statistics

**Figure 66: Labour force participation by marital status and gender, aged 25-54, 2011-2020**



Source: [ILO](#) Labour Statistics


The Italy case is in line with the situation around the world. The data presented by the ILO (2020) reveals that the labour force participation rate of men does not differ as much according to family status as that of women. However, the average gender gap in labour force participation is very narrow when focusing only on single people of working age. Women in the 25-54 age group who live alone tend to participate in the workforce at a higher rate, similar to men in this group. The gender gap in labour force participation between men and women in this age group living with their spouse and child is getting wider (ILO, 2020). Indeed, as Figure 66 shows, living with a partner, regardless of the presence of a child, dramatically impacts women’s labour force participation. That implies that the responsibility of taking care of the partner and the daily necessities of the household is also a binding element for women. Considering that male labour force participation is higher in those with a partner and lower in those living alone, the effect of this relationship becomes obvious (Figure 66). In this sense, the gender gap at stake may reflect continued social, traditional or institutional rigidities in some cases (Del Boca, 2022).

#### **5.2.1.4. Age and Generation Impacts**

Age is important in observing lifetime gender differences in employment and earnings, as mentioned earlier (ILO, 2020; UN Women, 2020a). In fact, women’s lower employment levels, relatively shorter working lives and domestic responsibilities starting from childhood

put them at a disadvantage position (European Commission, 2014). As discussed above, in Italy, as in most countries, women tend to be less connected to the labour market than men. In many cases, their careers are interrupted by childbearing, and they potentially make relatively low earnings throughout their lives (Istat, 2019b, 2022c).


*Figure 67: Old age pension holders by gender, 2012-2020*



Source: [Istat, Social Security and Welfare Statistics, 2022](#)

These cuts are most likely to contribute to gender pension gaps. Indeed, as data indicate (ILO, 2021a; Istat, 2019b), more women are in the bottom quintile of the retirement income distribution in Italy than men. On the other hand, women tend to live longer than men and probably spend a larger portion of their retirement as survivors. In this case, they need to save more. With fewer resources and a longer life expectancy, women’s post-retirement financial security is potentially more at risk than men. Women’s pensions are, on average, 27 per cent less than that of men across the EU (Angelici & Profeta, 2020; Del Boca, 2022).

*Figure 68: Gender gap in old-age pension income, 65 years and over (% less than men), 2020*



Source: [Euro Stat, EU-SILC survey](#)



In Italy, women old-age pension holders have also been falling steadily in recent decades (Figure 67), which is partly because of the Notionally Defined Contribution (NDC) system started in 1995. Since then, some European countries, including Italy,<sup>49</sup> have raised the standard retirement age and linked benefits to lifetime earnings (OECD, 2018). Italy is also one of the seven countries in the OECD linking the statutory retirement age with life expectancy (OECD, 2021a).<sup>50</sup> Given these new regulations and eligibility rules, interruptions in the paid working life of women are becoming a more significant problem. The largest gender inequalities in earnings are between men and women aged 65 and over, reflecting the impact of lifetime gender disparities (Figure 68), which include career breaks, part-time work, and vertical and horizontal gender segregation at paid and also unpaid work (EIGE, 2022). The gender pension gap in Italy was 33.4 per cent in favour of men for 2020, which is much higher than the EU average and Turkey (Figure 68). As a result, Italy's new old-age pension system seems not to consider gender disparities when designing the pension system and thus favours men more than women.

#### **5.2.1.5. Informal Work**

Italy is one of the countries with a high rate of informal work (Bejaković et al., 2017) and a relatively large share of employees in micro-enterprises compared to her peer countries (e.g. Portugal and Spain). A univocal definition of informal work, as defined by law, does not exist in Italy. From a judicial perspective, informal or undeclared work is any regular and remunerated activity which has not been declared to the relevant authorities<sup>51</sup> (European Union, 2015). In national accounts and according to [Istat](#), professional services that do not comply with the fiscal rules are considered non-regular. In social terms, it is characterised by poor working conditions, health and safety requirements deficiencies, low incomes, and lack of social security. These deficiencies lead to social dumping and worse social consequences (European Commission, 2017). On average, 11.6 per cent of total labour force input in the

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<sup>49</sup> NDC pension reform was first introduced in 1992 in Sweden. Following Sweden, Italy also adopted this system. For both countries, the prospect of joining the European Union (EU) and eventually the European Monetary Union (EPB) also required lowering their deficit and debt levels. Whereas Sweden reformed in one step, Italy took several (Holzmann et al., 2012). In Italy, “from 1 January 2019, in addition to at least 20 years of contributions, the pension age you must have reached 67 years (applying till 2026) for all categories of workers.” See [INPS](#) and [European Commission](#) Accessed 03.12.2022


<sup>50</sup> The other countries are Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland, Lithuania, and Estonia.

<sup>51</sup> The National Institute of Social Security (INPS - *Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale*), the National Institute for the Insurance against Accidents at Work (INAAIL - *Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro*), the Revenue Agency (*Agenzia delle Entrate*), the Employment Services (*del Ministero del lavoro e della previdenza sociale*) (Decreto-Legge n. 223, 2006).

private sector in the EU is undeclared and informal work accounts for an average of 16.4 per cent of gross value added. The difference points to the fact that undeclared labour is concentrated more in sectors with higher labour productivity (Bejaković et al., 2017).


Not surprisingly, therefore, the agricultural sector is likely to have the highest level of informal work, even in high-income EU countries (Figure 69). Indeed, agriculture has traditionally been a sector with high informal employment due to its seasonality and daily employment of workers. In Italy, most immigrant men are concentrated in this sector (European Union, 2015).

*Figure 69: Unregistered person rate to social security institution by sector, 2005-2021*



Source: [Istat, National Accounts Statistics, 2022](#)

*Figure 70: Persons who are not registered to social security institution due to the main job, 2005-2020 (%)*



Source: [Istat, National Accounts Statistics, 2022](#)

In this respect, in addition to the concerns about the migrant workers' rights, 'care', a very labour-intensive profession in the service sector, associates informality with women's labour. Domestic services, including housekeeping services, childcare and elderly care, personal services, private security, industrial cleaning, and the hotel, restaurant and catering industry, are also where informal work is most common (European Commission, 2017). Therefore, the correlation between the service sector and informality weakens women's ties to social and economic rights and contributes to their economic decline. In Italy, 66 per cent of the majority of informal carers for the disabled and elderly and 58 per cent for children are women (EIGE, 2019). On the other hand, the composition of economic sectors and firm size also affect the formation of informal work. For example, employees who receive "envelope wages" tend to work in smaller organisations. EU data also support this: 56 per cent of informal workers are occupied in companies with less than 20 employees (European Union, 2015). According to the latest [ISTAT data](#), in 2020, 12 per cent of total work was undeclared or informal. Considering the trend over the reference period in Figure 70, it seems rigid at this level (Figure 70). Recently, the legislature established a system of minimum legal protection (Decreto-Legge n. 101, 2019) to manage all worker contracts, contributions and employment relationships, increase transparency and reduce informal work in Italy (European Union & Loi, 2022).<sup>52</sup>

### **5.2.2. Socio-Political Normative Structure**

Italy has been a constitutional republic since the institutional referendum in 1946 decided to abolish the monarchy.<sup>53</sup> However, Italy's political landscape, beginning with the country's young and fragmented history, has experienced a remarkably high turnover of intertwined political and social causes (Donà, 2022). While the AKP in Turkey has been advancing as a single party since the 2000s, Italy is governed by different political parties, sometimes with similar political wills. It is, therefore, not surprising that this change in the ever-evolving ideological direction and discourse in Italy has had a significant impact on gender relations, among others (Lavizzari & Prearo, 2019). These gendered influences, which will be discussed below, have become an increasingly important part of the political agenda,

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<sup>52</sup> Italy has also set up a new national authority, the National Labour Inspectorate (NLI) brings together three stakeholders: the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, the National Institute of Social Security (INPS), and the National Institute for Insurance (European Union, 2015).

<sup>53</sup> See (Decreto Legislativo Luogotenenziale n. 98, 1946; Decreto Luogotenenziale n. 99, 1946; Decreto Legislativo Luogotenenziale n. 219, 1946).

especially for right-wing parties. In addition to polarising society in gender debates, they have also led to a backlash of gender equality gains.

### **5.2.2.1. The Political Discourse and Its Impact on Gender**

Giorgia Meloni, who took office on 22 October 2022, is the first female Prime Minister in the history of Italy.<sup>54</sup> Although this seems like an important step towards gender equality in politics, Meloni's statements and actions both before and after the election were criticised by many feminists (Donà, 2022; Lavizzari & Siročić, 2022; Trappolin, 2022). Meloni's counteractions and criticisms against them are also very important in understanding the path followed by the general political discourse on gender, especially after the 2000s (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021).

In Italy, the women's rights movement was included in the Italian political agenda in the 1970s, when feminist movements were on the rise and could voice the issues such as divorce and abortion rights, reform of patriarchal family laws, and male violence (Donà, 2022). However, views on gender roles differed significantly between the 1970s and 1990s. The politics of this period was dominated by Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana, DC), a large church uniting moderate right and left under a socially conservative, patriarchal platform. The dissolution of the DC in the mid-1990s left a political vacuum in the Catholic region that the Vatican sought to fill (Arfini et al., 2019; Spallaccia, 2020; Trappolin, 2022). Left-wing coalition governments that took office following this disintegration (1996–2001; 2006–08) supported policies based on equality and human rights discourse and thus included other discriminated minority groups beyond women, such as immigrants, ethnic minorities, people with disabilities and LGBTIQ+.

On the other hand, centre-right governments (2001–2006; 2008–2011) maintained a more conservative and traditional agenda aligned with Vatican's position and focused on protecting women as victims and supporting the traditional family (Donà, 2022). Among them, there was broad consensus that LGBTIQ+ rights should be excluded from legitimate public debate. In this period, for example, while abortion and divorce were legalised<sup>55</sup> as a result of great controversy, homosexual behaviour would only be tolerated as long as it remained completely private and hidden from the public (Ben-Porat et al., 2021).

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<sup>54</sup> Turkey's first and only female Prime Minister to date is Tansu Çiller, from the right-wing populist True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi), who served from 1993 to 1996.

<sup>55</sup> See (Decreto-Legge n. 898, 1970; Legge n. 194, 1978).

In this environment, right-wing and far-right parties and movements, including Meloni's Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d'Italia - hereafter FdI), have tried to define themselves as the political representatives of Italian Catholics by adopting a similar discourse to the Vatican, based on the heteronormative gender, sexuality and the family implying complementarity between the two sexes, except for their immigration policies (Arfini et al., 2019; Spallaccia, 2020; Trappolin, 2022). Thereby, the Vatican and its followers opposed the "gender ideology" of the UN world conferences women's rights held in the 1990s. Interest in abortion rights and the liberation of women from the constraints of family life prompted Church hierarchs to reiterate the moral value of maternity and human life preservation (Trappolin, 2022).

The current right-wing coalition of Meloni's FdI, Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia<sup>56</sup> and Matteo Salvini's Lega (League) is in line with this. Indeed, especially party slogan of the current prime minister Meloni, "God, Homeland, and Family" (Difendiamo Dio, Patria e Famiglia),<sup>57</sup> coincides with this perspective and the fascist roots of her party (Ben-Porat et al., 2021; Feo & Lavizzari, 2021).<sup>58</sup> Meloni's emphasis on being a woman, mother, and Christian<sup>59</sup>, as well as on the importance of "natural families"<sup>60</sup>, points to an exclusionary version of populism and a traditionalist agenda regarding issues of gender and morality. Another coalition member, the Lega, framed gender relations more explicitly in religious terms, with its unrestricted use of Christian symbols at political rallies and an attempt to compete with the Vatican in defining the meaning of Christianity in the public sphere (Ben-Porat et al., 2021).<sup>61</sup> Lega also invested significantly in the World Congress of Families (WCF), held in Verona in March 2019, using its position in Government institutions while in coalition with Giuseppe Conte's Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle) (Trappolin, 2022). This event has been described as the culmination of right-wing parties' commitment to supporting anti-gender

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<sup>56</sup> Meloni was also minister for youth policy under Berlusconi's government in 2009. Berlusconi's politics is described as a new form of political (male) leadership based on spectacularisation and sexualisation. Scandals and corruption involving Berlusconi fuelled grassroots movements, and on February 13, 2011, thousands of people in more than 200 cities and towns mobilised to demonstrate for women's greater dignity, gender equality and Berlusconi's resignation (Arfini et al., 2019)..

<sup>57</sup> This was also the slogan of the fascist Mussolini era. See the discussion [here](#). Accessed 07.12.2022.

<sup>58</sup> Meloni's party, FdI, which was co-founded by her in 2012, is the direct successor of the far-right party National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN). The AN itself emerged as the post-1990s successor to the Italian Social Movement (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*, MSI), which inherited the legacy of fascism as a political system and ideology after World War II (Ben-Porat et al., 2021; Feo & Lavizzari, 2021). In addition, the red, white, and green flame that is also MSI's logo is protected by FdI. While the tricolor flame is not as prominent as the stick or fascia, the chief symbol of Mussolini's National Fascist Party, it is still considered a powerful image that connects the present party to its past. See [Fratelli d'Italia website](#). Accessed 07.12.2022.

<sup>59</sup> See [here](#). Accessed 07.12.2022.

<sup>60</sup> See [here](#). Accessed 07.12.2022.

<sup>61</sup> Party leader Salvini defines himself as "[l'ultimo dei buoni Cristiani](#)" ([the last of the good Christians](#)).

and anti-feminist claims (Donà, 2022). The participants of the Italian government declared their opposition to LGBTIQ+ rights and criticised feminists who were unaware that, in Salvini's words, the real danger posed to women's rights was 'Islamic extremism, a culture where the value of women is less than zero'<sup>62</sup> (Ben-Porat et al., 2021). The current Prime Minister, Meloni, was one of the participants who gave a fierce speech on the sanctity of the family and the threats posed by feminists' demands for gender equality.<sup>63</sup> However, even before that, in 2018, the FdI added gender ideology to its 2018 Manifesto as a threat to the natural family. In fact, the struggle against gender ideology was seen as a conscious discourse for strategic alliances with Catholic conservatism (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021).

The important result emerging from official statements and policy documents is the centrality attributed to the traditional heteronormative family in Italy, which has been clearly influenced by the nativist ideology of the right-wing parties involved in the government, especially in the last 20 years. According to this understanding, the family is the place of ties, the primary core of the community, and the cradle of new life. In all respects, it is the first economic asset of society. It is also the primary site for education, care and childcare (Bellè & Poggio, 2018; Feo & Lavizzari, 2021; Ozzano, 2019). From this perspective, gender ideology and its gender-transformative and non-discriminatory demands threaten the central tenets of the Italian identity, value system, family and traditional gender roles most Italians share and identify with (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021). According to right populist political rhetoric in Italy, the biggest problem in terms of this deterioration is that while the birth rate of the Italian population has decreased significantly, the number of immigrants, especially Muslims, has increased, which should be fixed with tax policies and work-life balance policies favouring especially young Italian mothers (Brilli et al., 2016; Del Boca, 2022; OECD, 2018). The centrality of fertility and nationalist census, and traditional family issues in Italy constantly threaten both women's reproductive rights and the rights of same-sex couples (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021). Recently, new Prime Minister Meloni appointed Eugenia Roccella as the Minister of Family, Birth and Equal Opportunities, who opposes abortion and threatens to reverse the recently agreed-upon rights for same-sex parents (Ben-Porat et al., 2021). In addition, abortion rights are far from universal in Italy, as there is a very high proportion of

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<sup>62</sup> See [here](#). Accessed 07.12.2022.

<sup>63</sup> See [here](#). Accessed 07.12.2022. See also [Verona Declaration](#).

conscientious objector doctors in public hospitals who refuse abortions because of their religious or moral beliefs (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021).

In short, the conservative anti-gender rhetoric that dominates Italy's politics has effectively mobilised groups, associations and organisations belonging to Catholic militancy as well as radical right parties and groups against feminist gender equality demands (Arfini et al., 2019; Lavizzari & Prearo, 2019). Conversely, they adopt a neoliberal view that individualises risks and inequalities without recognising the existence of a patriarchal structure. They also only recognise the conservative Catholic positions where a single natural (heterosexual) family exist whose wives are perfect housewives and whose husbands provide a living (Arfini et al., 2019). On the other hand, there are reactions to the far-right conservative agenda through social mobilisation and protests led by feminist movements such as No One Less (Non-Una di Meno, NUDM). There are also political parties such as Possible (Possibile and Liberi e Uguali) that openly declare themselves as feminist parties and represent the most consistent support to equality issues in general. However, the political weight of these left-wing parties did not emerge enough to create sufficient pressure on these issues (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021).


#### **5.2.2.2. Cultural Norms**

Family relationships are culturally determined by gender role stereotypes that largely attribute care to women in Italy (Manna et al., 2021). As has been discussed in the previous section, the discourse that the family is a conservative institution and that it is the most important element of the cultural identity of the society, which is frequently used in the political arena, is also effective in this (Lavizzari & Prearo, 2019; Trappolin, 2022). On the other hand, the rigidity of these stereotypical norms determines the level of internalisation of the gender roles in question. When these norms are rigid, they allow a set of relationships with defined boundaries to be passed down from generation to generation (Pateman, 1988). In this case, analysis of the opinions regarding the roles inside and outside the home may give insight into this issue (Istat, 2019b).

In Italy, 73.2 per cent of women living with their partners think they contribute much more than their partner in unpaid care work. However, only 45.3 per cent report that they often talk to their partner about how to manage it, and only 24.4 per cent often ask for greater commitment from their partner. On the other hand, 70.3 per cent state that they are very or quite satisfied with the division of housework among couples (Carriero & Todesco, 2016).

Analysing the couples in which the woman is employed full-time (dual-earner couples) or those in which the woman is primarily responsible for the family income (female breadwinner), the share of those who report contributing much more than the partner in unpaid care work drops respectively to 61.1 and 57.6. At the same time, their bargaining capacity rises to 53.9 and 52.6 compared to the average. They also more frequently ask their partner to participate in unpaid care work (+2.8 and +4 points, respectively). However, it should be underlined that situations for women in which the gender stereotype is not established are still behind (Figure 71). These traditional gender stereotypes are less pronounced in cohabiting couples before marriage, and the relationship is more often symmetrical. This is probably because this behaviour is already in itself a sign of less commitment to traditional family values. A more important reason for this is that an increasing number of young, educated women not only want to build their social identity through marriage and family but also want to work, be economically independent, and take on roles other than wives and mothers (Mencarini & Tanturri, 2004). On the other hand, institutions and organisations related to the family are changing much more slowly (Manna et al., 2021).

*Figure 71: Women's views on the management of unpaid care work among couples, 2013-2014*



Source: (Carriero & Todesco, 2016; Istat, 2019b)

Considering regional differences in Italy, the share of men and women opposed to a traditionalist and stereotyped vision of roles in the family increases moving towards the North (Istat, 2019b, 2020, 2022b). In Northern Italy, 51.8 per cent of men and 57.8 per cent of women are against the male breadwinner model, and 74.0 per cent of men and 79.0 per cent of women



agree with the dual earner/dual carer model. While 79.3 per cent of men and 81.2 per cent of women find it entirely acceptable to be absent from work when a child needs assistance, about 63 per cent of men and women believe the father is equally capable as the mother in physical care activities aimed at young children. However, even in the North, the share of women who consider men less capable in unpaid care work, in general, is still high (52.9 per cent), but in any case, much less than among women in the South (66.8 per cent). In particular, it should be noted that as the level of education increases, all stereotypes gradually decrease (Istat, 2019b).

While cultural norms gradually change with education, illegal but pervasive regulations in the Italian labour market force women to choose between motherhood and work (Zannella et al., 2019). Research on women's working conditions (Manna et al., 2021; OECD, 2018) shows that women in Italy were often asked to sign a blank letter of resignation (*licenziamento in bianco*) when starting a job. This was widespread discrimination against working mothers in Italy, especially in small private businesses where protection by trade unions was often weaker, and the power relationship between employer and worker was more influential (Manna et al., 2021). In order to overcome this problem, a new regulation was enacted in 2015, announcing that resignations are only legally valid if they are sent through the web portal of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (Decreto Legislativo n. 151, 2015)

On the other hand, some women still think it is the mother's role to quit paid work if the conditions are not suitable for both (Manna et al., 2021). At this point, effective public childcare services are essential in women's employment and breaking down the stereotypical mother and caregiver roles that bind women to the home. Indeed, a recent study (Brilli et al., 2016) shows a per cent change in childcare services increases mothers' probability of working by 1.3 per cent. However, since the 2000s, there has been an increasing tendency for women who work during pregnancy to lose their jobs within two years of giving birth. This rate has recently increased to around 22 per cent (Bulgarelli, 2019). Moreover, in the south of Italy, where centre-based care is limited, younger and less educated women are more likely to lose their jobs (Istat, 2019b).


Regarding childcare, 63.4 per cent of women living with their partners in Italy think they contribute more than the father to the care needs of their children. On the other hand, 83.5 per cent are satisfied with this division of labour. If the parents are both employed, the share of mothers who believe they care more than the fathers drops to 53.1 per cent, while part-time employed mothers and unpaid carers are involved in childcare more, 70.3 per cent and 79.1 per cent, respectively. These levels are far above the share of female breadwinner mothers (37.7

per cent). However, when children are older, most parts declare that they share childcare activities equally (52.2 per cent) (Istat, 2019b).

The figures above imply that ‘women should leave paid work to manage their home and family care better’ still holds in Italy today. Indeed, 54 per cent of men state that it is better for the family if the man devotes himself mainly to economic work and the woman to the care of children and home. In addition, the same percentage of men think men cannot do housework as women. Nearly one-third of men (32 per cent) do not agree that the household chores should be shared equally between partners, and almost one in four men (23 per cent) think it is the mother’s duty to care for a sick child. This is probably because about three out of seven men (43 per cent) believe that mothers are more capable of caring than fathers.

On the other hand, one out of every two women (47 per cent) find it right to stay at home while men work in a paid job; and three out of five women (59 per cent) think women are better at housework, while almost two out of five women (44 per cent) say mothers are more skilled at caring than fathers (Figure 72).

**Figure 72: Proportions of respondents by geographic region and some gender stereotypes, age 15 and over, 2014**



Source: (Istat, 2019b)

This understanding oppresses women with sharp boundaries between public and private spheres. In this sense, as a complex, cultural and multidimensional phenomenon (Farina & Angelucci, 2020), gender-based violence is one of the most extreme forms of women’s vulnerability (Istat & Demofonti, 2022). In Italy, 31.5 per cent (almost 6.8 million) of women aged between 16-70 have experienced some form of physical or sexual violence in their lifetime (Barletta, 2020). In 2019, 19 per cent of ever-partnered Italian women had suffered from physical or sexual violence by their current or former partners (OECD, 2022b). 5.4 per

cent (1.2 million) have been subjected to the most severe forms of violence, such as rape and attempted rape (Barletta, 2020). In short, the responsibilities of women shaped within the private sphere by patriarchal traditions and neoliberal governance in Italy even today make them significantly vulnerable economically and socially. To transform this, there is a need for care-friendly and gender-transformative regulations. These are important in designing an effective legal and institutional framework for establishing gender equality and enabling a solid safety net for discriminated people.

### 5.2.3. Legal and Institutional Normative Structure

Together with the EU membership since 1958, The Italian feminist movement that emerged in the late 1960s led to important legal reforms. As discussed previously, in 1970, the Italian Parliament passed a legislation decree on the liberalisation of divorce<sup>64</sup>, and in 1978, the abortion penalty was abolished.<sup>65</sup> In addition, a law enacted in 1996<sup>66</sup> reinstated rape as a crime against the integrity of the female body, not of public morality. Meanwhile, the protests organised by the Italian LGBTIQ+ movement, which emerged in the early 1970s, for the recognition of same-sex family practices and the prevention of homophobia, enabled this issue to enter the political agenda, albeit reluctantly (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021; Trappolin, 2022).

The Italian legal framework for gender equality is provided by the National Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men,<sup>67</sup> created in 2006, which regulates and harmonises various laws on equality of opportunity in a single text (Rosselli, 2014). In addition, gender equality and certain threats to it have been legally defined in successive regulations. For instance, a decree-law in 2009 criminalised stalking<sup>68</sup>; in 2011, the gender equality law was enacted to ensure gender balance in the bodies of listed companies on the stock exchange<sup>69</sup>; and in 2013, the [Istanbul Convention](#) combats violence against women was ratified. Following these regulations, in 2016, the centre-left and Democratic Party government at the time passed the law on civil partnerships<sup>70</sup>, which legally recognised and regulated same-sex partnerships.

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<sup>64</sup> (Decreto-Legge n. 898, 1970)

<sup>65</sup> (Legge n. 194, 1978)

<sup>66</sup> (Legge n. 66, 1996)

<sup>67</sup> (Decreto Legislativo n. 198, 2006)

<sup>68</sup> (Decreto-Legge n. 11, 2009)

<sup>69</sup> (Legge n. 120, 2011)

<sup>70</sup> (Legge n. 76, 2016)

Before this law, in 2015, another much-debated regulation was enacted after a long process, a legislative decree on education<sup>71</sup> to enable non-discrimination, equal opportunity and gender equality, among others (Ferri, 2017).

Recently, in 2021, a law was passed reforming equality of opportunity for men and women,<sup>72</sup> obliging private and public companies with more than 50 employees to submit a bi-annual report on the working conditions of men and women, particularly on the gender pay gap (Donà, 2022). At the EU level, also a new policy directive was proposed in 2022, which aimed to be instrumental in banning pay secrecy and ending gender pay gaps (EIGE, 2022).

On the other hand, Italy lacks competent mechanisms at the national level to design, monitor and evaluate gender equality legislation. [The Equal Opportunities Department \(Dipartimento per le pari opportunità\)](#), the governing body responsible for gender equality, was established in 1997 under the Prime Ministry to support the development and coordination of human rights and equal opportunities policies. However, the lack of resources, the inability to establish an institutional culture due to short tenures, and, therefore, the different interpretations of gender discrimination by each minister reduced the potential positive impact of the organisation (Rosselli, 2014).

The current head of the department is Eugenia Roccella, Minister of Family, Birth and Equal Opportunities in the Meloni government, mentioned in the previous section. [National Equality Committee \(Comitato Nazionale Parità\)](#), on the other hand, under the Minister of Labour and Social Policies, implement the principles of equal treatment and equal opportunities between male and female workers (Decreto Legislativo n. 198, 2006). Apart from these, there are Equal Opportunity Commissions at the local level, transformed in 2010, and Equality advisors at the regional and provisional level against gender discrimination in employment (OECD, 2019a; Rosselli, 2014).

Finally, in addition to the fact that many local governments have supported gender-based budgeting in the last 20 years, at the national level, it has also been applied as an experimental practice to evaluate the effects of budget policies on women and men between 2016 and 2018 (EIGE, 2019). However, the promotion of gender budgeting, the only gender mainstreaming initiative widely used in Italy, remained at the sub-national level (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Italy, 2019). It is worth mentioning here these legal regulations and Italy's

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<sup>71</sup> (Legge n. 107, 2015)

<sup>72</sup> (Legge n. 162, 2021)

progress on gender equality, albeit slow, have mainly been driven by the need to adopt EU directives and the use of European funds, where equality of opportunity is a cross-cutting theme (ISFOL, 2015a).

Recently, in the post-pandemic period, in January-April 2021, Italy prepared two National Recovery and Resilience Plans ([Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza](#)) to take advantage of the EU's support for the recovery. In line with this plan, the National Strategy for Gender Equality ([Strategia Nazionale per la Parità di Genere](#)) was also adopted. Both plans addressed work, income, skills, time, and power. However, due to the top-down execution of the process and insufficient participation of stakeholders, gender equality measures have been bureaucratised (Donà, 2022). In response to the funding conditions set by the EU, it has become a somewhat apolitical technical issue as part of the Government's strategic agenda.

On the other hand, regulations encouraging action on women's employment, work-life balance, gender pay equality and similar issues have been influential in supporting women's employment. Going beyond this requires special arrangements that not only aim at achieving more equitable economic growth in Europe but also organise care work collectively and distribute it more equitably (Braunstein, 2012; Donà, 2022; Prügl, 2015).

#### **5.2.4. Social Care System and Dynamics**

As has been shown so far, in Italian society, the woman is the strongest pillar of community and family for caring for their dependents and maintaining the functioning of the reproductive sphere. The close relationship between women and social care makes it essential to understand the impact of the existence of government to provide care services, implying the need to distribute the burden equally across society. Within the framework of this approach, this section will examine how the state in Italy has a presence and preferences in areas that affect the burden of care.

##### **5.2.4.1. Government's Role on Gendered Socio-Economic Segregation in Italy**

###### *5.2.4.1.1. Income and wealth inequality*

To begin with, the gap between rich and poor in Italy is enormous: the ten wealthiest people own roughly the same wealth as the three million most impoverished Italians, which exemplifies the gap in a developed country like Italy (D'Alessio, 2012). Moreover, inequality

has intensified in Italy over the past decade. As the gap between the rich and the poor has widened, the number of people in extreme poverty has also increased (Pastorelli & Stocchiero, 2018). Since the mid-1980s, labour, capital and savings incomes have become 33 per cent more unequal, the highest increase among OECD countries (OECD, 2008). Moreover, in the period from 2004 to 2015 Italy experienced a decline in per capita income, which greatly affected the poorest (Guzzardi et al., 2022)

*Table 16: Gini coefficient, disposable income and poverty rates by years in Italy*

	1994	2004	2007	2009	2010	2011 <sup>§</sup>	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Gini (market income, before taxes and transfers)	0,467	0.512	0.486	0.494	0.512	0.508	0.513	0.513	0.512	0.524	0.517	0.516	0.511
Gini (disposable income, post taxes and transfers)	0.327	0.331	0.313	0.315	0.327	0.327	0.33	0.325	0.326	0.333	0.327	0.334	0.33
P90/P10 disposable income decile ratio***	4.7	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.9	4.5	4.7	4.6
Poverty rate before taxes and transfers, Poverty line 60% <sup>†</sup>	0.316	0.339	0.343	0.35	0.368	0.365	0.372	0.378	0.382	0.392	0.381	0.378	0.383
Poverty rate post taxes and transfers, Poverty line 60% <sup>††</sup>	0.206	0.186	0.193	0.189	0.204	0.199	0.194	0.196	0.198	0.21	0.2	0.202	0.205

\*\*\*: The ratio of the upper bound value of the ninth decile (i.e., the 10% of people with the highest income) to that of the upper bound value of the first decile.

†, ††: The share of people with an equivalised disposable income (before and after social transfers) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers. Figures represent the percentage of the population.

§: After 2011, OECD data include a more detailed breakdown of current transfers received and paid by households. Household income definition is also revised to include the value of goods produced for own consumption as an element of self-employed income.

Source: [OECD Stat](#)

At the national level, income inequality has also increased since the mid-1990s, and tax and transfer policies have not been effective in reallocating resources (Table 16). Although there has been an improvement in the fair distribution of capital income with the increase in rental income holders (Iacono & Ranaldi, 2021), the rich benefited more from the resulting economic growth than the poor or middle classes (OECD, 2008, Table 16). The highest income group continue to earn 4,6 times more than the lowest income group. In addition, even though it decreases in the post-transfer and taxes, 20 per cent of the population receives 60 per cent less than average household incomes (Table 16).

Within the framework of current policies, single-parent families headed by female wage-earner are more likely to fall into extreme poverty. Indeed, 85 per cent of these households are in this category (Pastorelli & Stocchiero, 2018). Inequalities such as the gender pay gap, interrupted working life due to pregnancy and childbirth, low pensions and, as a result,


low income and wealth accumulation are very effective in this (EIGE, 2022; Mencarini & Tanturri, 2004; OECD, 2022a).

#### 5.2.4.1.2. Tax policies

Taxation policies are one of the main factors affecting income distribution as it affects human and monetary capital and returns (Guzzardi et al., 2022). Therefore, besides policy interventions that directly address gender inequality, tax policy is a critical tool for building gender-transformative and care-friendly policies (Coelho et al., 2022).

In Italy, the tax system depends on the individual, not the household, so marital status does not directly affect the amount of tax paid. However, tax credits for dependent family members and universal cash transfers for children<sup>73</sup> can act to reduce household income to remain within the threshold to be eligible for these benefits. This regulation indirectly affects the labour force participation status of women and the financial burden on them (Colonna & Marcassa, 2015). Such policies increase the demand for children without changing the relative prices of childcare, thereby reducing the female labour supply.

*Figure 73: Share of direct, indirect and wealth taxes in total tax revenue, Italy, 2000-2020*




Source: [OECD Stat](#)

However, reforms that increase the female labour supply can also be combined with reforms that facilitate childcare delivery, for example, through the provision of public childcare or tax expenditures that reduce the cost of private childcare (Coelho et al., 2022). On the other hand, individualisation of income tax without combining social transfers can reduce fertility while increasing incentives to work. The majority of labour market inactive mothers with

<sup>73</sup> In Italy [Assegno Unico Universale](#) as of March 2022.

caring responsibilities and limited or no work experience in Italy receive cash support for their young children through a means-tested allowance, [Assegno Unico Universale](#) (AUU- vary between a maximum of 175 euros - a minimum of 50 euros based on the family unit's means and the number and age of dependent family members and disabled children, if any). This new allowance, which will unconditionally guarantee a minimum child benefit to any Italian household that applies, overcomes inconsistencies in the previous system that excluded unemployed and self-employed workers (OECD, 2018).<sup>74</sup>

*Figure 74: The structure of general government tax revenues in Italy, 2000-2020*



Source: [OECD Government Revenue Statistics](#)

On the other hand, recent research (Coelho et al., 2022) shows that the tax rate in Italy increases only slightly up to the 95th percentile. Moreover, while tax rates on labour income increase with income, the Italian tax system turns regressive for those in the top 5 per cent of the income distribution, which reverses the positive effect of higher direct taxes. Additionally, low levels of wealth taxes and the regressivity of consumption taxes at the higher levels (Coelho et al., 2022) reduce the redistributive role of the state towards lower-income groups (Figure 73). Finally, the low level of corporate taxes, unlike individual income and consumption taxes, presents a problematic picture for social justice (Figure 74).


<sup>74</sup> Previous allowances could not reach 40 percent of households with children, as they did not reach the sufficient income threshold ([Ministero dell'economia e delle Finanze](#)).



### 5.2.4.1.3. Government expenditure


According to the OECD (2018), in Italy, discouraged young adults with limited work experience and mothers with care responsibilities and inactive in the labour market have little, or no work experience face high poverty or social exclusion risks. However, the social safety net in Italy does not adequately cover them. The same report notes that while the vast majority of discouraged young adults are long-term unemployed, only 29 per cent receive unemployment benefits, and 3 per cent receive social or housing benefits (OECD, 2018). In this sense, governments social spending is critical in establishing this safety net, and it remains limited in Italy.

**Figure 75: Health, education and social protection expenditure as % of total government expenditure, 1995-2020**



Source: [Euro Stat](#)

Figure 76: Government expenditure by function (COFOG) (% of total)



Source: [Euro Stat](#)

[Euro Stat](#) data shows that social spending, which includes health, education, and social protection, has risen steadily in Italy. This level has consistently remained below the EU average in Italy, however it has reached the EU average by 2020 (Figure 75). Overall, these three social expenditure items constitute the largest share of government expenditures in both Italy and the EU (Figure 76).

Table 17: Distribution of expenditures on social protection by type of benefits \*, 2020

	EU-27		Italy	
	% of GDP	% of total	% of GDP	% of total
(1) Sickness/Health care	8.8	29.1	7.4	22.3
(2) Disability	2.2	7.3	1.8	5.3
(3) Old age	11.7	38.6	15.5	46.6
(4) Survivors	1.7	5.7	2.9	8.6
(5) Family/Children	2.5	8.3	1.3	3.8
(6) Unemployment	2.2	7.3	3.0	9.1
(7) Housing	0.4	1.3	0.0	0.1
(8) Social exclusion and n.e.c.**	0.7	2.4	1.4	4.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>25.1</b>	<b>100</b>

\*: Figures in the table may not add up to totals due to rounding.  
 \*\*: Not elsewhere classified

Source: [Euro Stat](#)

On the other hand, almost half (46.6 per cent) of the total social protection expenditures in Italy and two-fifths (38.6 per cent) in the EU are made up of old-age income holders. Healthcare expenditure follows it, which is higher in the EU (29.1 per cent). While Italy spends more (9.1 per cent) on unemployment than the EU average (7.3 per cent), family and children's benefits have a much higher share in the EU (8.3 per cent) than in Italy (3.8 per cent). Finally, Italy spends less of its GDP (25.1 per cent) on social protection than the EU average (30.2 per cent) (Table 17). Total cash and in-kind support for families with young children in Italy is below the EU average. Moreover, although the above-mentioned risk groups, namely discouraged young adults and mothers with caring responsibilities, are potential beneficiaries of family benefits in Italy, only 60 per cent of the group receive this support (OECD, 2018). On the other hand, supports such as the latest universal allowance for dependent children ([assegno unico universale](#)), nursery voucher ([bonus nido](#)), and childbirth allowance ([bonus bebè](#)) increase the involvement of low spending for families (see [Section 6.4](#) for detailed information). However, expenditures such as tax credits for dependent spouses not only encourage women to stay out of the workforce but also a significant portion of their additional earnings when they enter employment is taxed (Coelho et al., 2022; Colonna & Marcassa, 2015; OECD, 2018).

#### **5.2.4.2. National Healthcare System in Italy**

Italy has a tax-financed universal health system, supported by the National Health Service ([Servizio sanitario nazionale or SSN](#)) Act since 1978 (Legge n. 833, 1978). However, the Italian health system is decentralised and regionally organised. The central government channels general tax revenues for publicly funded health care and defines the basic health package ([livelli essenziali di assistenza \(LEA\)](#)), and each region organises and delivers the healthcare services. Healthcare covers all citizens and legally resident foreigners for emergency and basic services for irregular migrants since 1998 (Decreto Legislativo n. 286, 1998). Access to healthcare has been automatically guaranteed in Italy since this arrangement, and unmet medical care needs have remained low overall, according to WHO data (2019). However, low-income groups in some regions still face barriers to accessing health care. Especially with the Covid-19 pandemic, access to health services has been severely interrupted. According to WHO (2021), 23 per cent of the population in Italy and about 21 per cent in the EU did not have access to care services in the first 12 months of the pandemic. Nevertheless, public health coverage has resulted in higher life expectancy and very low infant and child mortality rates

since the 1980s (Table 18). However, this longer life expectancy has increased the health system's challenges in providing long-term care for people with chronic illnesses and reducing inequalities in access to care (OECD & WHO, 2021).

*Table 18: Health indicators for selected years, Italy, 1980-2021*

		1980	1990	2000	2010	2012	2015	2017	2019	2020	2021
Life expectancy <sup>a</sup>	Women	77.4	80.3	82.5	84.5	82.3	84.7	84.9	85.6	84.7	85.1
	Men	70.7	73.6	76.5	79.5	79.8	80.2	80.4	81.4	80.0	80.5
Mortality rate, (per 1000 live births) <sup>b</sup>	Infant	14.2	8.4	4.7	3.4	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.5	-
	Under 5 years	16.1	9.7	5.6	4.0	3.8	3.5	3.3	3.0	2.9	-

Source: a: [UN World Population Prospects](#); b: [UNICEF Child Data](#)


Overall, the ageing population and slow economic growth in Italy, as in most of the EU, put pressure on public health spending on health and long-term care in subsequent years. Projections of public health expenditures for Italy estimate that expenditures will increase by 0.7 per cent of GDP and long-term care by 1.3 per cent in the period 2016-2070, in line with the EU average (OECD & WHO, 2021; The European Commission, 2021). On the other hand, the number of hospital beds per capita in Italy decreased by nearly 30 per cent to 3.2 beds per 1,000 people due to reduced hospital capacity while promoting more cost-effective care (Table 19). While the number of hospital discharges decreased in line with the number of beds, the average length of stay increased slightly, partially due to the hospitalisation of heavier patients and increased outpatient use for milder cases (OECD & WHO, 2019). Private hospitals in Italy also constitute a considerable part of the total number of hospitals, more than 45 per cent (Table 8).

*Table 19: Hospital bed numbers by sector, 2020*

	Public	Private	Total
Number of hospitals by sectors	570	478	1048
%	54.4	45.6	100
Hospital beds (per 1 000 people)	3.2		
Intensive care beds (per 100 000 people)	8.6		

Source: [Istat Health Statistics](#); [Eurostat Health Statistics](#)


**Figure 77: Health expenditures of government and households, Italy 2000-2019**



Source: [World Bank Health Expenditure Statistics](#)

When we consider this with public healthcare expenditures, which are historically low relative to the EU average (OECD & WHO, 2021), out-of-pocket payments by households becomes important component of the health expenses. For 2019, public spending accounted for 74 per cent of total health spending, or about 6.5 per cent of GDP, with out-of-pocket payments making up the majority of the rest, or 23 per cent. This represents the overall trend for Italy for the reference period in Figure 77. Private health insurance constitutes a very low level of around 3 per cent ([World Bank Health Expenditure Statistics](#)).

**Figure 78: Number of medical doctors and consultations per person, annually, Italy, 2000-2020**



Source: \* [WHO Health Statistics](#); \*\* [Eurostat Health Statistics](#)

On the other hand, the healthcare sector in Italy is facing a shortage of healthcare workers due to adverse working conditions, such as difficult shifts and long working hours (Figure 78). The low value attributed to care work in the world and as well as in Italy, the employment of immigrants in this area, and the idea that care is the responsibility of women in

the home and is done for free are effective in almost all the problems faced in the health sector (EIGE, 2022; European Union & Loi, 2022). Thus, the fact that women in Italy have a longer life expectancy than men and have lower resources at an advanced age requires the attention of public policies in this regard.

#### **5.2.4.3. Early Childhood Care in Italy**


In Italy, where pre-primary education is not compulsory, childcare facilities are divided into services for children up to 3 years old and services for children 3 to 6 years old (UNESCO, 2021). Public services for 0–3-year-olds are generally provided by the regional governments, while services for 3–6-year-olds are under the control and responsibility of the national government. For 0–3-year-olds, three types of service are available: municipal nursery schools (asili-nido d’infanzia) (Legge n. 1044, 1971), supplementary service (servizio integrativo) and spring class (sezione primavera) (Bulgarelli, 2019). On the other hand, many studies and available data (EIGE, 2022; Mencarini & Tanturri, 2004; Zannella et al., 2019) point to the lack of childcare services in Italy. In 2019, there were 22 863 pre-school institutions (scuola dell’infanzia), of which 15 380 were public and 7 483 private. In total, only around 1.4 million out of 2.8 million children aged 0-6 enrolled in these institutions (Istat, 2022b). Moreover, according to the latest data (Istat, 2022c), the number of public pre-primary education institutions regressed to 13 542 at the end of 2020.

Although compulsory education starts at age 6 in Italy, participation rates in pre-primary education between the ages of 3-5 are very high, exceeding 92 per cent in 2020. However, even for this age period, there is a decreasing trend for the reference period in Figure 76. This may result from declining public facilities in pre-primary education (European Commission et al., 2020; Istat, 2022b). On the other hand, participation levels for the 0-2 age period are always very low, with around 28 per cent of the relevant age population for 2020 (Figure 79). This gap, especially in the care of children aged 0-2, has been chiefly closed by families, especially mothers and grandmothers (Amici & Stefani, 2013; Mencarini & Tanturri, 2004). According to Eurostat data (2022), in Italy where 46 per cent of children under the age of 3 in Italy were cared for by their parents in 2021.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> See [Eurostat](#) Accessed on 28.11.2022.

**Figure 79: Enrolment rates in early childhood education and care services (% of the population related aged)**



Source: [OECD Education and Training Statistics](#)

However, childcare at home is unequally shared between women and men. This is especially true for high-intensity childcare in Italy, where women (40 per cent) spend at least 4 hours a day caring for young children, twice as much as men (21 per cent) (EIGE, 2022). According to ISTAT data (2019b), about 30 per cent of working mothers whose children, aged 0-3, do not attend day-care centres prefer access to day-care. On the other hand, more than half of the mothers could not afford childcare, while 12 per cent stated that there was no place in childcare facilities. Indeed, figures show that due to the long waiting lists for enrolment and high costs, home care for young children becomes unavoidable in some families (Bulgarelli, 2019; Sarti, 2010).

The cost of public childcare also varies considerably between and within regions, as municipalities can autonomously determine childcare subsidies and the number of places available. Current estimates suggest that childcare costs account for 30 to 50 per cent of the average earnings of working mothers (Brilli et al., 2016; Del Boca, 2022; OECD, 2018). Furthermore, access to and cost of nurseries and other childcare services is often means-tested in Italy, which is an implicit disadvantage for working mothers. In this case, working women take on the responsibility of care by reducing their working hours, especially if they have flexible working hours or can choose when to work. In many cases, however, many leave the paid workforce, as adjustment margins are likely to be limited (Mencarini & Tanturri, 2004). The provision of formal public childcare is also particularly low in the southern regions (OECD, 2018), and public nursery schools (*nido d'infanzia*) are deficient compared to private schools, which account for more than 60 per cent (Bulgarelli, 2020). The recognition that

childcare is the mother's duty in Italy is also evident in the paid maternity and paternity leaves. In Italy, while mothers are entitled to five months of maternity leave (congedo di maternità) with equal to 80 per cent of pay, fathers have to claim ten days of paid statutory paternity leave (congedo di paternità) (Dipartimento per le politiche della famiglia, 2022; Decreto Legislativo n. 151, 2001; Decreto Legislativo n. 105, 2022).

### **5.3. CONCLUSION**

Italian society is characterised by a significant imbalance in the distribution of family work between men and women, where Italian women work more than men (Del Boca, 2022). In this, mostly Italy's welfare state understanding founded upon families as the fundamental care institutions are effective. From this perspective, care is an activity best managed at local units such as families and does not require a high-level skill set (Barigozzi et al., 2020; Bulgarelli, 2019). On the other hand, care responsibilities at home are the second most important reason for Italian women not joining the workforce ([Eurostat LFS, Figure 4](#)), and mostly unpaid care work of women continues to dominate household production in Italy (Istat, 2019b). When we compare the total work of women and men, including all paid and unpaid work, it becomes evident that women in Italy work 1.23 times more than men overall, and the total amount of unpaid work hours produced in Italy is equal to 1.5 times that of paid work hours (Table 12; Table 13; and [Istat](#)).

Considering also the family-centred political discourse, gendered policies and regulations in Italy, the feminisation of care work is established institutionally, and the unjust distribution of unpaid labour deepens. Although women with higher education and professional experience tend to act contrary to traditional expectations, in cases where the state does not provide social protection as a right, many women are forced to apply to charities and kinship relationships formed through personal connections (Brilli et al., 2016; Del Boca, 2022; Istat, 2019b; Pailhé et al., 2019). In this context, it is required to figure out potential gender transformative policy dimensions in the wider macro level context as part of supporting policymakers in the transformation processes, but also design and reconsider the role of government, men and society as a whole which is the objective of the next chapter.



## 6. FINDINGS & ANALYSIS

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In light of theoretical discussions and existing empirical data, this thesis has drawn upon the *four pathways* devised by Cantillon and Teasdale (2021). This thesis, building upon and adapting this approach through applying it to the contexts of Turkey and Italy, attempts to further develop the *four pathways* as an analytical approach for exploring gendered unpaid care work. Case studies are the first to use *pathways* to analyse and discuss the factors affecting gendered unpaid care work in a wider macro-level context. In practice, each case study has important implications for transforming the social and institutional structure with policies, regulations and actions which will *recognise, reduce, and redistribute* care work (Elson, 2017) and *represent and reward* care workers (Addati et al., 2018; Rost et al., 2020).


Combining the *four pathways* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) with the *5Rs* (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020), this thesis aims to develop further the analytical framework. Therefore, the novelty of this thesis is to use pre-existing tools- *four pathways* and the *5Rs*- to investigate and analyse cases and integrate them to provide a more comprehensive approach to understanding and transforming gendered unpaid care work. For this purpose, this chapter brings together all the relevant discussions from the previous chapters to highlight the factors that initiate or perpetuate the gendered division of labour and place them in the novel *integrated analytical framework*. This framework focuses on the interconnections of the gendered areas (four pathways) and solutions to them (*5Rs*). Based on the results of the case studies, although each *pathway* influences the other, the *framework* shows that the legal and institutional structure, the socio-political normative structure, and the social care system and dynamics construct the gendered division of paid and unpaid labour. Once the gendered unpaid care work is established, its impact on these areas reinforces the more dominant gender stereotypes. Therefore, adequate policies that promote the recognition of gendered unpaid care through legal and institutional norms and challenge gender stereotypes embedded in socio-political norms and discourses create a favourable tide in the system. On the other hand, policies to reward care workers and carers through robust, clear, and transparent legal and institutional structure and social care system that regards care as a human right is crucial to sustaining the positive impact. Such a social care system is vital in reducing and redistributing care work not only between men and women but also between families and the state. However, the transformation of care relations cannot be complete without inclusive representation in

decision-making positions both in politics and the labour market that will impact socio-political norms and the gendered division of paid and unpaid labour (see Figure 80).

In this context, the *integrated analytical framework* aims to support policymakers drive processes of change in the *recognition, reduction and redistribution* of care work, the *representation and rewarding* of carers, and thus transforming care work. Within this *framework*, fifteen policy areas were determined to orientate the transformation in question and rank Turkey and Italy in the final *gendered unpaid care work index*.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the comparative analysis between Turkey and Italy regarding the four pathways and highlights differences and similarities between the two countries within the dominant policy context. Using the 5R framework to analyse the implications of these current measures concerning the key domains (as identified through the pathways) and their effects on advancing or inhibiting gender equality, Section 2 explores the possible domains in terms of the transformation of gendered unpaid care work. Bringing together the knowledge in these two sections, Section 3 presents the original contribution of this thesis, which is *gendered unpaid care work index*, focusing on key policy actions that support the gender transformative outcomes and advance gender equality. This section consists of fifteen policy dimensions: (i) *institutional infrastructure for data collection and processing*; (ii) *national gender equality framework*; (iii) *institution for setting, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating gender equality goals*; (iv) *national legal framework on gender equality*; (v) *protection against gender-based violence*; (vi) *universal healthcare*; (vii) *universal childcare*; (viii) *universal education right*; (ix) *universal social protection policies*; (x) *universal old-age pension system*; (xi) *gender-equal parental leaves*; (xii) *care friendly working environment regulations*; (xiii) *specific regulations regarding directly unpaid care work and caregivers*; (xiv) *fiscal policies on unpaid care work*; (xv) *gender-equal discourse*. Employing these policy dimensions, Section 4 develops the *gendered unpaid care work index* for the final comparison and ranking the performances of Turkey and Italy.

Figure 80: Integrated Analytical Framework to Unpaid Care Work



## **6.1. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: *FOUR PATHWAYS***

The case studies of Turkey and Italy have presented similarities as well as peculiarities that should be analysed together in terms of *four pathways*. Therefore, this section presents a comparative analysis under each of the *four pathways* to understand potential areas for moving towards the *5Rs* and, thus, *gendered unpaid care work index*. The analysis here will integrate the theoretical discussion with the results from the case studies.

An overview of the current policy configurations for these categories of gendered unpaid care work suggests several implications for establishing an *integrated analytical framework*. First, there is a clear need for more inclusive welfare policies and institutional organisation at the national level to create favourable conditions for care in Turkey and Italy. In these countries, gender relations are shaped by socioeconomic conditions and organisational cultural barriers that do not adequately support women. Some pervasive social customs and norms embrace mostly male presence in the public sphere while lacking care services and a flexible labour market force women to choose between work and care. These elements will be pointed out in the remainder of the chapter.

### **6.1.1. Employment Opportunities and Labour Market Regulations**

Gender imbalances in labour force participation have been at the centre of mainstream and feminist economics debates for decades (Addabbo, Rodríguez-Modroño, et al., 2015b; Braunstein, 2012). Feminist debates, in particular, centred on the fact that while there has been a significant increase in female labour force participation over the past decades, the presence of women in the wage labour market has not translated into a directly proportional increase in men's household activities (EIGE, 2022). In this case, women work more than men through double shifts in paid jobs outside the home and unpaid care work at home but earn much less than men. Turkey and Italy are no exception to this. In addition, as demonstrated by the available data on Turkey and Italy, participation in the labour market and accessing the opportunities there is not a subject to be examined on its own and requires situating within wider, social, cultural, and economic contexts. Addressing gendered unpaid care work within these contexts can provide practical tools to deal with its unfair consequences.

The abundance or scarcity of time is critical in shaping these consequences (Waring, 1988). This distribution is determined by many cross-cutting characteristics such as gender,

race, ethnicity (Crenshaw, 1991; Davis, 1990), institutional structure and social norms (Hartmann, 1976; hooks, 1981). Availability of time therefore also affects paid and unpaid working hours (EIGE, 2022) and the situation in the labour market (Arruzza et al., 2019).

Women's labour market participation is below the OECD average in Turkey and Italy, while it is higher in Italy than in Turkey (Figure 5). On the other hand, while the total working hours for paid work is higher in Turkey, women undertake a more significant part of unpaid work (89.2 per cent) compared to Italy (71.4 per cent). This alone may indicate that the more women join the paid workforce, the more equal the share of unpaid care work becomes. However, compared to Turkey (47.6 per cent) in Italy, unpaid hours make up the majority of total working hours (60.6 per cent), and women's share of unpaid care work is higher in both countries. This data shows that women in both countries work longer hours, and working in paid work does not lead to a proportional decrease in unpaid care work. Although women in Italy participate more in the labour market, they work longer hours than women in Turkey, both paid and unpaid. It seems to be in line with the normative structure that defines women's labour power as part of the reserve army (Bruegel, 1979) in both Turkey and Italy and assigns women first as caregivers and then as paid workers (England, 2005; Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c). Therefore, it is not surprising that women are in the most marginalised groups in these countries (Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c) regarding poverty, social exclusion and violence. The fact that unpaid care work is the first reason for not participating in the labour force in Turkey and the second in Italy reveals these contradictions (Turk Stat, 2021b, Eurostat LFS 2022). On the other hand, empirical and non-empirical literature suggests that the most relevant factors in being an unpaid worker (Addabbo, Rodríguez-Modroño, et al., 2015a; Bettio & Verashchagina, 2014; Farrell, 2005; Kongar & Memiş, 2017) are education level, maternity, household structure and total income, age, and informal employment. The available data for Turkey and Italy provide important insights into each of these areas.

First, education is essential in that it impacts social mobility and economic equality (Turk Stat, 2016, 2022c). Education is also critical to employment rates, given that most low-educated people are neither in employment nor in education (Acar Erdogan & V. Del Carpio, 2019). For example, in Turkey, being an unpaid family worker and self-employed is more common among the population with only primary education (Turk Stat, 2022). On the other hand, women with children and without work experience in Italy usually have a lower-secondary school diploma. Although women in both countries are less likely to be employed at all levels of education than men, considering that nearly half of the highly educated women

in Turkey are unemployed, it becomes clear that gender roles are not resolved by education alone (Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c). It is worth noting that employment rates for men in both countries are very high, even at very low levels of education. This again shows that although gender relations become more flexible with education, gender roles do not disappear (Figures 22 and 60). On the other hand, the education expenditures of governments in both countries stay below the OECD and EU averages. In particular, tertiary education in Italy and secondary and primary education spending in Turkey lag behind (Figure 20 and Figure 57). The low enrolment rate in pre-primary education, particularly in Turkey, is also a significant problem increasing the childcare burden on women. In addition, the intermittent education system in Turkey makes it easier for girls to drop out of education and become unpaid family workers. While most boys join paid employment to contribute to family income. At the same time, early leavers are more likely to enter the NEET population in Turkey than in Italy. The consequences of inequality in both spending and participation in education are disproportionately evident in the Southeast and Eastern regions of Turkey and the Southern parts of Italy.

Second, arrangements to reconcile work and family life are of great importance due to the current polarisation between the gender roles and spheres of reproduction and production (Pearson & Elson, 2015). If these regulations are scarce, women reduce their working hours, quit their jobs, reduce the number of children, or choose not to have children (Euro Stat, 2022). In this respect, the decreasing child population in Turkey and Italy reveals the inadequacy of social services to reduce and redistribute women's care burden. Given the absence of centre-based formal childcare and the short school days for older children, mothers and grandparents play an important role in childcare in both countries. This again increases the care burden on women, especially grandmothers, due to childcare and other activities (Turk Stat, 2022d; UN, 2015). An important difference between these countries concerns maternal age. Although more women in Turkey today postpone births to advanced ages, most women give birth between the ages of 25-29, which coincides with graduation and starting their profession. However, in Italy, fertility is higher in women aged 30-34 and shifts to the 35-39 age period (Figures 25 and 63) (Turk Stat, 2022c, Istat Population Statistics, 2022). The difference in fertility period may be another reason for the variation in women's labour force participation between Turkey and Italy.

Household structure and accumulated income in this unit also affect women's unpaid labour supply and labour force participation in two ways. First, women's labour force participation and employment levels differ significantly in both countries, depending on their

marital status and type of household, especially the presence of children (ILO, 2020). Although men's labour force participation does not differ as much as women's according to their family status, there is an increasing trend in the labour force participation of men living with their spouses and children (Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c). For women, this relationship works in the opposite direction. Having children and living with a partner negatively affects women's labour force participation in both Turkey and Italy (ILO, 2020). This relationship may indicate that although caring for family members is a relevant factor in women's labour market participation, it has almost no effect on men's labour status. Second, tax credits or reductions based on dependent spouses and children incentivise women to stay home. Especially in Turkey, the lack of regulation on the minimum subsistence amount based on the consumption of families encourages female spouses to remain out of the workforce. Otherwise, the tax they pay on a household basis increases significantly (Özdiler Küçük, 2016).

Age is also important in women's relationship with the paid labour market. In both countries, the most apparent impact of age on women occurs through the wage and pension gap. Women are disadvantaged due to career cuts, lower earnings, and, therefore, lower retirement savings (Istat, 2019b, 2022c; Turk Stat, 2022c). Indeed, almost a quarter of women in Italy are in the lowest quintile of the retirement income distribution ([Istat, 2022](#)), while most women in Turkey are connected to the social security system through their partners, fathers or sons (Turk Stat, 2022). On the other hand, many women leave their careers due to motherhood during the possible rise of their careers, and in some cases, motherhood is the reason women lose their jobs (Manna et al., 2021; OECD, 2018). Despite new regulations to eliminate gender pay inequalities and unlawful resignation procedures, current government policies in both Turkey and Italy continue to assign parental responsibilities to women through policies such as parental allowances (EIGE, 2022; Turk Stat, 2022c). In Turkey, while women have statutory 16 weeks of paid maternity leave, fathers have an optional 10 days of leave (Decree Law 29882, 2016). Similarly, in Italy, women have a statutory 5 months of leave but with 80 per cent of their wage; and men have obligatory 10 days paid leave ([INPS](#)). Thereby, the approach here institutionally approves the gendered segregation in care and intensifies polarised gender roles with government policies.

Finally, the informal sector remains a significant setback regarding women's relationship with the social state and, thus, the burden of unpaid care work in both countries, especially in Turkey (European Union & Loi, 2022; Labour Special Commission, 2018). The relationship between being a woman, working in the informal sector and being socio-

economically disadvantaged shows that not only unpaid work but also most women's paid work does not count in the official statistics (Acar Erdogan & V. Del Carpio, 2019). The data also proves that informal workers are generally female, older, and less educated in Turkey (Turk Stat, 2021a). Most women in agriculture work as unpaid family workers (Ministry of Development, 2018; Turk Stat, 2022c). On the other hand, informality is common among caregivers, who are mostly women, in Italy (EIGE, 2019).

To sum up, each of these factors, mentioned above and discussed with the available data in case studies, is critical in terms of the opportunities and constraints in the labour market and the gendered structure surrounding it. The central importance of these factors is that they are part of a more systematic structure in terms of their relationship to the socio-normative, legal, and institutional structure and social care infrastructure, which will be discussed below.

### **6.1.2. Neoliberal & Patriarchal Socio-Political Normative Structure**

The socio-normative structure built based on patriarchal (Connell, 1987; Maynard, 1995) and neoliberal relations maintains gendered and hierarchical power relations (Barrett, 1980; Hartmann, 1979; Walby, 1990). Therefore, given the patriarchal and neoliberal orientation of politics in Turkey and Italy in recent decades (Adaman & Akbulut, 2021; Trappolin, 2022), it is not surprising to witness low gender equality scores and further polarisation of production and reproduction (Pearson & Elson, 2015) roles in both countries (EIGE, 2022; Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c).

The social and normative fabric of Turkey and Italy is based on similar patriarchal relations in terms of the importance attributed to the heterosexual family unit, women's role as mothers in these, and the continuity of ancestry (Donà, 2022; Sancar & Bulut, 2006). Thus, many women are confronted with the female identities determined for them in public and private spheres. Within the current power relations, these norms expect the woman to protect the social order through her position in the family and primarily via the 'mother identity'. In other words, the continuation of the generations and the continuation of the moral order especially depend on the so-called functionality of women in society (Elçi, 2012).

Turkey and Italy are also very similar, especially in how conservative right-wing politics articulate traditional gender roles and use public resources to build a society around these roles (Korkut & Eslen-Ziya, 2018; Lavizzari & Prearo, 2019). In both Turkey and Italy, gendered political discourse contributes to social division (Arruzza et al., 2019) and the



definition of ‘outsider’ which refers to the LGBTIQ+ community and ethnic and religious minorities (Ben-Porat et al., 2021; Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün, 2017; Lavizzari & Prearo, 2019). In addition, the involvement of the religion (Muslim-Catholic) and related authorities (‘Diyanet’ in Turkey and ‘The Vatican’ in Italy) in politics also radicalises gender relations. However, this situation can also be considered an extension of the conservative populism that has been rising in many parts of the world in these countries (Aytaç & Elçi, 2019). In this context, the conservative populist parties’ links to religious institutions in Turkey and Italy represent the current stance of a similar trend around the world that support more gendered rhetoric, attacks women’s rights and fuels LGBTIQ+ hatred (Arfini et al., 2019; Trappolin, 2022). Especially in Turkey, religious organisations and charities function as a tool for social re-establishment and consent formation with the social assistance they provide (Ateş, 2017). The reason for this is the weak existence of the welfare state and the inadequacy of social assistance programs (OECD, 2021d). In Italy, on the other hand, there are more government-funded social programs that can reduce dependency on religious charities (Coelho et al., 2022; OECD, 2018). However, a shared understanding of gender relations around Catholicism (Trappolin, 2022) puts religion at the centre of populism again (Arfini et al., 2019; Spallaccia, 2020). Moreover, integrating this religious-conservative way of policy-making (Ateş, 2017) with aggressive neoliberal programs in both countries causes the increasingly impoverished segments to become the leverage of the populist movement (Arfini et al., 2019). In terms of gender relations, this socio-political environment maintains the gendered status quo and traditional relationship structure. The establishment and re-establishment of gender relations in this socio-political framework (Beauvoir, 1949) also help to produce a collective agreement to construct, perform, and maintain polarised genders (Butler, 1999).

In practice, similar family-centred rhetoric in both countries shapes daily life assigning women inside the home and men outside as family breadwinners. Thus, family relationships in Turkey and Italy are culturally determined by gender stereotypes that largely attribute care to women (Manna et al., 2021; Turk Stat, 2022c). While this discourse further turns family into a political tool by making it conservative and nationally significant, it also ignores the disadvantaged position of women stemming from their responsibilities in this sphere (Başak et al., 2013; Lavizzari & Prearo, 2019). Given that gender equality is developing very slowly in these countries, it is likely to argue that these stereotypical norms are rigid (WEF, 2021). This rigidity ensures the internalisation of these norms and is passed down from generation to generation (Pateman, 1988). As the data show (Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c), social norms in

both countries expect women to fulfil care duties regardless of their employment status, age and role at home. Many women in Turkey and Italy (Manna et al., 2021; Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019) also share traditional attitudes, although they consider it a significant burden for them. These social norms expect women to take on the responsibility of care, as most women do, even if time devoted to caring leaves no time for self-actualisation and requires them to take a break from paid employment or leave work (Budlender, 2008; Charlesworth et al., 2015). This division of labour also helps meet the needs of households where public care services are inadequate or not provided at all (Çağatay & Özler, 1995; Toğrul & Memiş, 2011). Although there are many empirical studies (Brilli et al., 2016; İlkaracan & Memiş, 2021) on the positive impact of public childcare services on women's employment and breaking stereotyped mother and caregiver roles, the insistence on public policies built on the traditional division of labour indicates the deliberate gap in the neoliberal-patriarchal state. These gaps and the consistently low level of investment in social care increase the importance of the reproductive sphere within the economic system. Indeed, its significance and ties to the productive sphere, particularly as the bearers of contractionary policies since the 1980s, are evident in most feminist studies (Çağatay & Özler, 1995; Due & Gladwin, 1991; Elson, 1995; Toğrul & Memiş, 2011)

In order to maintain this status quo, the socio-normative structure in question creates an illusionary 'proper female' image, which legitimises the exclusion of those who do not fall into this category (Karamessini & Rubery, 2014). In this context, social norms shaped by the patriarchal state on neoliberal grounds have a serious impact not only on the gendered division of labour in production and social reproduction (Pearson & Elson, 2015) but also on the defining 'outsider' category and possible harassment and violence tendencies towards them (Bandelli, 2017; Crenshaw, 1991; Farina & Angelucci, 2020). In this respect, this structure, in which public power is in place, creates pressure and threat on individuals who do not comply with moral norms that dictate certain lifestyles (Donà, 2021; Korkut & Eslen-Ziya, 2018).

On the other hand, the feminist movement, which was revived especially after the 1980s, experienced ups and downs in Turkey and Italy (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021; Sancar & Bulut, 2006), could not enter the agenda of left politics enough or, in some cases this relationship was ineffective. However, this also shows the current potential in this field, which can contribute to the transformation of the masculine patriarchal culture that instrumentalises the formation and preservation of neoliberal moral principles (Elson, 2016; Elson & Çağatay, 2000; Pearson & Elson, 2015). Although right-wing governments have dominated politics in both countries

for more than two decades and efforts have been made to reclaim rights in many areas (Adaman & Akbulut, 2021; Pailhé et al., 2019), it is promising that the feminist struggle has progressed nationally and internationally in some areas. For example, while a national gender budgeting project has been on the agenda in Turkey since 2019, in Italy, public resources were allocated within the gender budgeting framework between 2016-2018 and same-sex partnerships were legalised in 2016 (EIGE, 2022; WEF, 2021). In addition, the Istanbul Convention has been ratified by many countries in the EU, including Turkey and Italy, and many national plans and reports have included gender equality targets in these countries as a requirement of the EU's gender equality framework. Finally, unpaid care work is now among the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. On the other hand, despite the severity of male violence in Turkey, the Istanbul Convention was withdrawn, and the revocation of the rights in terms of abortion and same-sex partnerships in Italy has been a constant political material in the last period (Ben-Porat et al., 2021). In addition to these setbacks, feminist achievements will likely be challenged in the coming decades, given the rise of far-right movements within the EU (Braunstein, 2012; Donà, 2022; Prügl, 2015).

### **6.1.3. Legal and Institutional Normative Structure**

Feminist debates dating back to the 20th century (Gilman, 1911; Reid, 1934, 1977; Waring, 1999) have clearly stated that unpaid care work is an essential component of social reproduction, but it is also of vital importance for the productive economy (Benería & Sen, 1981; Gill & Bakker, 2003). This is due to the need for lifelong care for many reasons inherent in being human (Bjørnholt & McKay, 2014; Fineman, 2017). On the other hand, accepting this need on a public scale brings with it the requirements of being a social state (Enríquez, 2018), not least because when there is a gap in institutional care, households, and mostly women, step in to bridge the gap. Given the socioeconomic differences between households, it is clear that when social care provision is inadequate, women in relatively low-income families will face worse conditions in accessing care than those with the resources (Benería, 1995; Elson et al., 1997; Folbre, 1994). As a result of feminist struggle of decades, inequality in care delivery among households, public and private sectors at the institutional level, and family members at the household level has entered the agenda of international organisations and sustainable development goals ([SDG 5](#)). From this perspective, care is essential to human survival and helps those receiving care to develop the skills to benefit themselves and others physically, emotionally, and intellectually throughout their lives. Within this network of social and

institutional relationships, care includes direct care from one person to another, as well as personal care, the creation of specific prerequisites for providing care, and the management of care delivery through legal and institutional protection (Enríquez, 2018; Karimli et al., 2016).

On the other hand, as mentioned above, in connection with the neoliberal tendencies and patriarchal traditions of the states, care is mainly carried out at home, unpaid, and by women in many parts of the world (Budlender, 2010; Elson, 2017; Razavi, 2007). Neoliberal patriarchal discourse and practice integrate care and femininity in a way that ultimately conceals the government's responsibility to provide care (Arruzza et al., 2019). This often leads to the suppression of rights at the legal level and the reinforcement of polarised binary gender relations over public policies (Evans, 2013; Weedon, 1987). These policies include controlling sexual and reproductive activities, gendering the labour market, family relations and income distribution (Elson & Cagatay, 2000; Karimli et al., 2016).

In Turkey and Italy, being part of the EU in some way - one as a candidate, one as a member - is important in terms of setting legal boundaries (Donà, 2022; GDSW, 2012). On the other hand, their unique historical socio-political backgrounds and cultural gender norms have also affected the legal and institutional framework that regulates gender relations and, thus, social care. Therefore, while this thesis is not concerned with the holistic analysis of the historical background of Turkey and Italy, it is essential to highlight the interconnections between specific historical breakthroughs that impacted the legal and institutional framework on gender equality.

Feminist movements in Turkey and Italy and the subsequent arrangements are embedded in a long and complex process. Although this process began in the new Turkey during the Republican reforms of the early 1920s, it was associated with the feminist movements of the modernisation in the Ottoman era in the 1860s and the struggle to establish a nation-state and stand against Western colonialism (Ekin Akşit, 2008; Sancar, 2011; Sancar & Bulut, 2006). Similarly, the feminist movement dating back to the Renaissance in the literary works of educated upper-class women in Italy has also been revived with the efforts to establish a nation-state and the unification of Italy in the 1860s (de Clementi, 2002; Malagrega, 2006). In this respect, although there is a sixty-year gap between Turkish and Italian feminism, the path they follow in the conflict of nationalism, family-orientedness and traditional and modern feminist demands are pretty similar (Donà, 2021; Sancar, 2011; Yelsalı Parkmaksız, 2012).

In Turkey, the ‘woman issue’ was an essential component of the early Republican social modernisation process and an obstacle to the country’s development. Thus, it has been an important area of conflict where old and new images of women constantly clash (Durakbaşa, 1998; Ekin Akşit, 2008; Kandiyoti, 1997). In the first three decades of this young republic, there was an environment in which men and women were educated together, and women were engaged in positive sciences, music and art, following the example of the West (Durakbaşa, 1998). Although the ‘Women of the Republic’ were content with the opportunities provided by the republic and its founders, some of them went forward, for example, by gathering under a political party and demanding suffrage for women. However, the limits of the rights granted to women could not reach this point then, and this movement was suppressed (Cakir, 1997) until the right to vote and to be elected was given in 1934.

In Italy, on the other hand, the feminist movement and the legal and institutional transformations were developed as a similar product of a different story. Although Italian feminism was influenced by European feminism, which served as a horizon in a sense, unique historical circumstances set the context for Italian feminism (Malagreca, 2006). During the unification of Italy in the 1860s (*Risorgimento*), early feminist philanthropic interventions aimed to improve women’s educational standards and combat illiteracy in the recently reunified country (de Clementi, 2002). At that time, Italian feminism was being represented by nationalist women who, along with the influence of European feminism, fought for suffrage that would allow women to participate in political decisions and pass laws against gender discrimination (Arruzza et al., 2019; de Clementi, 2002; Malagreca, 2006). However, with the failure to win suffrage in 1912, this movement had largely faded with the onset of fascism (de Clementi, 2002).

In this context, Turkey and Italy underwent similar processes in the functionalisation of women’s rights to include them in the development and nationalisation process. Turkey and Italy also have similar historical tendencies in articulating women’s rights with family-oriented interventions, which were practical for both the rise of the nation-state and the regulation of gender relations. In these young nation-states, it was the woman’s duty to establish the modern family with nationalist ideals and the man’s to establish the state (Durakbaşa, 1998; Malagreca, 2006; Sancar & Bulut, 2006). For this reason, while regulations in this period aimed at modernisation gender relations, they were also family-centred (Sancar, 2011) and concentrated on women’s roles as wife and mother (Durakbaşa, 1998; Sancar & Bulut, 2006). Nevertheless, this process paved the way for thinking about gender oppression and opened up spaces for

political intervention (Malagreca, 2006). On the other hand, especially in Turkey, this environment enabled each political entity to express their political symbols, identities, and images, built for their own political purposes, on the women's bodies (Durakbaşa, 1998).

In the following period, female identity and its role in the family continued to be instrumentalised in a political element. In Turkey, the feminist movement, which oscillated in the traditional/religious and modern/Western dichotomy, entered the same trajectory with transnational feminism after 1980 (Sancar, 2011). This process of articulation first began with the ratification of CEDAW in 1985, thereby making the political commitment to eliminating gender discrimination (GDSW, 2012). This was followed by establishing the Presidency on the Status and Issues of Women under the Prime Ministry as the national mechanism envisaged by CEDAW in 1990 (Kanun Hükmünde Kararname/422, 1990). Turkey also joined the EU's Gender Equality Program in 2003 and aimed to follow the Employment Strategy due to its candidacy (Koray, 2011). Parallel to these developments at the international level, amendments were made to the Constitution, Civil Code, Labour Law, Penal Code, and some other laws at the national level. The primary purpose of these amendments was to regulate the masculine language of the law and to recognise gender equality within certain limits. These limits were directly related to the definition of family and women in the dominant politics (GDSW, 2012). Indeed, the recent termination of the Istanbul Convention on the grounds that it promotes same-sex partnerships and homosexuality expresses the current limit in Turkey ([Council of Europe](#)).

On the other hand, in Italy, in the process that started right after the collapse of fascism, women's right to vote in 1945, the EU membership in 1958 and the resurgence of feminist demands from the late 1960s led to critical legal reforms (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021; Trappolin, 2022). In this process, to establish gender equality, several laws have been enacted, most of which by the impact of the EU, and institutionally equal opportunity commissions were established; gender equality has been legally defined and specific threats against it and criminalised (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021; Ferri, 2017; Rosselli, 2014). Recently, same-sex marriage has been legalised. However, there is also a threat from the rise of right politics of losing this and other gender equality achievements (Ben-Porat et al., 2021). Indeed, not only in Italy but also in Turkey and elsewhere, nationalist roots and emphasis on family have been the most critical tool frequently used by right wing political parties that threaten to reverse gender equality gains (Femicides Platform, 2022; Trappolin, 2022).

#### 6.1.4. Social Care System and Dynamics

In light of the discussions so far, it is possible to infer that in a neoliberal and patriarchal order, being a woman, for the majority, means being an unrecognised caregiver and thus providing labour that is invisible to the economy and decision-makers (Fraser, 2017; Hartmann, 1976; Waring, 1999). As many feminist studies have shown (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Bettio & Verashchagina, 2014; Pearson & Elson, 2015), this relationship refers to the shock-absorbing role of women through their unpaid work whenever there is any interruption or disruption to public services essential for social reproduction, such as health, education, and social protection (O'Reilly & Nazio, 2014). This proposition is also based on the fact that most paid and unpaid care workers are women (Pearson, 2019). Under such a system that exploits their labour, they are more likely to need to be cared the most and be among those most affected by the continuing financing gap in the care sector (Azcona et al., 2020).

Therefore, any reduction in welfare spending contributes to these adverse outcomes by increasing mothers' and homemakers' care responsibilities and reinforcing gender roles (Daskalaki et al., 2020). On the other hand, the social welfare spending of governments is expected to contribute to the transformation of unpaid care work (Crenshaw, 1988; İlkaracan & Memiş, 2021; Pearson & Elson, 2015) and compensate for income and wealth inequalities that determine access to social care, which includes education, health and social protection from a broader perspective, and also paid jobs (Brunori & O'Reilly, 2010). Thus, social care expenditures are of great importance in preventing women from interrupting their careers and sometimes losing their jobs (Balakrishnan et al., 2016). In this context, government expenditures shape gender relations and social care infrastructure, not only with social spending on education, health and social protection but also with interventions and tax policies that regulate income and wealth accumulation throughout society (Abramovitz, 2012; Balakrishnan et al., 2016; Durbin et al., 2017).

Although Turkey and Italy represent similar neoliberal trends in this category, inequality in Turkey seems to be more profound. First, market revenues are more unequally distributed in Turkey than in Italy; nevertheless, redistribution policies seem more effective in Italy ([OECD Stat](#)). In other words, the inequality of disposable income in Turkey does not change significantly even after government transfer payments. Turkey is also behind Italy in income equality between the highest and lowest incomes. While the disposable income of a person in the highest income group (top quintile) in Turkey was 5.4 times the disposable

income of a person in the lowest group (bottom quintile) in 2018, this rate was 4.6 in Italy ([OECD Stat](#), [Euro Stat](#)). On the other hand, although some progress has been made in this gap in both countries, it appears that this change has been relatively slow, and state interventions have not improved significantly (Tax Special Commission, 2014).

Moreover, the tendency of the government in Turkey to finance government expenditures with indirect taxes rather than direct taxes widens the gap between wage workers, who have to spend most of their income on consumption for basic needs, and profit-making capitalists. The persistence of post-tax and post-transfer poverty rates also indicates that the curative effect of transfers and progressive taxation for social justice in Turkey is not working well (Tax Special Commission, 2014). In other respects, although the tax and transfer policies are more effective in Italy than in Turkey, the increase in the relatively impoverished population indicates that this effect is gradually decreasing ([OECD Stat](#)). In addition, the relatively low level of wealth taxes in Italy also intensifies the income gap. Nevertheless, the fact that Italy has higher levels of direct taxation relieves the pressure of indirect consumption taxes, especially on low-wage income. On the other hand, although the tax systems in Turkey and Italy are based on the individual, not the family, as discussed in the labour market section, tax deductions based on dependent spouses and children encourage women to stay at home (OECD, 2018; Özdiler Küçük, 2016). However, there are improvements in social allowances, in Italy, for example the means-tested universal childcare program, [Assegno Unico Universale](#), parents can receive tax-free cash support for their children until age 21. Although limited, this universal care support can provide financial support for childcare, reducing pressure on women's labour force participation (Coelho et al., 2022; OECD, 2018). On the contrary, the absence of a legal regulation on consumption-based minimum subsistence for families, including childcare, burdens families where both parents work. Thus, current tax regulations in Turkey stimulate female spouses to stay out of the workforce; otherwise, the tax they pay on a household basis increases significantly (Özdiler Küçük, 2016; Tax Special Commission, 2014).

Finally, in addition to redistributive tax policies, social protection expenditures are critical in redistributing political and economic power, centralised in a particular class, social segment, or gender, thus establishing social justice (Piketty, 2014; Tax Special Commission, 2014). The social expenditure patterns of Turkey and Italy also differ in favour of Italy. Total social spending in Turkey, including social protection, health and education (Brunori & O'Reilly, 2010), accounts for just over half of all government spending, compared to almost



seven-tenths of total expenditure in Italy. On the other hand, old-age pensions account for nearly half of the total social protection expenditures in both Turkey and Italy ([Euro Stat](#)). Although the healthcare expenditures of these two countries are similar (slightly higher in Turkey), Italy allocates more (a quarter of GDP) to social spending than Turkey (less than one-fifth of GDP), especially in the categories of disability, unemployment, and social exclusion ([Euro Stat](#)). However, considering the EU average in social expenditures (about one-third of GDP), these rates are quite low in Turkey and Italy (OECD, 2018). Nevertheless, social assistance interventions in Italy, such as universal allowance for dependent children ([Assegno Unico Universale](#)) and nursery vouchers ([Bonus Nido](#)), increase the relatively low spending capacity for low-income families and reduce the childcare burden on women. In this sense, Italy, where child benefits cover Italians and foreigners from the 7<sup>th</sup> month of pregnancy until the child reaches the age of 21 and for disabled children without an age limit, differs from Turkey, where only a one-time birth allowance ([Doğum Yardımı](#)) is provided for only Turkish citizens. On the other hand, if we consider all this together with gendered parental leave regulations in both countries mentioned in the previous sections, it is likely to conclude that Turkey and Italy are similar in attributing less responsibility to fathers. However, in Italy, women are more protected with extended allowances.

The national health systems of Turkey and Italy also differ. The national healthcare service ([Servizio sanitario nazionale or SSN](#)) is tax-financed and universal in Italy. The central government directs general tax revenues to publicly funded healthcare and defines the basic health package. However, the Italian healthcare system is organised regionally. Therefore, in some cases, a contribution may be required for specific treatments and drugs that vary regionally. In Turkey, on the contrary, access to the national health system is provided by [Social Security Institution](#) (SGK) contributions paid by the employer for workers and by the state for the unemployed up to a certain income threshold. Although the [Transformation of Health](#) in Turkey has increased the coverage of the health system by introducing public general health insurance together with the standard health insurance service package, the obligation to be associated with the system through employment status and to pay contributions when benefiting from health services leaves the majority of women dependent on their working husbands and sons. This rate is relatively high considering the number of women not employed in Turkey. In this context, the reform formalised and increased the role of income in accessing health services. At the same time, this transition also increased private hospitals and out-of-pocket health expenditures (Yilmaz, 2017). The resulting gap in access to public health services

has formally shifted care to households and intensified the burden on women, particularly in low-income families. Second, it has made accessing care more difficult by excluding unemployed women, particularly those most in need of care (Ministry of Health, 2003). This approach stems from the widely accepted patriarchal understanding of women's access to social rights, mostly through marriage and their spouses (Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010). In addition, providing health services with a contribution share, not with the tax revenues it already receives (OECD, 2021d), while offering important incentives to the private sector reduces the publicness of health services in Turkey (Turkish Medical Association, 2003). The impacts of this situation are felt more intensely by low-income families (Turk Stat, 2022b).

Early childhood education is also insufficient in Turkey, where only 40 per cent of the child population aged 3-5 is in care institutions. Given that preschool education in Turkey is optional and the public early childhood education facilities are not enough to cover the relevant population, childcare in the early years mostly depends on mothers and women's relatives, neighbours, and unpaid caregivers in Turkey. Especially in the 0-2 period, the childcare burden is left entirely to the households and women in Turkey (İlkkaracan et al., 2015; Koray, 2011; Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). On the other hand, enrolment in early childhood education in Italy reaches over 90 per cent for 3-5-year-olds and nearly 30 per cent for 0-2-year-olds (OECD). This may be one of the important reasons for higher female labour force participation rates in Italy compared to Turkey. However, due to the diverse organisation of public kindergartens at the municipal level across the country, affording childcare services (Brilli et al., 2016; OECD, 2018) and vacancies in facilities one of the major problems in Italy (Bulgarelli, 2019; Sarti, 2010). In the absence of such a service, home care for young children becomes inevitable in some families, and women devote more time to this work. Indeed, data (EIGE, 2022; Istat, 2019b) reveal that in Italy, too, home childcare is unequally shared between women and men. Almost half of the population aged 0-3 are mostly taken care of by families (Eurostat, 2022), especially mothers and grandmothers (Amici & Stefani, 2013; Mencarini & Tanturri, 2004). Therefore, although childcare service coverage is significantly better than in Turkey, the lack of adequate childcare, particularly for the 0-3 age period, is a home-binding factor for women in Italy (Istat, 2019b). In light of the current data and research compiled by this thesis (Del Boca, 2022; EIGE, 2022; Eurostat, 2022; Istat, 2019b, 2022c; OECD, 2021d; Turk Stat, 2021a, 2022c), it is possible to conclude that insufficient investment in childcare in both Turkey and Italy is related to the patriarchal structure of social norms that associate women with care and the neoliberal trend that suppresses the provision of public services.

## 6.2. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: 5R FRAMEWORK

The previous section has provided a comparative analysis to understand where Turkey and Italy stand regarding gendered unpaid care work and its roots around the *four pathways*. This section, harvesting the insights of the previous section, aims to provide a similar comparative analysis in terms of the 5Rs, to reveal the situation in these countries in *recognising, reducing, and redistributing* care and *representation and reward* of the carers. In doing so, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the ultimate goal is to point to the potential areas to advance gender equality to support policymakers in transformation processes and for a more collaborative care design. Therefore, the implications of the previous and this chapter are critical to building the *gendered unpaid care work index*, which this study aims to be a supportive tool for the collaborative care design in question.

### 6.2.1. Recognition

In the case studies chapters, the calculation of the value created by unpaid and paid work revealed the contribution of women to both society and the economy (Aslaksen & Koren, 1996; Himmelweit, 1995). These calculations also showed that women work more than men in Turkey and Italy (Istat, 2019b; Turk Stat, 2022c). Thus, recognising the economic and social value of unpaid care work is vital to explain adequately the burden it creates on women and explore the ways to reduce and redistribute it (Addati et al., 2018; Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021; Chopra & Nazneen, 2016; Elson, 2017). The first step, recognising gendered unpaid care work in national decision-making and policy processes, requires public acknowledgement that this unpaid value is critical to sustaining society and that stereotypical gender role has adverse outcomes (Pearson & Elson, 2015). This process also includes developing a nationwide understanding of data processing and periodic measurement of unpaid care work through time-use surveys and other tools (Waring, 1999), and finally, monitoring and evaluation of it for a better understanding of the social and economic impacts (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 1995).

In this context, public recognition of gendered unpaid care work remains partial in Turkey and Italy. Although both countries conduct time-use surveys, which are one of the tools that have the potential to measure unpaid labour with their deficiencies and biased nature, they were most recently conducted in the 2014-2015 period in Turkey and 2013-2014 in Italy ([HETUS](#)). Likewise, in these countries, regular studies remain limited at the public level to understand the impact of gender stereotypes on public spending and policies on right-holders

(Downes et al., 2017). The lack of intersectional data on unpaid care work also prevents the recognition of it and the gendered structure on which it is positioned (Elson, 1992; Waring, 1999). In addition, with the effect of this deficiency, approaches that reinforce gender stereotypes rather than transform them emerge in policy design, monitoring and evaluation processes. The main jeopardy in this is that the gendered direction of the political will (O'Hagan, 2013) enables the practical use of gendered roles at the public level as policy tools (Evans, 2017).

The use of gender roles as political material, especially through debates on women's moral responsibilities, continues today in Turkey and Italy (de Clementi, 2002; Sancar, 2011). In these countries, the policy understanding that consciously protects the status quo regarding gender relations, on the one hand, the neoliberalisation of the state that forces women to fill the social care gaps, on the other, supports this argument. In other words, the general tendencies of the governments in Turkey and Italy seem to encourage women at points that do not contradict neoliberal and patriarchal goals (M. A. Chen, 2001; Dabrowski, 2021). As discussed in detail in previous sections, similar political discourse trends in Turkey and Italy seem to have preserved traditional gender roles as the building blocks of nation-states (Donà, 2021; Sancar, 2011; Yelsalı Parkmaksız, 2012).

Nevertheless, especially after the 1980s, the increasing pressure of the feminist movement and the importance of women's rights in the international arena led to some actions supporting gender equality (Klatzer & O'Hagan, 2018). International gender equality conventions and platforms, to which Turkey and Italy are parties, have provided guidance in this regard. These internal and external feminist efforts have created national platforms to monitor and eliminate gender-based discrimination (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017). For example, gender equality commissions such as [GDSW](#) in Turkey and [DppO](#) (see [Section 6.4](#)) in Italy have been established, and there have been gender budgeting initiatives in these countries (Budlender, 2001; Karimli et al., 2016). However, the fact that the decisions of international platforms are mostly advisory and that the institutional transformation in the countries is spread over a very long term causes these activities to be abandoned when there is the slightest change in the political agenda.

On the other hand, the inclusion of the institutional requirements brought by international platforms into the national policy, without considering the local characteristics, is also effective in this. In other words, although there are institutional initiatives to monitor and establish gender equality in both Turkey and Italy, there are bottlenecks that prevent them from

functioning effectively in these countries. The fact that [GDSW](#) had operated for more than ten years without a legal basis when it was first established or that [GDSW](#) and [DppO](#) are directly or indirectly linked to the Ministry of Family under conservative governments can be cited as examples of local inadequacies. In short, these peculiarities, along with others not mentioned here, show that these developments took place due to international requirements and mainly under the influence of the EU. However, given the current position of gender equality in Turkey and Italy, internalising these standards in the local policy process has somewhat remained ineffective. Thus, there is still a gap in recognition of unpaid care work and auditing of the outputs of gender equality initiatives (Addabbo, Bastos, et al., 2015; Benería, 1999b; Ferrant et al., 2014; ILO, 2012).

The most significant contribution to the formation of this gap is the institutionalisation of women's role as wives and mothers in society. This process started with nationalisation efforts in modern Turkey and Italy (de Clementi, 2002; Sancar & Bulut, 2006). However, in line with neoliberal state policies, it has accelerated in macroeconomic policy and social context after the eighties (İlkkaracan, 2012; Kongar & Memiş, 2017).

This issue came to the fore during the AKP, the last ruling party in Turkey, especially in its latest phase (Adaman & Akbulut, 2021). This understanding has also permeated the policymaking and legislation process and social norms affecting daily lives. The government's efforts to mainstream gender equality in Turkey, or instead its claims, are now more frequently cited as challenging feminist demands, making them a bureaucratic and technical issue, and representing an understanding behind feminist demands (Günlük-Şenesen et al., 2017; İlkkaracan, 2012; Kızılırmak et al., 2022; Kongar & Memiş, 2017; Koray, 2011). The discriminatory political discourse, which constantly refers to the role of women in society as mothers and wives, has undoubtedly been influential in the concentration of the care burden on women in Turkey. The political discourse in question has repeatedly declared that the visibility of women in the private sphere and men in the public sphere is a natural and religiously accepted division of labour (Cantek & Ünlütürk Ulutas, 2014; Kandiyoti, 2012). Not surprisingly, therefore, government efforts to recognise the value of women's unpaid work and devise policies to reduce and redistribute it has been relatively limited (İlkkaracan et al., 2015; İlkkaracan & Memiş, 2021; Kızılırmak et al., 2022). The informality of women, both in the sense of their unpaid care work and their tendency to work informally in the paid labour market, has left them socially and economically unprotected under the welfare system in Turkey and thus dependent on others (Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010). Therefore, in addition to the gendered

policies and practices that define women in the private sphere and determine their rights accordingly, the internalisation of these norms by a significant part of society often renders women's unpaid labour invisible (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022c).

Likewise, Italy, which is now led by Meloni, the first female prime minister, under a far-right and fascist origin party (Ben-Porat et al., 2021), is characterised by a significant imbalance in the distribution of labour (Del Boca, 2022). Contrary to this, gendered unpaid care work is neither adequately measured nor receives the attention it deserves as a significant obstacle to gender equality (Istat, 2019b). The understanding that care is the responsibility of women and they are more competent in care impacts the political and socio-normative structure in Italy, similar to Turkey (Carriero & Todesco, 2016; Istat, 2019b). In Italy, to a lesser extent than in Turkey, work arrangements that do not reconcile work and family life create a polarisation between the reproductive role of women and the productive role of men (Mencarini & Tanturri, 2004). Indeed, although female labour force participation is better than Turkey's, it is far behind the EU average ([OECD Stat](#)). As a remedy, women choose to reduce their working hours or quit their job, reduce the number of children, or not have children (Euro Stat, 2022). Their care responsibilities at home result in discontinuous and shorter working life and less experience and specialisation in their field and career advancement (Del Boca, 2022; Istat, 2019b). Women in Italy, as in Turkey, also tend to work informally outside the home, often in areas that overlap with their domestic responsibilities (European Commission, 2017). All these weaken women's ties to social and economic rights and contribute to their economic decline.

On the other hand, women in Turkey and Italy tend to live longer than men and probably spend a larger portion of their retirement as survivors. However, new regulations and eligibility rules do not recognise these interruptions in women's paid employment, as evident in the gender pension gap (EIGE, 2022). Therefore, without acknowledging the gendered structure of paid and unpaid work and the disruption it creates in women's life, declaring family as the centre of policies, as happening both in Turkey and Italy, result in the endorsement of the gendered unpaid care by the state (İlkkaracan, 2012; Lavizzari & Siročić, 2022).

### **6.2.2. Reduction and Redistribution**

As the traditional understanding of gender relations dominates the political arena in Turkey and Italy (Aytaç & Elçi, 2019; Donà, 2022), government policies on key areas such as

education, employment, health, children and elderly care and social security seem to ignore intersectional gender inequalities, and women's unpaid care burden (Del Boca, 2022; Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). The fact that policies towards women and children position them more within the family and design policies around this network with a traditional understanding makes both women and children more vulnerable, especially when their situations do not comply with the legally recognised relationship structure (Ben-Porat et al., 2021; Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün, 2017). On the other hand, recognising the responsibility of care, not the value of women's labour, hides the fact that households exploit women's labour, and public policies stimulate this (Bhattacharya, 2017a; Quick, 2016; Vogel, 2013). This deliberate gender-blindness (Elson, 1995) is also in accordance with the abolition of social welfare policies, which directly regards the reduction and redistribution of care work (Elson, 2017). Indeed, women constitute the majority of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups worldwide (Appelbaum et al., 2002; Ferrant & Thim, 2019), as in Turkey and Italy (Dedeoğlu, 2000; Del Boca et al., 2020). In these countries, their reintegration into the paid labour market with public support requires the transformation of gendered norms, masculine political discourse, gendered unpaid care work, gender segregation in the labour force and thus discrimination in earnings and retirement income. As many feminist studies have proven (Ilkcaracan et al., 2021; İlkkaracan et al., 2015; Zacharias et al., 2019), women's access to social rights through more equitable financial and institutional infrastructure will produce more economically efficient results.

On the contrary, the fact that government expenditures on education, health and social protection in Turkey and Italy are relatively low compared to the EU and OECD averages indicates the limited presence of the government in these areas ([Euro Stat](#)). However, while the social care expenditures of government are gradually decreasing in Turkey ([Ministry of Treasury and Finance](#)), the increasing trend of the last quarter century in Italy, in line with the EU, might be interpreted as an indication that the state has strengthened its presence in these areas ([Euro Stat](#)). In Turkey, while spending on social benefits and access to formerly public services are decreasing, the importance and influence of families, communities and sects' in social care are increasing (Turk Stat, 2022d). Although women's higher education enrolment rates in Turkey are higher than men, the fact that women's participation in the labour force and thus the rate of women among pension holders is very low gives an idea about the extent of the boundaries surrounding women (Turk Stat, 2022d). In Turkey, women continue to take more responsibility in unpaid care work and meet a significant part of the social care needs of

families (İlkkaracan, 2012; Kongar & Memiş, 2017). While the commodification of social care services that cannot be met at home draws social care and reproduction into commodity relations (Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010; Koray, 2011), women also work paid jobs to meet the increasing cost. However, it is a weighty burden for women in the current division of labour (Yaman-Öztürk, 2010).

In this sense, the new social protection approach based on the feminisation and privatisation of social care in Turkey and Italy redistributes unpaid labour to the household and the woman, yet not between the state and the household or between men and women (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022b, 2022c). For example, being included in the social care system depending on the employment status in Turkey, and benefiting from health services by paying a contribution (Ministry of Health, 2003), sometimes causes women to get married at an early age and sometimes stay in an abusive relationship (Turk Stat, 2022d). In addition, a very limited one-time birth allowance is not enough to cover the high costs of having a child in Turkey ([Doğum Yardımı](#)). These policies instead place a greater burden on women, particularly those living in rural areas (Ministry of Development, 2018; Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019).

Most importantly, due to the lack of adequate childcare services (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Ministry of National Education, 2021), most women in Turkey and Italy tend to take on care responsibilities and stay out of the workforce (Turk Stat, 2021b), especially when they lack the support of their families (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). Depending on class composition (Folbre, 2006), some women can receive paid care in private institutions or at home. Indeed, relatively well-educated women in high-income jobs or with a high family income can afford these services (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2017). Therefore, the social care infrastructure in Turkey leaves women vulnerable and dependent on others, especially those who are uneducated, live in low-income families and have a care burden. In this context, the GDSW, which is currently under the Ministry of Family (GDSW, 2008), should adopt more supportive policies by accepting that the gender relations problem cannot be solved only by associating them with the family. On the other hand, the emphasis on family reinforces the impression that a woman's existence in the public sphere is only possible if she is a mother and remains in the private sphere (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019).

On the other hand, in Italy, the universal health system (SSN) that automatically covers all residents (Legge n. 833, 1978) and relatively better childcare services are reflected in higher



female labour force participation ([OECD Stat](#)) and higher share of women in pension recipients compared to Turkey (OECD, 2022a). On the other hand, it is worth to note here, gender pension gap is smaller in Turkey, due to the entitlements facilitating retirement of women and lower age requirements. However, the care burden on women is still a relevant reason that leaves them outside the workforce, it is not as common as in Turkey ([Eurostat LFS](#)). However, given the longer maternity leave compared to paternity leave, employers in both Turkey and Italy tend to discriminate against female workers. For example, in Italy, until recently, employers implemented a blank resignation policy, albeit illegal. Recent regulations have changed the official resignation procedure by focusing on this issue, but discrimination in parental leave, which is one of the sources of the problem, still continues. Given all this and the normative pressure on women in Italy to maintain current standards in childcare and housework, very low fertility can be viewed as a strategy to reduce the burden on women relatively (Pailhé et al., 2019).

### **6.2.3. Representation**

Representation of women at decision-making levels is quite insufficient in Turkey and Italy, not only as the bearers of the burden of unpaid care but also as individuals who are experiencing similar problems and differentiate according to intersecting factors such as class, race, age, education, and income level (Turk Stat, 2021b). The underrepresentation of women in political and civic decision-making mechanisms is also in harmony with the social role attributed to them, which is mainly confined to the private sphere and rarely extends to the public sphere (Pearson & Elson, 2015). This low visibility of women in the public sphere in these countries, which is processed through both public discourse and politics, causes them to lag behind men in education, labour force participation and social rights (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019). Indeed, according to the data of the official statistics office of Turkey (Turk Stat, 2016, 2021a, 2022c, 2022d), high-level positions such as professors, rectors, prosecutors, ambassadors, governors, and deputy governors are predominantly male, as has historically been the case, and this ratio sometimes exceeds 90 per cent. Political representation is also very limited; today, the representation rate of women is around 17 per cent, while the representation rate of men reaches to 83 per cent. Women have also historically held very few ministerial positions in governments, and this remains a fact (Turk Stat, 2022c). When all this is evaluated together with the low labour force participation rate of women and the fact that they are mostly working in part-time and precarious jobs, it is clear that the struggle of women

to exist in the public sphere continues (Dedeoğlu, 2000; Kızılırmak et al., 2022; Yaman-Öztürk, 2010). It should be noted once again that in a system that positions women only within the family in Turkey, marriage appears as a tool for many women to exist in the public sphere and thus to have a chance to be represented (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022c).

On the other hand, with Giorgia Meloni, the first female prime minister of Italy, who recently took office, we have been reminded that the issue was not just to increase the number of women's seats. Italy is a patriarchal society in the sense that women's representation in the public sphere is relatively low (EIGE, 2019). It is one of the advanced industrial democracies with the lowest number of women elected to public office (Campus, 2010). In 2021, women lagged behind men in the workforce (40.1 vs 57.6 per cent), in ministerial level representation (43 vs 57 per cent), as deputies (36 vs 64 per cent), regional assemblies (77 vs 23 per cent), and the board of directors (39 vs 61 per cent) (EIGE, 2022). In addition, gender equality in Italy has largely been driven by greater gender balance in decision-making (EIGE, 2022). Therefore, [some](#) saw the election of Meloni as an achievement of feminism (Lavizzari & Prearo, 2019; Trappolin, 2022), even though [Meloni herself stated that](#) she was not a feminist. Meloni, representing the far-right party, has been criticised by many feminists due to her party's ties to its fascist roots and its discourse on gender and family issues (Donà, 2022; Lavizzari & Siročić, 2022; Trappolin, 2022). According to these critics (Ben-Porat et al., 2021; Donà, 2021; Ozzano, 2019; Trappolin, 2022), Meloni's and her party's understanding of gender deliberately lags behind even the feminist demands. In some critical gender-related topics, such as abortion rights and same-sex couples, there is an effort to go back and keep these issues on the political agenda (Bellè & Poggio, 2018; Feo & Lavizzari, 2021; Ozzano, 2019). In addition, the fact that women are made the subject of politics through the roles of mother and spouse and the emphasis on the continuation of the lineage reveals the importance given to the traditional roles of the family (Feo & Lavizzari, 2021; Ozzano, 2019). Nevertheless, it is promising that there are constitutional arrangements that guarantee gender equal opportunities in Italy ([Articolo 51](#)).

Overall, this contradiction shows us that the traditional and conservative understanding of gender relations tends to attribute women to the private sphere, regardless of the gender of the representative (Akçay, 2018; Trappolin, 2022). The bigotry of this approach stems from the fact that its persistence in this attitude at the expense of lower educational attainment and work experience of women, but also more interruptions in their working life, and less economic

and social protection (Bulgarelli, 2020; Istat & Demofonti, 2022), and therefore their greater need for kinship support (OECD, 2021a), and consequently a higher probability of experiencing intimate violence (Bandelli, 2017; Farina & Angelucci, 2020). For this reason, while inclusive representation is needed (Pateman, 1970), it is far more essential to have internal and external actors in Turkey, Italy and elsewhere who will advocate for feminist demands (O'Hagan, 2013, 2015), aiming to transform gender relations and emancipate them from their patriarchal bonds (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Crenshaw, 1988; Evans, 2017). In this sense, male dominance in the public and production sphere (Pearson & Elson, 2015) represents a vicious circle not only in Turkey and Italy but also in many countries. While a more diverse gender representation is needed to design more effective policies that address gender relations, policymaking is monopolised by single gender (EIGE, 2022; OECD, 2022a; Turk Stat, 2021a).

#### **6.2.4. Reward**

As has been indicated thus far, the care provided to family members, sick and elderly, by women who do not work or are employed in a paid job is not included in the mainstream economy in Turkey and Italy. Women who spare time caring for children, patients and the elderly cannot take part in paid jobs as a *punishment* for their care responsibility (M. Gregory, 2011). On the other hand, they cannot benefit from the 'future salary' (Yaman-Öztürk, 2010) provided by the social security system.

The fact that benefiting from social rights in Turkey is dependent on having a paid job causes homemakers, in particular, to face more precarious conditions (Dedeoğlu & Şahankaya, 2016). In addition, most women working in small production workshops or home-based jobs and working as unpaid family workers in agriculture and family businesses are unregistered in Turkey (Turk Stat, 2021b). All these women can benefit from social security services only if their husbands or fathers are included in the social security system. Today, more than 21.6 million women of the 31.2 million female population over the age of 15 in Turkey (Turk Stat, 2022) can access the social security system through their husbands, fathers (mothers with a much smaller percentage) or son-daughter with certain limitations (Yaman-Öztürk, 2010). This practice, which makes it possible to benefit indirectly from the social security system, reinforces women's dependence on kinship and does not fully support women's participation in the labour market. Yet instead, it stimulates their return to the domestic sphere and reproductive roles based on patriarchal norms (Dedeoğlu, 2000; Kızılırımak et al., 2022; Özar & Günlük-Şenesen, 1998). Certainly, the solution to this problem should not be to prevent

women from indirectly benefiting from the social security system. In this case, these women are entirely excluded from the system, which leaves them unprotected against risks such as disability, old age, unemployment, illness and poverty. (Yaman-Öztürk, 2010). Instead, the appropriate solution is a social care system that is not dependent on employment status and provides social care as a universal right. While unpaid care work is a significant social problem in Turkey, the contribution of paid healthcare workers is also not well recognised in Turkey. Healthcare workers who work long hours and fulfil their duties in the face of the ongoing danger of health violence in Turkey have recently become the target of masculine political discourse. This situation, which resulted in the emigration of a large number of healthcare workers (Turkish Medical Association, 2019), causes disruptions in the health system of Turkey, which is one of the countries with the highest number of visits and patients (Turk Stat, 2022b; Turkish Medical Association, 2003). Especially after the [Transformation of Health](#), the increase in public incentives for the privatisation of health to increase competition and thus the transformation of health into a consumption object also contributed to the exploitation of caregivers (Yilmaz, 2017). In particular, women healthcare workers in Turkey are the targets of this exploitative system (Turkish Medical Association, 2019).

However, Italy providing universal certain social care services, such as childcare and healthcare, suggest a willingness to fund the general costs of social reproduction. These policies directly and immediately impact mothers, who are often in charge of the household budget (Karamessini & Rubery, 2014). Moreover, in Italy, when childcare support is not enough and gender transformative, women tend to strengthen their work commitment (Del Boca, 2022; Istat, 2019b). This may be because more women graduate from higher education, meaning they invest more in education than men. Another reason may be the reduced capacity of male partners to provide lifelong support due to both high divorce rates and reduced secure paid jobs (Addabbo, 2017; Del Boca, 2022; Istat, 2019b).

In this gendered socio-economic system, while women produce 53.8 per cent of the total 108.8 working hours in Turkey, they work 46.2 billion unpaid hours. Similarly, in Italy, women contribute to 56.9 per cent of total working hours; however, their 48.6 billion hours of work remain unremunerated (Tables 5 and 13). Although these figures are biased due to the limitations of the time-use surveys in measuring the time devoted to different activities accurately, it still gives an idea about the situation of the paid and unpaid care work in these countries. They are also in line with the results of other studies worldwide (Bejaković et al., 2017; Gündüz & İlkaracan, 2019; OECD, 2019b; van de Ven et al., 2018). Moreover, societal

expectations placed on women as ‘mothers and caregivers’ in Turkey and Italy force them to choose either to start a family or to work in a paid job, which increases the unpaid working hours (Istat, 2019b; Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; Turk Stat, 2022c). In particular, unemployed women who are mothers and have no working experience are the most fragile group in these countries (Ministry of Family and Social Policies, 2019; OECD, 2018). While interventions that focus on women’s employment and the discrimination they face (such as empty resignation) are essential to legally guaranteeing support in this area, income policies have yet to reach the level of addressing gender inequality and the gendered nature of unpaid care work (Del Boca, 2022; Manna et al., 2021).

From this point of view, it does not seem possible for women with a presence and role in the public sphere in Turkey and Italy to return to the private sphere as before (Karamessini & Rubery, 2014). Indeed, with Covid-19, particularly, what it means to return home for women, especially mothers, has become more apparent (Del Boca, 2022; Del Boca et al., 2021). The available data and literature also suggest this: despite the traditional socio-normative meaning of women in societies and politics, scarce childcare policies, work regulations and social protection measures, women will resist becoming only a mother and wife in the private sphere and increase their presence in the public sphere (Brilli et al., 2016; Del Boca, 2022; EIGE, 2022; İlkkaracan, 2012; Istat, 2022c; Turk Stat, 2022c).

### **6.3. POLICY ACTIONS TO TRANSFORM CARE RELATIONS**

This final section concludes the discussion with proposed policy actions based on the results of the comparison between Turkey and Italy. In accordance with this comparison, fifteen policy areas were identified driving the transformation of gendered unpaid care work (see *gendered unpaid care work index* [Section 6.4](#)). The results show that international recommendations do not get to the root of the problem when regional differences are not considered, as the gendered unpaid care work structure is far from homogeneous. Therefore, there is a clear need for comprehensive and internationally comparable but also locally adaptable policy guidelines that will enable longer-term national policies rather than funds for short-term projects. In this sense, each of the following categories presents an opportunity to transform gender relations and, thus, care relations, given the relevant structures discussed above.

### **6.3.1. Institutional Infrastructure for Data Collection and Processing**

- The gender equality policies first depend on the quality, comprehensive and consistent gender-disaggregated data. Provided data should cover gendered disparities experienced in every field, such as education, access to healthcare, childcare, employment opportunities, sexual violence, and the gender pay gap, but also the impacts of government policies on different genders via cost/benefit analysis.
- Turkey and Italy have a statistical framework enabling them to gather gender-segregated data. Starting with CEDAW, being part of the international platforms for gender equality has resulted in the formation of mechanisms to measure and interpret the phenomenon, such as time-use and unpaid care work.
- While Italy measured the time value of unpaid care labour for the first time three years after CEDAW, the first time-use survey in Turkey was conducted much later, in 2006. Although the establishment dates of the statistical institutes and the processes of the institutional infrastructure are similar, it is evident that Turkey is progressing more slowly in the institutional transformation towards gender equality. Italy, on the other hand, represents the other low-level transformation trend in the EU.
- That shows us that the institutional transformation process takes longer than the general EU trend, arising from regional peculiarities.
- On the other hand, TUS has limitations due to its limited capacity to measure unpaid care work, especially when multitasking is involved. These surveys are also less clear for people without expertise in this field.
- However, it is still one of the most powerful tools to reveal the gendered organisation of paid and unpaid care work. This situation presents important reasons for eliminating its deficiencies, with more consistent data production and a more precise explanation of the meaning of the categories to the participants.
- At the international level, while the EU has been working on the integration to build consistency, the difference in the categorisation between organisations limits the building of common knowledge and comparable data.
- In the context of Harmonised European Time-Use Surveys (HETUS), integration of the EU has facilitated internationally comparable data production. Although all these attempts are crucial to building a gender transformative institutional framework, constantly changing international standards and different categorisations (such as OECD vs EU) distract the attention from the social phenomenon itself to the technical issues.

- On the other hand, the political independence of the institutions is crucial for objective data production at the local level.
- In both countries, the importance attributed to the traditional structure of gender relations at the political level and the effect of politics on data-producing institutions lead to limited data on women and the exclusionary attitude of these institutions by remaining within binary gender stereotypes.

### **6.3.2. National Gender Equality Framework**

- In Turkey and Italy, a national gender equality framework recognising the unpaid care work burden on women is lacking. This situation causes the implementation of short-term projects and experiment policies which lack consistency.
  - Nevertheless, experiments sometimes lead to a greater allocation of public funds and resources in the next period, as in Italy's case of contribution support for female employers.
  - However, in most cases, these short-term practices are often abandoned in the next budget year. For example, in Italy, the government allocated public resources between 2016-2018 within the framework of gender budgeting, which was implemented as an initiative and a short-term project, and then abandoned in the next budget term.
  - Recently, Turkey launched a nationwide gender budgeting project with the support of the UN. Again, although this project is essential in introducing international tools to the national level that will transform gender relations, its impact seems limited and short-term.
  - On the other hand, national frameworks, including reports, regulations and strategic plans, are shaped very much by the dominant political discourse. Especially right-wing governments tend to be reluctant to change the existing gender relations, which assign care to women.
  - Thus, cultural norms internalise the gendered division of labour in the absence of public policies to distribute care activities between households and government and fiscal policies that support women's participation in the paid labour market.
  - In this context, there is a need for gender-transformative national-level policies that consider regional characteristics and are also effective in eliminating the internalisation of gender roles.

### **6.3.3. Institution for Setting, Implementing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Gender Equality Goals**

- In practice, there are separate institutions ([GDSW](#) and [DppO](#)) in both countries to set, implement, and evaluate gender equality goals for the opportunities and status of women and men.
- However, linking these institutions directly or indirectly to the Ministry of Family, which sets gender equality rights according to the family unit, jeopardises the independence of women's rights and hinders prioritising radical binary gender relations.
- Thus, these institutions become agents for 'gendering' the production, reproduction and finance spheres and determining the gender distribution in these areas, especially under conservative administrations.
- Accordingly, these institutions function as a tool for designing and maintaining gender roles rather than establishing gender equality and transforming gender norms. On the other hand, this design process is more focused on social policies prioritising the continuation of the lineage and the role of women in it.
- Therefore, they ultimately lead to using gender equality bodies and international funds to strengthen traditional roles further rather than promote gender equality at the local level.
- In this respect, having an institution that carries women and equality in its legal personality is not enough. It is also not enough to just have an institution without official intentions to improve gender equality.
- The key to creating gender-transforming institutional structures is to have political intent and societal pressure.
- Finally, without robust, transparent, and independent institutions, the tendency to shift the national framework towards political domination reduces the ability of these institutions to address gender inequalities.

### **6.3.4. National Legal Framework on Gender Equality**

- First, gender equality rights have developed under the influence of early Republican-era transformations in Turkey and subsequent feminist movements. Similarly, in Italy, the union of EU membership and feminism played a role in the emergence of these rights.
- In fact, in both countries, there has been a political will to establish gender equality with some limitations over the years.



- In these countries, international standards have been reflected in the national law and policy infrastructure as a requirement of the conventions and platforms to which they are parties.
- Although this has been critical to initiate the transformative process, as mentioned earlier, international requirements have limitations when combined with short-term funding initiatives in these countries.
- With the growing interest in gender equality at the international level, governments at the local level are adopting the framework as a technical target to be set.
- In this case, at the local level, governments have become part of the international mechanisms; however, in most of the initiatives, the top-down process, without the involvement of the experts from academia, civil society, and citizens, has resulted in the bureaucratisation of the social phenomenon in question.
- The fact that gender transformative norms and actions have not been adopted by left politicians and the majority of the society also leads to a lack of sufficient opposition pressure in the public when these practices are missing, or existing ones disappear.
- In addition, when there is no such pressure, and the dominant politics do not seek to create it, the impact of these transformative norms and platforms on society remains limited at best.
- Thus, in the absence of feminist opposition in politics in Turkey and Italy, conservative political tendencies deliberately divide society based on gender relations and the importance of the family.
- While this approach creates discrimination by using the traditional/modern dilemma instead of political responsibility, it also creates masses with a right-wing populist understanding through the discourse in the media and politics.
- In this sense, *reverse recognition* reinforces traditional gender roles in these countries. To transform this, robust, transparent, and clear laws and regulations are needed to protect care rights, enabling different lifestyles.

### **6.3.5. Protection Against Gender-Based Violence**

- Femicides, especially intimate partner violence, and gender-based violence rates are very high in Turkey compared to Italy.
- On the other hand, the functioning of the local legal system seems to remain insufficient to end male violence here.

- Nevertheless, despite this, the government in Turkey withdrew from the Istanbul Convention, which aims to end all forms of gender-based violence, on the grounds that it promotes and legally protects homosexuality, thus posing a threat to the ‘Turkish family structure’.
- This shows, in a way, the limited impact of international platforms on local gender equality actions.
- In this environment, while male perpetrators most of the time get time off based on ‘moral reasons’ and their ‘good behaviour’ during the trial, the imprisonment of some women who act in self-defence coincides with the sacred meaning of the family and the suppressed role of women in this institution. Even the law to prevent violence against women bears the name of protecting the family ([Law No. 6284](#)).
- Although Turkey has many reports on violence against women, National Action Plans, and development goals, it lags behind Italy and OECD countries in legalising this issue.
- In this sense, there is a need for solid legal regulations to reduce domestic violence and femicides experienced by women in both countries, but especially in Turkey.
- Protection against gender-based violence in Italy is more extensive and is based on many legal regulations. Italy is also one of the signatories of the Istanbul Convention.
- However, conservative political discourse that praises traditional lifestyles and targets ‘others’ constitutes a threat to the existence of individuals who do not conform to ‘politically accepted’ lifestyles and creates risks of violence in both countries.
- Therefore, there is a need for a legal framework that adopts a more inclusive approach to protection based on human rights, transforming political language and actions, as well as not applying punitive reductions on moral grounds.

### **6.3.6. Universal Healthcare**

- From a broader social care perspective, access to universal health services, together with education and social protection, constitute broad social welfare rights. Therefore, presenting quality and accessible health as a universal right is one of the most essential elements.
- The reduction and redistribution of unpaid care labour largely depend on universal social welfare rights, and health services constitute one crucial pillar of it.
- While Italy has a universal health system financed by taxes and covers everyone legally residing there, Turkey provides a health system based on social security contributions. As a

result, access to healthcare services and care burden in Turkey differ according to income level.

- This situation, which can be associated with the erosion in the understanding of the social state and the transition to family-based social policy, dramatically restricts access to quality health services, especially for low-income families and those who do not have paid jobs.

- In these families, women who bear the burden of unpaid care and need care the most are excluded from the system. Thus, they are exposed to discrimination the most.

- On the other hand, the inclusion of private hospitals in the process to increase competition in health services, especially in the case of Turkey, leads to a significant differentiation in the health services accessed.

- As privatisation increases, the transformative effect of these services decreases. In this case, the inadequate delivery of these services reinforces traditional gender stereotypes.

- Considering that most health care workers are women and women compensate for any disruption in care services with their unpaid care labour, health services are at the centre of the transformation of gendered unpaid care work, along with other social protection expenditures.

### **6.3.7. Universal Childcare**

- Given that care is the most valid reason for women's exclusion from the workforce, and childcare is the most binding factor for women, universal childcare is critical to the redistribution of care and women's participation in the workforce.

- In the cases of Turkey and Italy, it is evident that with the increase in childcare services, women's labour force participation also increases. Thus, the provision of centre-based care for children aged 0-6 is significant to support both the child's development and the mother's socioeconomic independence.

- However, the absence of universal childcare in Turkey until compulsory education and in Italy at the age of 3-6 points to a family-based social policy understanding and the *reverse recognition* of the role of women in care delivery.

- In addition, the universal child allowance, which starts in the 7<sup>th</sup> month of pregnancy and continues until the age of 21 in Italy, provides more extended support than a one-time birth allowance for live births in Turkey.

- The transfer of care from the state to the family, more evident in Turkey, through limited and gendered parental leave arrangements and very restricted child allowances, adds to women's caring responsibilities.
- Moreover, the very weak presence of the state in childcare until the age of compulsory education compels those who cannot afford private sector care to home care, which requires a person to be excluded from the unpaid workforce. This is especially burdensome for women who have no one to support them.
- In this case, career breaks for childcare tend to deepen the income and pension gap between men and women.
- Given that, there is an evident need for quality and inclusive universal childcare to increase women's participation in the paid workforce and close the gender income and pension gap.
- On the other hand, the reluctance of increasingly neoliberal-oriented governments to provide this official support also shows that they ignore the contribution of care investments to growth.

### **6.3.8. Universal Education Right**

- The importance of compulsory education is high as it provides equal opportunity to acquire the skills necessary for participation in the paid workforce. On the other hand, there is a need to transform the gendered structure of education and, therefore, professions, with social programs introducing fields that seem to belong to the specific gender.
- Universal education right complements childcare which must begin with parental leaves and allowances during pregnancy.
- Despite the right to universal education, which is 12 years in Turkey and 10 years in Italy (excluding the last 2 years of high school), the high dropout rates in Turkey and Italy point to the weaknesses of the system in these countries.
- Although compulsory education has been increased to 12 years with the new education system in Turkey, the interrupted education structure of 4+4+4 in practice causes school dropouts to remain high, albeit slowly decreasing.
- On the other hand, the Italian system keeps the last 2 years of high school out of compulsory education, which decreases the transition to tertiary education and increases school dropouts again. Nevertheless, the Italian system seems more effective in keeping young adults in education.

- There is also a difference in education expenditures between Italy, where general government expenditures make up 85 per cent of the financing source of education, and Turkey, where it remains around 69 per cent. On the other hand, households in Turkey spend more on education, which is in line with the increasing level of private education.
- However, the privatisation of education deepens the inequality between low- and high-income segments of society and prevents social mobility through education. In this case, girls whose education is not prioritised, especially in poor households and regions, are pushed out of the education system.
- Thus, effective and fair education policies are needed in both countries, especially in Turkey, to eliminate poverty and inequalities and to ensure sustainable development.
- Recognising that education is one of the most powerful tools to lift marginalised children and adults out of poverty requires the right to receive quality education to be designed as a sustainable investment and regarded as a human right.
- For this, it is crucial to determine the social, economic, and cultural reasons that cause exclusion from education and their interactions with each other.

### **6.3.9. Universal Social Protection Policies**

- Social protection represents the safety net for disadvantaged individuals and segments of society, including most mothers without a paid job.
- It also constitutes the last component of broad social care, which is crucial in transforming gendered care work.
- Despite this critical importance, social protection policies in Turkey and Italy are fragmented based on family-oriented traditional understandings.
- Both provide social protection to very low-income families based on income testing. While this excludes high-income households from these expenditures, in practice, it also excludes women who most need support but cannot receive it because their household income thresholds are set too low.
- On the other hand, while the application is much easier in Italy, the physical application requirement in Turkey restricts access to social assistance, especially for women who have a burden of care and do not have easy access to transportation.
- In addition, the protection offered in some cases in Turkey does not cover all residents, and services are provided according to the citizenship rule.

- Social protection rights are also provided for a shorter period and in a lower amount compared to Italy. We can observe this from the fact that while the EU spends a third of GDP on social protection expenditures, it remains a quarter in Italy and below a fifth in Turkey.
- Another disadvantage of the social protection system in Turkey is its association with employment status, which increases the complexity of the system. This is a significant problem, especially for single mothers without paid jobs.
- Under the social protection system in Turkey, social insurance is not separated from social benefits, except in certain situations for foreigners (see [Section 6.4](#)).
- On the other hand, according to the system in Italy, while the social insurance system covers workers, the social assistance system covers citizens and residents with certain conditions. Nevertheless, it remains below the EU average and lacks a gender-transformative perspective.
- In this sense, a more precise, longer, and more inclusive social protection system should be established in both countries, particularly in Turkey. Such a system should consider the socio-economic condition of applicants rather than household income when setting the thresholds, aim to reduce the complexity of the system and increase its accessibility.

### **6.3.10. Universal Old-Age Pension System**

- Providing universal old-age pensions and eliminating the gender pension gap is vital because women spend a longer period of their older ages as survivors and tend to live longer compared to men. On the other hand, men all around the world tend to earn and accumulate more. Turkey and Italy are no exception to this.
- Gender differences in paid employment opportunities, starting with access to education, childcare and health services, accumulate to the detriment of women of older ages. The gender gap in pensions is significantly higher than the gender pay gap. This is because women are more likely to work part-time and take longer career breaks to care for family and relatives, in addition to the fact that they often hold lower-paying jobs.
- As such, women are more likely to have difficulty meeting their premium requirements and are, therefore, more likely to receive only the minimum pension or old age benefits. In this case, the result will get worse when we include women who have never received assistance in the pension gap.

- In addition, the increase in the contribution period and retirement age makes it harder for women to be eligible for retirement or receive the full amount of payment.
- On the other hand, some special conditions apply (reducing the retirement age or the number of premium days, as in Turkey and Italy) for women to facilitate their retirement.
- Indeed, the lower and gradually decreasing gender pension gap in Turkey suggests that more comprehensive supportive pension arrangements are more effective than those in Italy and the EU.
- However, while these practices facilitate retirement, differences in career profiles between men and women can lead to significant gender disparities in retirement benefits, as pensions are often linked to earnings.
- In addition, governments tend to increase the retirement ages according to life expectancy, also in Turkey and Italy. The reason for this is the burden of the old-age pension, which constitutes 6 per cent of the GDP in Turkey and exceeds 15 per cent in Italy, on the state budget.
- Tightening the conditions for entitlement to retirement will lead to a slower increase in the number of retirees, especially women.
- Combining these with temporary regulations such as contribution support by governments for fragile populations will create relief for those who do not qualify for retirement, albeit temporarily.
- Even if more women benefit from retirement benefits in the future due to higher labour force participation rates, achieving gender equality in pensions will remain challenging due to the continuing earnings gap and the differential distribution of care duties among parents.
- In short, current pension systems are insufficient to address and solve these problems. Therefore, a more comprehensive approach covering employment, social and family policies is required to address the challenges women and working parents face.

### **6.3.11. Gender-Equal Parental Leaves**

- The right to work-protected leave after birth and providing temporary job protection to enable an employee to care for their newborn child and then return to the same job has become essential policy measures to support parents.
- These policies are important tools for both promoting gender equality and realising the right to care.

- The critical importance of these policies stems from their simultaneous impact on outcomes in many areas, such as child and parent health and well-being, increasing the youth population, supporting women's labour market participation, and reducing gender pay and pension gaps.
- Although both parents have parental leave rights, the duration and extent of these rights vary considerably between countries and between genders.
- While maternity leave is compulsory in many countries, paternity leave is optional and very limited. This double standard not only discriminates genders by assigning care responsibility of the newborn to women but also causes women's maternity leave to be perceived as a burden for employers, no matter how short-term it is.
- Hence, women, whose career cuts are already so high, fall into a disadvantageous position in terms of gender bias in the laws.
- Thus, in employment, men who take significantly less leave and are absent from work are preferred compared to women.
- The situation mentioned above applies to Turkey and Italy. While mothers in Turkey are entitled to only 16 weeks of paid leave, paternity leave is optional for 10 days. Although maternity leave is longer in Italy (5 months), women receive only 80 per cent of their salary during this period, while fathers are only given 10 days of mandatory leave.
- Thus, in regulating gender relations, the disproportionate burden of women's domestic responsibilities is reinforced, and legal care rights are built against women.
- However, care rights should be regulated to support women's participation in the labour force or their return and distributed equally to prevent gender discrimination in the labour market. Even beyond this, they should transform gender relations to move towards a care economy.

### **6.3.12. Care-Friendly Working Environment Regulations**

- Gender-transformative and care-friendly working arrangements are crucial in establishing mechanisms that will reorganise working environments in the context of care right.
- However, they remain limited in Italy and especially in Turkey.
- In addition, if these practices are not carefully designed, as in Turkey, they can sometimes act in the opposite direction and harm gender equality.



- For example, these regulations in Turkey are limited to requirements such as opening a nursery or a separate breastfeeding room in the workplace for companies with more than 150 female employees. On the other hand, the obligation to open a nursery causes companies to tend to limit the number of female employees in practice. In addition, since Turkey is a country where SMEs are common, this regulation does not have an impact in practice.
- On the other hand, new resignation regulations in Italy protect women from illegal enforcement of them to resign when they are pregnant. This is an important regulation as it protects women's working rights and eliminates discrimination based on biased perspectives.
- In addition, regulations ensuring a gender balance in the bodies of listed companies and a bi-annual reporting requirement on the working conditions of women and men for companies with more than 50 employees protect the presence of women in the labour market. Apart from these, the National Equality Committee implements the principles of equal treatment and equal opportunity between male and female workers in Italy.
- Again, although Italy represents the lowest rank in the EU regarding women's labour force participation, Turkey also lags behind Italy.
- In this context, care-friendly working conditions policies would enable parents to balance working hours with caring and facilitate women's greater participation in employment. The right to flexible working should also be established with public incentives.
- These arrangements would provide employment support to lone parents so that all parents, regardless of partnership status, could participate in the labour market. It is also important to improve employment conditions and access to social support, particularly for the most vulnerable informal workers, such as home-based and domestic workers.
- Regulations expected to balance work-family life should include, for example, ensuring the availability and access of affordable quality early childhood education and care, as well as affordable long-term care for other dependents, including children, disabled and elderly relatives.
- They should raise awareness among both employers and employees about the equal distribution of care responsibilities and encourage fathers to benefit from exclusive and non-transferable care leave. This would also eliminate gender discrimination based on caring responsibilities.
- Finally, gender transformative working arrangements should include measures and policies to increase women's representation in decision-making positions, occupations, and positions with low representation, including government, parliament, local governments,

and the judiciary and also should promote all appropriate measures to end sexual harassment in the workplace.

### **6.3.13. Specific Regulations Regarding Directly UCW and Caregivers**

- Specific arrangements for UCW and carers are essential to promoting a more equitable sharing of unpaid care work between men and women, households, and the government. These regulations are also crucial to raise awareness of gender stereotypes as one of the most important reasons for women's unemployment.
- Designing policies to share caring responsibilities within the community for dependents such as children, the elderly, the disabled and the sick are relevant in all areas identified so far. However, the separate regulation of unpaid care work and carers contribute to their recognition by the government and society.
- On the other hand, these arrangements should not focus assisting women to carry out UCW. Instead, they should redistribute these responsibilities between men and women and centre-based public care. However, when home care is preferred, carers should be financially empowered through government funds.
- Given the fragmented care arrangements in Turkey, home care regulations and limited financial support entrust care to women rather than emancipating them. For example, arrangements such as providing financial support to home caregivers of dependents or the government's home care project limit women's labour to domestic care work. This approach further reduces female labour force participation, which is already very low in Turkey.
- In addition, regulations such as adding one-fourth of the number of premium payment days or deducting the age limit for women with severely disabled children among insured make it easier for women to fulfil their care duties, not men. Therefore, care allowances and pension arrangements should be made by the carer, not by gender.
- On the other hand, in Italy, providing a carer's allowance based on residence provides more inclusive protection. In addition, giving care leave for up to 2 years to workers who have to take care of their relatives with severe disabilities, regardless of gender, helps families reconcile work-family life.
- Apart from these, both countries have regulations for including domestic workers in the social security system. In Italy, laws requiring lower contributions are introduced to encourage employers to employ domestic workers for longer working days, while in Turkey,

calculations over a percentage of the daily wage correspond to a higher co-payment requirement than in Italy.

- In short, regulations that are sufficiently comprehensive and fairly distribute the burden of care are lacking in both countries.
- Possible solutions should focus on designing institutional care and home care as complementary rather than alternatives. In addition, institution-based care should remove the burden of home care by supporting the social and emotional integrity of both the caregiver and the cared people.
- In this case, there is also a need for institutional structures that recognise and regulate home care as a job.
- Thus, to eliminate the gendered structure of unpaid care work, future regulations and policies must transform hierarchical gender relations, patriarchal socio-normative systems, and masculine political discourse. In this way, the social and political transformation that will lead us to the gender transformation of care will occur.

#### **6.3.14. Fiscal Policies on UCW**

- Introducing public funds, tax incentives and reductions or credits that stimulate greater women's participation in employment and allow parents to balance working hours with family responsibilities is very much related to UCW responsibilities.
- In this sense, Turkey's development plans, which in principle determine the following five-year route within the scope of national targets, are also critical in terms of gendered care work. In the last two development plans, in the context of gender equality, the objectives of empowering women in social, economic, and cultural life, promoting women's human rights and preventing all kinds of violence against women have been included.
- Current national policies, in line with these goals, also show the intention, albeit limited, to regulate gender relations, mostly through incentives for women's employment. For example, exemption of kindergarten allowance from tax, provided that the minimum wage for each child does not exceed 15 per cent of the monthly gross amount, and financing of social security premium employer shares of private sector employers (up to 54 months) employing women are among them. In addition, private kindergartens, and day-care centres, are exempt from income and corporate tax for 5 taxation periods starting from their operation in 2016.

- On the other hand, these regulations are quite limited in terms of women's participation in the labour force. Moreover, individual tax deductions on unemployed spouses and children, albeit very few, contribute to the exclusion of women from paid work.
- On the other hand, despite the high rate of intimate violence and femicide in Turkey, withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention contradicts the goals of eliminating violence against women and using public resources for it. Moreover, no specific provision exists for women in the newly enacted 2023 Budget Law in Turkey.
- Fiscal policies in Italy support women's employment and entrepreneurship as in Turkey- but for more effective and longer durations compared to Turkey.
- In this, inevitably, the effort to adapt to the funds received from the EU is important.
- For example, as in the post-Covid-19 period National Recovery and Resilience Plans, which focus on job, income, skills, time, and power inequalities regarding gender equality, benefiting from EU support for recovery was a significant incentive.
- Nevertheless, the policies explicitly stated in the budget documents appear to have a more significant impact on women's participation in the public sphere and indirectly on the distribution of unpaid care work. Indeed, this situation is also reflected in women's labour force participation rates in Italy.
- In light of this, fiscal policies should aim not only to increase participation in employment but also to improve employment conditions, access to social support, and availability of affordable, quality early childhood education and long-term care for other dependents. They should also provide incentives to create flexible working entitlements, provide paid parental leave with employment protection, and design care as a human right on a collective basis.

### **6.3.15. Gender Equal Discourse**

- Political discourse and institutional attitudes on gender issue significantly impact the gendered construction of society, as has been discussed until here.
- With a 60-year gap in Turkey and Italy, the issue of women's rights has been a critical component of establishing nation-states in a process that puts gender equality efforts on the axis of nationality. This process has created a division between the modern roles of men and women. The first was assigned to establish the state, while the latter was for the family.

- This situation, which defines the articulation of women's rights in state affairs, has caused the political agenda to be shaped or transformed through gender issues. Thus, this process changed the demands for gender equality as a tool in politics.
- Given the growing influence of religious institutions on politics in Turkey and Italy, addressing gender relations from a more traditionalist perspective is inevitable. In both countries, the discourse developed on the moral role of women in the family and society, and the sanctity of motherhood reinforces the homemaker role of women regardless of their socio-economic consequences.
- On the other hand, political discourse and accompanying policies also manage the cultural norms through benefits to families and women.
- However, while the EU's impact in Italy is observed in the more extended social allowances for families and women, Turkey's social welfare state remains relatively limited.
- The crucial point here is that while feminist demands insist on transformative policies, current policies explicitly aim at reinforcing traditional gender roles, decreasing public services, and tightening the entitlement rules for social protection rights.
- However, these benefits significantly empower women socio-economically and ensure work-life reconciliation. In this sense, the dominance of polarised gender relations on the political agenda challenges actions to transform gender relations.
- To address this challenge, it is crucial to raise awareness of the devastating socio-economic consequences of women's traditional gender roles that keep them isolated in the private sphere. In this, feminist activism and politics are significantly essential. Yet more critically, there is a need for more collective opposition at the political level to change the direction of the decision-making.
- Therefore, a more diverse and inclusive representation that internalises feminist demands and aims to present care as a human right is needed.

## 6.4. GENDERED UNPAID CARE WORK INDEX FOR TURKEY & ITALY

POLICY TOOLS TO TRANSFORM GENDER ROLES		TURKEY	ITALY	
<b>LEGAL &amp; INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE</b>	<b>Institutional infrastructure for data collection and processing</b>	<b>PARTIAL</b>	<b>PARTIAL</b>	
		Measurement of UCW with <u>TUS</u> periodically (every 5-10 years)	- Latest in 2015 First conducted in 2006	- Latest in 2014 First conducted in 1988, later in 2002, and 2008
			National Statistical Institutes	
			<a href="#">Turk Stat</a> (founded in 1926)	<a href="#">Istat</a> (founded in 1926)
		Database	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Data on time-use available                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrated in Harmonised European Time-Use Surveys <a href="#">HETUS</a></li> <li>• Internationally comparable</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Gender-disaggregated data are available for topics such as education, labour force, social security, health, and income</li> <li>- Microdata is also available upon permit, for such as time-use</li> <li>- Intersectional data is limited</li> <li>- There is no data on LGBTIQ+</li> </ul>	
Reports & publications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Since the 2012 annual newsletter on Women’s Statistics and since the 2019 annual “Gender Statistics” report</li> <li>- Other related periodic reports:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Family Structure 2006, 2015, 2021</li> <li>• Life Satisfaction, 2003-2021</li> <li>• Statistics on Elderly, Youth and Children since 2018</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Not periodic special report on gender equality</li> <li>- Instead Istat’s annual reports includes gender inequality</li> <li>- Istat provides documents on gender starting from 2010 on the topics mostly gender discrimination, gender-based violence and harassment</li> <li>- Istat provides survey on users of anti-violence centres: 2006, 2014</li> </ul>		
Clarity about future data collection and study plans on gender equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Turk Stat shares the planned gender statistics and reports clearly on its website (see <a href="#">here</a>)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Istat plans to “engendering statistics” rather than producing separate gender statistics (see <a href="#">here</a>)</li> </ul>		

	Nationwide gender equality framework	<b>VERY LIMITED</b>	<b>VERY LIMITED</b>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- UN Women and the Ministry of Family and Social Services launched a three-year project for <a href="#">Gender Budgeting</a> in early 2021.</li> <li>- General Directorate on the Status of Women under Ministry of Family and Social Services prepares 5-year National Action Plan since 2008. <a href="#">Latest Plan (2021-2025)</a> focus on violence against women <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most important reason is the criticisms about withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention with the Presidential decree</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>⇒ There are no coherent national policy mechanisms at the national level for the designing, monitoring, and evaluating the gender equality</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Italy conducted a pilot gender budgeting at national level between 2016-2018</li> <li>- Following Covid-19 Italy has prepared National Recovery and Resilience Plans (<a href="#">Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza</a>) and National Strategy for Gender Equality (<a href="#">Strategia Nazionale per la Parità di Genere</a>) in 2021 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It has been criticised for the top-down execution of the process and insufficient participation of stakeholders</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>⇒ There are no coherent national policy mechanisms at the national level for the designing, monitoring, and evaluating the gender equality</p>
	Institution for setting, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating gender equality goals	<b>PARTIAL</b>	<b>PARTIAL</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">General Directorate on the Status of Women</a> was established in 1990 under the Prime Ministry as the national mechanism stipulated by CEDAW <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• had been operating without legal basis for 10 years, was restructured in 2004</li> <li>• in 2011 moved under the Ministry of Family and Social Policies</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">The Equal Opportunities Department (Dipartimento per le pari opportunità)</a>, the governing body responsible for gender equality, was established in 1996 under the Prime Ministry <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• President of the department is Ministry of Family, Birth and Equal Opportunities</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <a href="#">National Equality Committee (Comitato Nazionale Parità)</a> implement the principles of equal treatment and equal opportunities between male and female workers</li> </ul>	
National legal framework on gender equality	<b>PARTIAL</b>	<b>YES</b>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Early Republican era regulations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legalisation of co-education for boys and girls (1924)</li> <li>• Liberalisation of divorce for women (1926)</li> <li>• Right to vote and to be elected (1934)</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Abortion right (1983- recognised partially)</li> <li>- First female prime minister in 1993</li> <li>- Candidate of EU since 1999</li> <li>- Signatory of CEDAW since 1985</li> <li>- Amendments in the Constitution (2001, 2004, and 2010), enactment of new Civil Code (2002), Labour Law (2003), Penal Law (2004), and other subsequent regulations to regulate the masculine legal language</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU membership since 1958</li> <li>- Following feminist movements important regulations, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Liberalisation of divorce, in 1970</li> <li>• Right to vote and to be elected (1945)</li> <li>• Abortion right in 1978 (<a href="#">Law No: 194, UG: 22/3/1978</a>)</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Signatory of CEDAW since 1985</li> <li>- Amendments in law regulating for example rape as a crime against the integrity of the female body, not of the public morality in 1996 (<a href="#">Law No: 66, UG:15/2/1996</a>) and stalking as crime in 2009</li> </ul>	

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An important change here is that although rape has been recognised as a crime since 1926, with the latest regulations, it is regulated as “sexual offenses” against sexual immunity under the crimes against individuals instead of public morality.</li> <li>- <a href="#">The Commission on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (KEFEK)</a> was established in 2009 with the <a href="#">Law No. 5840</a> on the Commission on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, in order to ensure equality of opportunity for men and women and combat gender-based discrimination.</li> <li>- Turkey signed the Istanbul Convention in 2011. However, she withdrew her signature in 2021, claiming that the convention favoured LGBTIQ+ people rather than preventing violence against women.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Legal framework for gender equality in Italy is also provided by <a href="#">National Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men in 2006</a> which <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• regulates and harmonises various laws on equality of opportunity in a single text</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Italy also signed Istanbul Convention in 2013</li> <li>- In 2016 civil partnership of same-sex couples regulated</li> <li>- Finally, in 2022 Italy elected the first female Prime minister from far-right party.</li> </ul>
	Protection against gender-based violence	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VERY LIMITED</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Within the scope of <a href="#">Law No. 6284</a>, (Law on The Protection of The Family and The Prevention of Violence Against Women) which entered into force in 2012, it has been enacted to protect women, children, family members and people who are victims of persistent stalking, who have suffered or are at risk of violence, and</li> <li>- the establishment of “Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centres (ŞÖNİM)”, where support and monitoring services are provided for the prevention of violence and the effective implementation of protective and preventive measures, and services to be provided by the centres were regulated. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Art. 20, regulates that for the execution and execution of applications within the scope of the law, such expenses as litigation expenses, fees, postal expenses, and similar expenses will not be taken under any name.</li> <li>• Payments made pursuant to Article 17 (temporary financial aid) are exempt from income tax, inheritance and gift tax, and documents issued in return for these payments are exempt from stamp tax.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- “Domestic Violence Against Women in Turkey Survey” was conducted by the support of General Directorate of the Status of Women (GDSW) in <a href="#">2009</a> and <a href="#">2015</a>.</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PARTIAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The so-called law on femicide (legislative decree no. 93 of 14 August 2013, converted into <a href="#">Law No. 119 UG: 15/10/2013</a>, on the matter of combating gender-based violence)</li> <li>- <a href="#">Art. 14, paragraph 6, of the Law No: 124, UG: 7/8/2015</a>, provides a female civil servant who is a victim of gender-based violence and is included in special protection, to request a transfer to a different administration.</li> <li>- <a href="#">Art. 1, paragraph 16, of Law No: 107 UG: 13/7/2015</a> regulates the reform of the national education and training system and authorises the reformation of the applicable legal provisions that promote the prevention of gender-based violence and all forms of discrimination in each school's three-year education proposal plan, and order to inform and raise awareness of students, teachers and parents about the subject.</li> <li>- <a href="#">Art. 11 of Law No: 122 UG: 7/7/2016</a> regulates the provision for the fulfillment of the obligations deriving from Italy’s membership of the EU which establishes the right to compensation in favor of victims of violent intentional crimes.</li> <li>- <a href="#">Legislative Decree No:212 15/12/2015</a> regulates the implementation of <a href="#">Directive 2012/29/EU</a> of the European Parliament and of the Council, which establishes minimum</li> </ul>



		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National Action Plans for Combating Violence Against Women (<a href="#">2007-2010</a>, <a href="#">2012-2015</a>, <a href="#">2016-2020</a>, <a href="#">2021-2025</a>) were prepared by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. The latest plan focuses on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access to justice and effective enforcement of legislation</li> <li>• Policy and coordination</li> <li>• Protective and preventive services</li> <li>• Social awareness</li> <li>• Data and statistics</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Apart from this, Ministry of Family and Social Policies in the <a href="#">Women’s Empowerment Strategy Document and Action Plan (2018-2023)</a> includes the work to be done by the relevant parties for women’s empowerment in five main policy axes: education, health, economy, participation in decision-making mechanisms and media.</li> <li>- In addition, the “<a href="#">Action Plan on the Prevention of Violations of the Human Rights Convention</a>” covering a 5-year period was published in 2014, in order to eliminate the reasons that led to the violation decisions given by the ECtHR against Turkey.</li> <li>- The <a href="#">11<sup>th</sup> Development Plan (2019-2023)</a> stated that social awareness-raising activities will be accelerated to prevent violence against women, forced early marriages and all kinds of abuse, and the efficiency and capacity of protective and preventive services will be increased.</li> </ul>	<p>standards on the subject of rights, assistance and protection of victims of crime.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">Law No: 4 UG: 11/1/2018</a> have made amendments to the civil code, the criminal code, the criminal procedure code and other provisions in favor of orphans for domestic crimes.</li> <li>- <a href="#">Law 19 July 2019, n. 69</a>, have made amendments to the penal code, the code of criminal procedure and other provisions regarding the protection of victims of domestic and gender-based violence</li> <li>- <a href="#">DPCM 17/12/2020</a>, provided freedom income for women victims of violence through the fund for policies relating to rights and equal opportunities</li> <li>- The <a href="#">2020 Budget Law</a>, (art. 1, paragraph 27) in order to guarantee and implement the presence in penitentiary institutions of expert psychological professionals for the intensified cognitive-behavioural treatment of perpetrators of crimes against women and for the prevention of recidivism, the expenditure of 2 million euro is authorised for each of the years 2021, 2022 and 2023.</li> <li>- <a href="#">Law No: 53 5/5/2022</a> aimed to guarantee an adequate flow of information regarding gender-based violence against women and to ensure provisions on statistics and adequate prevention policies and effective monitoring of the phenomenon.</li> </ul>
<b>SOCIAL CARE SYSTEM</b>	Universal healthcare	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PARTIAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Access to the national health system is provided by <a href="#">Social Security Institution</a> contributions paid by the employer for workers and by the state for the unemployed up to a certain income threshold.</li> <li>- Although the <a href="#">Transformation of Health</a> in Turkey has increased the coverage of the health system by introducing public general health insurance together with the standard health insurance service package, the obligation to be associated with the system through employment status and to pay contributions continues.</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>YES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Access to healthcare has been automatically guaranteed in Italy via <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Italy has a tax-financed universal health system, supported by the National Health Service (<a href="#">Servizio sanitario nazionale or SSN</a>) Act since 1978.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- The central government directs general tax revenues to publicly funded healthcare and defines the basic health package. However, the Italian healthcare system is organised regionally.</li> </ul>

	Universal childcare	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PARTIAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Compulsory education starts at age 5,5</li> <li>- Pre-primary education is not compulsory</li> <li>- Childcare facilities are divided into: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For 0-3 age group public kindergartens (Kreş) are very limited <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Total enrolment rates around 0.02 per cent</li> <li>▪ There are public/private institutions providing day-care but not affiliated to the Ministry of National Education, and may require fee and other expenses</li> </ul> </li> <li>• For 3–5,5 age group care services are under the control and responsibility of the national government. These facilities are divided into: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Nursery classes (Ana sınıfı) are for aged 4-5,5 in the primary school premises (more than 90 per cent public)</li> <li>▪ Nursery schools (Bağımsız Ana Okulu) are independent childcare facilities for children aged 3-5,5 (50 per cent public)</li> <li>▪ Total enrolment rates around 40 per cent</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>- There is one-time birth allowance (<a href="#">Doğum Yardımı</a> - 300 TL for the first child, 400 TL for the second child, 600 TL for the third and subsequent children of Turkish citizens.</li> <li>- There are also temporary projects, which is funded by EU, without national scope: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Centre-based childcare support project for formally employed mothers in 2022, 100 Euro per month for mothers with children 0-60 months who want to start working or return to their previous job</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PARTIAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Compulsory education starts at age 6</li> <li>- Pre-primary education is not compulsory</li> <li>- Childcare facilities are divided into: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For 0–3 age group are generally provided by the regional governments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Municipal nursery schools (asili-nido d’infanzia)</li> <li>▪ Supplementary service (servizio integrativo)</li> <li>▪ Spring class (sezione primavera)</li> <li>▪ Total enrolment rates around 30 per cent</li> </ul> </li> <li>• 3–6 age group are under the control and responsibility of the national government (67 per cent public) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Total enrolment rates exceed 90 per cent</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>- As of 2021, through the means-tested universal childcare program, <a href="#">Assegno Unico Universale</a>, Italians and legally residing foreigners can receive cash support for their children from the 7th month of pregnancy until the child reaches the age of 21 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Amount varies between vary between 50 and 175 euros</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Parents can refund the fees paid for authorised public and private children nurseries via nursery vouchers (<a href="#">Bonus Nido</a>), a means tested allowance between varying between 1.500 and 3000 euros</li> <li>- This amount can also be claimed for children under the age of three with a serious chronic illness, regardless of whether they attend nursery</li> </ul>
	Universal education right	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PARTIAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Compulsory education begins at the age of 5,5 and lasts for 12 years.</li> <li>- This period covers primary education lower secondary education, and upper secondary education.</li> <li>- This system is configured as an intermittent system that includes ‘4+4+4’ education (<a href="#">Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı</a>).</li> <li>- In practice, this discontinuous structure causes higher dropouts in upper secondary education compared to Italy.</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PARTIAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Compulsory education begins at the age of 6 and lasts for 10 years.</li> <li>- This period covers primary education, lower secondary education, and two years of upper secondary education.</li> <li>- The two compulsory years of the second cycle can be continued in general and vocational high schools or the regional vocational education and training system (<a href="#">Ministero dell’Istruzione dell’Istruzione e del Merito</a>).</li> <li>- Upper-secondary school dropout rates are high.</li> </ul>

	Universal social protection policies	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PARTIAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coverage (<a href="#">SGK</a>): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Social insurance system</a>: Employed persons, including civil servants; self-employed persons; and full-time household workers. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Voluntary coverage is available.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Special systems for employees of banks, insurance companies, chambers of commerce, and stock exchanges.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <a href="#">Unemployment allowance (İşsizlik Ödeneği)</a>: the payment made to the insured unemployed for a certain period and amount for the period they were unemployed if they meet the conditions specified in the law. For the unemployed who worked as insured and paid unemployment insurance premium in the last three years before the end of the service contract: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 180 days for 600 days</li> <li>• 240 days for 900 days</li> <li>• 300 days for 1080 days</li> <li>• The unemployment allowance cannot exceed 80% of the gross amount of the monthly minimum wage.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <a href="#">Social Assistance and Solidarity Encouragement Law</a>: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Citizens and foreigners who are in need and are not subject to social security institutions established by law and who do not receive any monthly or income from these institutions are within the scope of this Law.</li> <li>• <a href="#">Income support for widowed women</a>: For women who lost their last civil marriage and lived in households without social security within the scope of <a href="#">Law No. 3294</a>. Payments with a maximum of 1000 TL are calculated monthly and made every two months.</li> <li>• <a href="#">Recruitment Assistance</a>: For the members aged 18-55 in the households benefiting from regular social assistance programs within the scope of <a href="#">Law No. 3294</a>. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• within 1 year; a maximum of 10% of the monthly net minimum wage is given, up to a maximum of 3 times.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>- <a href="#">Social Cohesion Assistance</a>: It includes foreigners with Temporary Protection Status, International Protection Status, International Protection applicants and Humanitarian Residence Permit, who meet the requirements of at least one of the needy and demographic criteria. Payments are made monthly, as 230 TL.</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PARTIAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coverage (<a href="#">INPS</a>): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Social insurance and notional defined contribution</a> cover private-sector employees, including household employees, and self-employed persons. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Voluntary coverage is available.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <a href="#">Social assistance</a> cover citizens of Italy, citizens of the EU residing in Italy, and non-EU citizens residing in Italy for 10 consecutive years with a residence permit.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <a href="#">Citizenship Income (Reddito di Cittadinanza)</a>: Means-tested cash assistance targeting poor and socially excluded families and conditional on participation in job-seeking activities. This allowance covers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Italian citizens legally residing foreigners for at least 10 years, the last two of which continuously</li> <li>• The maximum total amount paid is 9,360 euros per year (780 euros per month)</li> <li>• The payment of the benefit starts from the month following the request and is disbursed for a maximum continuous period of 18 months. It may be renewed, subject to a one-month suspension, before each renewal. The suspension is not foreseen in the case of the citizenship pension.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <a href="#">Citizenship Pension (Pensione di cittadinanza)</a>: For anyone over the age of 67 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The benefit assumes the denomination of Citizenship pension if the family nucleus is made up exclusively of one or more members aged 67 or over. It can also be granted in cases where the member or members of the family unit aged 67 or over live exclusively with one or more persons of a younger age, in a condition of serious disability or non-self-sufficiency.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <a href="#">Incapacity Pension (Pensione di inabilità)</a>: Financial benefit, paid upon claim, for workers who have been ascertained as completely and permanently unable to perform any work activity (based on the total social security pension contributions). Payment can be received for a maximum continuous period of 18 months. It may be renewed, but subject to a one-month suspension, before each renewal.</li> <li>- <a href="#">Unemployment insurance (NASpI, DIS-COL, and ISCRO)</a>: The first two covers the involuntary redundancy, and the latter is extraordinary allowance for income and operational continuity.</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Disability Pension (Engelli Aylığı)</u>: Monthly aids provided to citizens with 40 per cent or more disability and who do not have social security and whose per capita income in the household is less than 1/3 of the net minimum wage.</li> <li>- <u>General Health Insurance (GSS) Premium Payments</u>: Covers all citizens without social security (based on means-tested calculations). The premium on behalf of the individual is paid to the SSI by the state every month.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NASpI is a cash benefit granted, on request, for half the number of weeks covered by contributions in the last four years prior to losing the job.</li> <li>• DIS-COL is a cash benefit granted, on request, for half the number of months for which contributions were paid during the year preceding termination of the working relationship, for up to six months. The amount is 75 % of the average monthly income.</li> <li>• ISCRO can be requested only once in the three-year period 2021-2023 and is paid, for six months. It is equal to 25%, on a six-monthly basis, of the last self-employment income.</li> </ul>
Universal old-age pension system	<b>PARTIAL</b>	<b>PARTIAL</b>	<b>PARTIAL</b>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Contributory- Old-age pension (Emekli Aylığı)</u>: <a href="#">Law No 5510, RG: 16/6/2006</a> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Age: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Men: 60 (men, gradually rising to age 65 from 2036 to 2044)</li> <li>▪ Women: 58 (women, gradually rising to age 65 from 2036 to 2048)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Contribution: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ with at least 7,200 days of paid contributions (9,000 days for civil servants and self-employed persons)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>- <u>Early retirement (Erken Emeklilik)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Age: 55 for men, 50 for women</li> <li>• Contribution: a minimum of 15 years</li> </ul> </li> <li>or</li> <li>• Those who have not completed the age of 50 and 55, early retirement is possible with</li> <li>• Contribution: 20 years for women and 25 years for men</li> <li>- <u>Old Age Settlement (Yaşlılık Toptan Ödemesi ve İhya)</u>: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For the insured people who quit their job or close their workplace and cannot qualify for an old-age pension despite meeting the age requirement specified in the law (58 for women, 60 for men)</li> <li>• For this, the insured people working with a service contract and public officials, after leaving their job, and the insured people working independently on their own behalf and account, have to apply to the provincial directorate with the request document after closing the workplace.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <u>Non-contributory - Old-age pension (Yaşlı Aylığı)</u>:</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Contributory Old-age pension (Pensione di Vecchiaia)</u>: <a href="#">Decree Law No 201, UG: 6/12/2011</a> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Age <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ minimum age requirements are adjusted over time based on life expectancy, which is 67 years for both men and women till 2026</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Contribution: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ at least 20 years of contribution</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>- <u>Early retirement (Pensione Anticipata)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Men: a minimum of 42 years and 10 months of contributions,</li> <li>• Women: a minimum of 41 years and 10 months of contributions.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <u>Female option (Opzione donna) (Decree Law No: 4, UG: 28/1/2019)</u>: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Early access to the pension for female workers</li> <li>• Female workers who by 31 December 2018 had accrued 35 years of contributions and a registered age of 58 years, if employees, and 59 years, if self-employed, the right to access retirement upon request</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <u>Non-contributory Old-age pension (Assegno Sociale)</u>: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Law No 153, UG: 30/4/1969</a></li> <li>• Means-tested allowance</li> <li>• Assistance allocated upon request to Italian and foreign citizens with ten years of legal and continuous residence in Italy and older than 67 years, in disadvantaged economic conditions and with incomes below the thresholds set by law each year.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

		<p><a href="#">Law No 2022, RG:1/7/1976</a></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Means-tested allowance</li> <li>• Citizens aged 65 and over and who do not have social security and whose per capita income in the household is less than 1/3 of the net minimum wage can receive monthly payments.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The amount of the grant for the year 2021 is equal to 460.28 euros for 13 instalments. The income limit is equal to 5,983.64 euros per year and 11,967.28 euros if the subject is married.</li> </ul>
<b>LABOUR MARKET REGULATIONS</b>	Gender equal parental leaves	<b>NO</b>	<b>VERY LIMITED</b>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cover workers of Public &amp; Private Sector (İş Kanunu, 2003, Article 74) &amp; (Devlet Memurları Kanunu, 1965, Article 104)</li> <li>- Compulsory leave <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For mothers 16 weeks (full wage)</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Optional &amp; supplementary leave <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For fathers 10 days (full wage)</li> <li>• <u>In the public sector</u>: The mother is granted unpaid leave of up to 24 months, upon their request, from the end of the postpartum maternity leave period, and for the father, from the date of birth (Decree Law 29882, 2016).</li> <li>• At the end of the postpartum maternity leave period, the female civil servant may, upon her request, work half the daily working time for 2 months for the first birth, 4 months for the second birth, and 6 months for the following births, starting at the end of the maternity leave.</li> <li>• Can be claimed in adoption.</li> <li>• <u>In the private sector</u>: In the private sector: From the end of the maternity leave, 60 days for the first birth, 120 days for the second birth, and 180 days for subsequent births unpaid leave is given as half of the weekly working time.</li> <li>• <u>Breastfeeding leave</u>: A female civil servant is given 3 hours of breastfeeding leave a day for the first 6 months, and 1,5 hours a day for the second 6 months (in private sector 1,5 hours for the whole period), starting from the end of the postpartum maternity leave period to breastfeed her child. Regarding the hours and how many times a day the maternity leave will be used, the female officer's preference is fundamental. This period is counted as the daily working time.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Maternity/paternity leave covers employed workers and under certain conditions agricultural workers, domestic workers or caregivers, home workers or the unemployed whose employment contract has been suspended (<a href="#">Decree Law No 105, UG: 30/7/2022</a>):</li> <li>- Compulsory leave (<a href="#">INPS</a>) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For mothers 5 months (80 per cent wage)</li> <li>• For fathers 10 days (full wage)</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Optional &amp; supplementary leave <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• After the expiration of compulsory leave, the parent can request reduced paid leave for a total of 6 months until the child is three years old (or within three years of adoption).</li> <li>• In addition, provided that the relevant cash assistance does not exceed 2.5 times the minimum monthly pension established by law for the current year, this allowance can be requested for a maximum of 5 more months until the child reaches the age of 12.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Can be claimed in adoption</li> </ul>

	Care-friendly working environment regulations	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VERY LIMITED</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The obligation to open a day-care or kindergarten for children aged 0-6 in workplaces depend on employing more than 150 women (Regulation, RG:16.08.2013, 28737, 2013)</li> <li>- Female workers are allowed to breastfeed their children under the age of one for a total of more than 1.5 hours a day. The worker herself determines how this time will be used. This period is counted as the daily working time (İş Kanunu, 2003)</li> <li>- Regardless of their age and marital status, in workplaces with 100-150 female employees, it is obligatory to establish a breastfeeding room separate from the workplace and at a distance of maximum 250 meters from the workplace, for breastfeeding employees to breastfeed their children (Regulation, RG:16.08.2013, 28737, 2013).</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PARTIAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A new regulation was enacted in 2015, announcing that resignations are only legally valid if they are sent through the web portal of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (Decreto Legislativo n. 151, 2015) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Women in Italy were often asked to sign a blank letter of resignation (licenziamento in bianco) when starting a job</li> </ul> </li> <li>- In 2011, also a gender equality law (Legge n. 120, 2011) was enacted to ensure gender balance in the bodies of listed companies on the stock exchange</li> <li>- In 2021, a law enacted requires companies with more than 50 employees to submit a bi-annual report on the working conditions of men and women (Legge n. 162, 2021)</li> <li>- <a href="#">National Equality Committee (Comitato Nazionale Parità)</a>, under the Minister of Labour and Social Policies, implement the principles of equal treatment and equal opportunities between male and female workers (Decreto Legislativo n. 198, 2006)</li> <li>- Apart from these, there are Equal Opportunity Commissions at the local level which was transformed in 2010.</li> </ul>
	Specific regulations regarding directly UCW and caregivers	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VERY LIMITED</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The disabled and elderly mostly depends on families <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social services law regulates the <u>means-tested</u> limited support to care disabled dependents at home (Sosyal Hizmetler Kanunu, 1983, Ad. Article 7)</li> </ul> </li> <li>- One-fourth of the number of premium payment days is added to the total number of premium payment days for insured women who demand retirement or old-age pension and have a severely disabled child in need of continuous care, and these periods are also deducted from the retirement age limits (<a href="#">Law No 5510 RG: 16/6/2006</a>, Article 27).</li> <li>- Those who work in domestic services such as child, sick or elderly care, cleaning, or gardening, most of which are local or migrant women, are included in the scope of social security with this law (<a href="#">Law No 5510 RG: 16/6/2006</a>, Additional Article 9).</li> <li>- <a href="#">Home-Based Child Care Services Project</a> was implemented by the Social Security Institution (SGK) in the period 2015-2017 to promote registered employment of women by facilitating the</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PARTIAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Carer's allowance (<a href="#">Indennità di Accompagnamento</a>): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For 2021, the amount of the indemnity is 522.10 euros a month disbursed on request, in favour of mutilated or totally disabled for whom the impossibility of walking without the help of a companion or the inability to carry out the daily tasks of the life.</li> <li>• It covers <u>all citizens</u> with health needs who are permanently residing in Italy, regardless of their annual personal income and age.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Care leave is granted only to workers who have to care for <u>severely disabled relatives</u> (<a href="#">Law No 183, UG: 4/11/2010</a>). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the “single carer” principle, which means that only one worker in a household can meet the needs of a person with a severe disability. The caregiver is entitled to two different types of care leave:</li> <li>• 3 working days of paid leave per month</li> <li>• Up to 2 years paid leave for longer leave provisions to care for a severely disabled child or relative</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

		labour market integration of women with small children who are at risk of withdrawal from the labour market and supporting the formal work of women providing home-based childcare services.	- Italy also has regulated the criteria and methods for using the resources of the fund to support the role of care and assistance of family caregivers in 2021 ( <a href="#">Decree No: 22A02351 UG: 28/12/2021</a> )
Fiscal policies on UCW	<b>VERY LIMITED</b>		<b>PARTIAL</b>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <a href="#">2014-2018 10th Development Plan</a> “empowering women in all areas of social, economic and cultural life in the context of gender equality” was determined as the main target. In the <a href="#">11<sup>th</sup> Development Plan (2019-2023)</a> the determinations, evaluations, and policies regarding the development of the human rights of women, the social and economic empowerment of women, and the prevention of all kinds of violence against women are included under the title of ‘Women’ in the ‘Qualified Person, Strong Society’ section.</li> <li>- Since 2018, benefits provided by employers to female employees for nursery and day care services are exempt from tax, provided that they do not exceed 15% of the monthly gross amount of the minimum wage for each child (<a href="#">Law No 193, Article 23, Paragraph 16</a>).</li> <li>- Between 2018 and 2022, the Social Security Institution financed the social security premium employer shares of private sector employers employing women, up to the upper limit of earnings subject to premium, from the Unemployment Insurance Fund for a period of 24 to 54 months (see <a href="#">here</a>).</li> <li>- Minimum subsistence deduction (<a href="#">Law No 193 RG:6/11961</a>): 50% for the taxpayer, 10% for the spouse who does not work and has no income, 7.5% for each of the first two children and 5% for the other children.</li> <li>- After 2016 private kindergartens and day care centres are exempt from income and corporate tax for five taxation/accounting periods from the date of their operation (<a href="#">General Communiqué on Income Tax, Serial No: 295, RG:23/12/2016</a>).</li> <li>- However, there is no special provision for women in the <a href="#">2023 Budget Law</a>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- From January 2013 in terms of incentives for the hiring women, a reduction of 50% of the contributions paid by the employer has been envisaged (<a href="#">Law No:92, UG: 28/7/12, Art.4, Paragraph 11</a>)</li> <li>- (<a href="#">Interministerial Decree, 16/10/2020</a>): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• women of any age without a regularly paid job for at least 6 months and residing in regions eligible for funding from the EU structural funds</li> <li>• women of any age without a regularly paid job for at least 24 months, wherever resident.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- The <a href="#">2021 Budget Law</a> (art. 1, paragraphs 97-106), a fund was established at the Ministry of Economic Development to support women’s businesses aimed at promoting and supporting the start-ups and strengthening of women’s entrepreneurship.</li> <li>- With the <a href="#">2022 Budget Law</a> (art. 1, paragraph 137) recognised, on an experimental basis, the exemption of 50% from the payment of social security contributions of working mothers employed in the private sector, starting from date of return to work after taking compulsory maternity leave and for a maximum period of 1 year from the date of return. The calculation rate of pension benefits remains the same.</li> <li>- Family tax credits on individual income based on <a href="#">Assegno Unico Universale</a> since 2022.</li> <li>- The <a href="#">2023 Budget Law</a> (art. 57), using the experiment results of the 2021-2022 period, the exemption from contributions is increased to the extent of 100% up to the maximum amount of 6,000 euros per year. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• for the hiring of disadvantaged women and young people under 36 years of age.</li> <li>• Lastly, it extends to 31 December 2023 the deadline within which subjects aged up to 40 who register for agricultural welfare benefit from 100% tax relief for two years.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<b>SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE</b>	Gender Equal Discourse	<b>NO</b>		<b>NO</b>	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In Turkey and Italy, the discourse developed on the moral role of women in the family and society, and the sanctity of motherhood reinforces the homemaker role of women regardless of their socio-economic consequences.</li> <li>- Political discourse in these countries remains highly gendered considering the attitude of government on the issues such as abortion, motherhood, women’s participation in public sphere, and LGBTIQ+ rights. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• According to this, motherhood is sacred role and above anything else.</li> <li>• This biased right populist discourse is also excluding the LGBTIQ+.</li> <li>• Heterosexual families, and husbands in this families are privileged.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Involvement of the religious organisations in the gender equality issues also create a pressure on gender equality rights.</li> </ul>			
<b>SCORES</b>		<b>21/45</b>		<b>28/45</b>	
<b>LEGENDS</b>		<b>NO (0)</b>	<b>VERY LIMITED (1)</b>	<b>PARTIAL (2)</b>	<b>YES (3)</b>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There is no gender equal policy</li> <li>- Actions intensifies gendered stereotypes and status quo</li> <li>- Policies deliberately discriminates based on gender</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There are actions towards gender equality, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• but their impact remains very limited</li> <li>• they cover very short term or very few cases</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There are policies on gender equality, but they <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• do not aim to transform gender relations</li> <li>• do not apply at the national level</li> <li>• apply the citizen principle in terms of social policies</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There are policies on gender equality, and they are <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• aiming to transform gender relations</li> <li>• valid at national level</li> <li>• including more people in the system on the basis of residence.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



## 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

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This thesis has set out to bring together and develop the *four pathways* of Cantillon and Teasdale (2021), and *5Rs* (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020) to identify and analyse the structural factors around gendered unpaid care work and create a broader understanding that visualises the interactions for policy actions to transform care relations. This combination, which was presented under the *integrated analytical framework*, provided a novel *gendered unpaid care work index* focusing on the most common barriers to the transformation of gendered unpaid care work and the specific favouring factors in the context of cases. The underlying premise here is that gendered unpaid care work is formed by several external and internal factors around care, each of which may require different policy responses. Successful care policies must include a care-friendly and gender transformative labour market, socio-political structure, legal norms, and care system and are expected to be based on adequate strategies to target and tailor policy interventions to these barriers and individual circumstances.

In this context, the thesis has aimed to investigate the structural factors surrounding unpaid care work and provide a methodological contribution in light of the extensive feminist literature on gendered unpaid care work and the existing data to illustrate the current situation in cases. As explained in Chapter 2, the feminist literature has highlighted certain systematic elements to address the broader socioeconomic, cultural, political, and legal context in the formation and perpetuation of gendered unpaid care work. This thesis has gathered them under five categories as embedded elements in the macro-level context. These are: i) patriarchy and social reproduction, (ii) agency-oriented arguments and neoliberal approach, (iii) employment and economic gender inequality (iv) social care inequality and (v) intersectional gender inequalities.

In order to capture and analyse these embedded elements, this thesis employed the four pathways approach (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) as an analytical model. The fact that this model has already been devised with a specific focus on the EECA region, including Turkey, has made it an effective model for conducting comparative case studies. On the other hand, the empirical and theoretical data on Turkey and Italy required to broaden the focus of the model and its variable set to capture the patterns and deviations more effectively in these countries regarding gendered unpaid care work. In order to highlight this difference, along with broadening the focus of the model, titles of the *pathways* have been developed to include *paid*

*employment opportunities and labour market regulations; neoliberal and patriarchal socio-political normative structure; legal and institutional normative structure; and social care system and dynamics.* However, the philosophy of the model and the main focus of the *pathways* remained the same as in the original model. Although gendered unpaid care work is a much broader phenomenon than this thesis could cover, the *four pathways* approach (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) allowed moving beyond the current trend in existing literature and in policy-making that focus mostly on one dimension, mostly female labour force participation.

While *four pathways* represented the problematic areas, the thesis brought together the policy actions under the 5Rs- *recognition, reduction and redistribution* of the care work (Elson, 2017), *representation* and *reward* of care workers (Addati et al., 2018; Rost et al., 2020). Combining the *four pathways* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) with the 5Rs (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020), the present study developed the *integrated analytical framework*.

Using the *four-pathways* model (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021), two case studies were conducted in Turkey and Italy to test and represent the most critical barriers and potential remedies that characterise gendered unpaid care work. These countries have similar tendencies as well as distinctions in terms of gendered unpaid care work. First, they represent higher gender inequality rates than their peers and the EU average, and unpaid care work is intensely gendered. They are also similar in placing the family at the centre regarding welfare service provision and associating households with these services, which indicates a patriarchal understanding of welfare in these countries. However, especially after the 1980s, these two countries began to diverge in policies that prioritised social inclusion and reduction of inequalities, reflecting the influence of the EU and neoliberal structural adjustment policies under the influence of the IMF and WB. Nevertheless, gender equality policies remained very limited in these countries. They lag behind their peers, and there is a significant gap to close, especially in unpaid care work. Given this, the similarities and peculiarities of Turkey and Italy have provided a strong foundation for the comparative discussion of socio-economic, political, legal, and cultural structures forming gendered unpaid care work.

The results of the case studies have been analysed under three main sections. The first section has drawn a comparative discussion on *four pathways* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021), comparing the similar and distinctive factors in Turkey and Italy. The second section has conducted the same conclusive discussion for the 5Rs (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost

et al., 2020), emphasising the effective and insufficient elements for recognising unpaid care work and going beyond. The last section has brought together the results gathered under *four pathways* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) and *5Rs* (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020) to form the *integrated analytical framework*, and ultimately *gendered unpaid care work index* which focuses on highlighting the transformative policy actions regarding care work.

Using a case study approach and descriptive data from official statistical institutions, reports, strategic plans and other relevant documents and data sources, this thesis made practical use of existing feminist tools and approaches to originally point out possible dimensions that will reduce gender inequalities and transform care relationships. In other words, drawing upon the *four pathways* framework (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) and thus employing a macro-level country context model, this thesis aimed to understand and interpret persistent gender gaps in unpaid care work in country cases. The central importance of the factors discussed is that they are part of a more systematic structure in terms of their relationship to the labour market regulations, socio-normative, legal, and institutional structure, and social care infrastructure. The *four pathways* approach (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021), together with the *5Rs* (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020), provides a framework for capturing this systematic structure conceptually and at a theoretical level to support policy makers in the process of change. The remainder of the chapter sums up the key results of the thesis.

#### *Summary of Results on Four pathways*

Theoretical discussions in the literature and case studies in this thesis indicated that paid and unpaid working hours are critical in shaping opportunities, constraints, and time distribution. It is, therefore, crucial to consider gendered unpaid care work together with relevant factors to provide practical tools against its unfair consequences. From this perspective, many intersecting characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity and institutional structure and social norms determine the abundance or scarcity of time and thus socioeconomic conditions starting from the situation in the labour market.

While there has been a significant increase worldwide in female labour force participation over the past decade, the presence of women in the wage labour market has not translated into a directly proportional increase in men's household activities. As demonstrated by the available data, Turkey and Italy are no exception. Unpaid hours make up the majority of total working hours, and women's share of unpaid care work is higher in both countries.

That is, women in both countries work longer hours in total. Thus, unpaid care work is the first reason for not participating in the labour force in Turkey and the second in Italy. While more women proportionally in the labour force in Italy than in Turkey, they remain below the OECD average. On the other hand, *education* seems to impact women's labour force participation significantly. However, overall, women in both countries are less likely to be employed at all levels of education than men. Given that nearly half of the highly educated women in Turkey are unemployed, and employment rates for men in both countries are very high, even at very low levels of education, it becomes clear that gender roles do not resolve by education alone. Moreover, the burden of the responsibilities imposed on women by the role of *motherhood* increases with the insufficient, less accessible, and expensive childcare services. Given the absence of centre-based formal childcare in Turkey and Italy, mothers and grandparents play an important role in childcare in both countries. In this respect, the decreasing child population in Turkey and Italy reveals the inadequacy of social services that reduce and redistribute women's care burden. *Household structure and accumulated income* in this unit, on the other hand, affect women's labour force participation in two ways. First, it differs significantly in both countries, depending on their marital status and type of household, especially the presence of children. Second, tax credits or reductions based on dependent spouses and children incentivise women to stay at home. However, it does not affect men's labour force participation as much as that of women. Moreover, gender inequalities grow exponentially with *age*. This is due to the higher carrier cuts, lower earnings, and, therefore, lower retirement savings of women. Almost a quarter of women in Italy are in the lowest quintile of the retirement income distribution, and most women in Turkey are connected to the social security system through their partners, fathers, or sons. Despite new regulations to eliminate gender pay inequalities and unlawful resignation procedures, current government policies in both Turkey and Italy continue to assign parental responsibilities to women through policies such as gendered parental allowances. In addition, *informal work* is more common in both countries among women, the elderly, and the less educated population, especially in agriculture and carers.

On the other hand, *neoliberal and patriarchal understanding dominating the socio-political normative structure* also substantially impact the formation of gendered unpaid care work. Results in Turkey and Italy also confirm this. Their social and normative fabric are similar in their patriarchal tendencies attributing significant importance to the heterosexual family unit, women's role as mothers, and the continuity of ancestry. Thus, in these countries, women are confronted with the female identities determined for them in both the public and

private spheres. Within the current power relations, these norms expect the woman to protect the social order through her position in the family and primarily via the ‘mother identity’. In other words, the continuation of the generations and the continuation of the moral order mainly depend on the so-called functionality of women in society. Turkey and Italy are also very similar, especially in how conservative right-wing politicians and religious authorities articulate traditional gender roles and use public resources to build a society around these roles. In Turkey and Italy, gendered political discourse contributes to social division and the definition of ‘outsider’, which refers to the LGBTIQ+ community and ethnic and religious minorities. In practice, family-centred rhetoric in both countries shapes everyday life around gender stereotypes that largely attribute care to women. On the other hand, neoliberal tendencies in Italy and particularly in Turkey limit the state’s social role and increase the dependency on kinship and religious charity organisations.

*Legal and institutional normative structure* defining the care infrastructure and institutions also inevitably impacts gendered unpaid care work. Given the socioeconomic differences between households, it is clear that when social care provision is inadequate, women in relatively low-income families will face worse conditions in accessing care than those with the resources to access care from the private sector. From this perspective, care is essential to human survival and helps those receiving care to develop the skills to benefit themselves and others physically, emotionally, and intellectually throughout their lives. Within this network of social and institutional relationships, care includes direct care from one person to another, as well as personal care, the creation of specific prerequisites for providing care, and the management of care delivery through legal and institutional protection. On the other hand, in connection with neoliberal tendencies and patriarchal traditions, care is mainly carried out at home, unpaid, and by women in many parts of the world. Neoliberal patriarchal discourse and practice integrate care and femininity in a way that ultimately frees governments to a large extent from their obligation to provide care. This has often led to the suppression of rights at the legal level and the reinforcement of polarised binary gender relations over public policies, which includes the control of sexual and reproductive activities, positioning women inside the home through gendered family policies, and the transfer of wealth generally to men through gendered labour policies. In Turkey and Italy, being part of the EU in some way - one as a candidate, one as a member - is important in terms of setting legal boundaries. On the other hand, their unique historical backgrounds and socio-political gender norms have also limited the legal and institutional framework that regulates gender relations and, thus, social care.

Finally, as a product of all of these interactions, *social care systems and dynamics* shape the provision of care and its redistribution to the different social actors, including individuals, families, the state, and the private sector. Although Turkey and Italy represent similar neoliberal trends in this category, inequality in Turkey seems to be more profound. On the other hand, some progress has been made in this gap. Nevertheless, this change appears relatively slow, and state interventions have not improved significantly, especially in Turkey. In this context, redistributive tax policies and social protection expenditures are critical in redistributing political and economic power centralised in a particular class, social segment, or gender, thus establishing social justice. However, social spending remains relatively low in Italy and particularly in Turkey. Although the healthcare expenditures of these two countries are similar (slightly higher in Turkey), Italy allocates more to social spending than Turkey, especially in the categories of disability, unemployment, and social exclusion. On the other hand, old-age pensions account for nearly half of the total social protection expenditures in both Turkey and Italy. This is due to the higher proportion of older people in the overall population, which is increasing in both countries. It also increases the pressure on healthcare systems and long-term care needs in the recent future, given the limited capacity of the public health systems in Italy and the fragmented structure and coverage of healthcare services in Turkey. However, the most significant impact remains on women due to the family-centred social welfare understanding.

#### *Summary of Results on 5Rs*

*Recognising* the economic and social value of unpaid care work is vital to explain the burden adequately it creates on women and reducing and redistributing it. It requires public acknowledgement of the adverse effects of stereotypical gender roles in women's private and public lives at the national policy level and in decision-making processes. This process also includes developing a nationwide understanding of data processing and periodic measurement of unpaid care work through time-use surveys and other tools, and finally, monitoring and evaluating for a better understanding of unpaid work's social and economic impacts. In this context, public recognition of gendered unpaid care work remains partial in Turkey and Italy. First, although they measure unpaid time via time-use surveys at the national level, regular studies remain limited at the public level to understand the impact of gender stereotypes on public spending and policies on right-holders. In addition, the lack of intersectional data on unpaid care work hinders understanding the gendered structure on which it is located. With the effect of this deficiency, approaches that reinforce gender stereotypes rather than transform

them emerge in policy design, monitoring and evaluation processes. The main jeopardy in this is that the practical use of gendered roles at the public level as a policy tool will affect the direction of the political will and, thus, political outcomes. In this sense, Turkey and Italy's references to traditional gender relations and their practical use in the transition to the nation-state are similar. In addition, similar political discourse trends in Turkey and Italy seem to support and take action to preserve the traditional gender roles as the building blocks of societies. On the other hand, the increasing pressure of the feminist movement, especially after the 1980s, and the importance of women's rights in the international arena, led to some actions supporting gender equality. These include amendments in laws, new regulations against gender-based violence, and labour market regulations allowing- mostly women- to care for their dependents and the like. However, these regulations remain highly limited in eliminating gender discrimination, by excluding LGBTIQ+s, and assuming that care is a duty belong women.

Due to this biased assumption, policies for *reduction and redistribution* are insufficient to remove the socio-economical and emotional burden of care and define new responsibilities for this. Government policies remain ineffective or limited in Turkey and Italy in key areas such as education, employment, health, children and elderly care and social security. The fact that policies towards women and children position them more within the family and design policies around this network with a traditional understanding makes women and children more vulnerable, especially when their situations do not comply with the legally recognised relationship structure. On the other hand, recognising the responsibility of care, not the value of women's labour, hides the fact that households exploit women's labour, and public policies stimulate this. Most importantly, due to the lack of adequate childcare services, most women in Turkey and Italy tend to take on care responsibilities and stay out of the workforce, especially when they lack the support of their families. In this sense, the new social protection approach based on the feminisation and privatisation of social care redistributes unpaid labour to the household and the woman, yet not between the state and the household or between men and women.

Thus, inclusive *representation* remains a utopia even today due to the highly gendered and biased systematic structure surrounding caring relationships. Representation at decision-making and managerial levels is highly male dominated in both countries. In this sense, the representation of women not only as the bearers of the burden of unpaid care but also as individuals experiencing similar problems and differentiating according to intersecting factors

such as class, race, age, education, and income level is quite insufficient. The underrepresentation of women in political and civic decision-making mechanisms is in harmony with the social role attributed to them, mainly confined to the private sphere and rarely extends to the public sphere. This low visibility of women in the public sphere, which is processed through both public discourse and politics, causes them to lag behind men in education, labour force participation and, therefore, social rights. In this sense, male dominance in the public and production spheres represents a vicious circle in Turkey and Italy, and many other countries. While a more diverse gender representation is needed to design more effective policies that address gender relations, policymaking is monopolised by a single gender.

The political stance in the other four Rs thus self-proved that women are not *rewarded* for their care work and sometimes even their paid work. Contrary to the reliance on the care of families and, more particularly, on women, the current economic system utilises the unpaid care work, yet it does not recognise its value. Considering this, together with the precarious conditions of women both inside and outside the labour market, due to career cuts, fewer savings, and weak ties to social security rights, it is clear that this negligent system reinforces women's kinship dependence and does not fully support women's socio-economic empowerment. Yet instead, it encourages their return to the domestic sphere and reproductive roles based on patriarchal norms. The limited and gendered social care provision in Turkey and Italy can exemplify this.

#### *Implications for Policy and Future Research through Integrated Analytical Framework*

This thesis, gathering the outputs of the case studies regarding *four pathways* (Cantillon & Teasdale, 2021) and *5Rs* (Addati et al., 2018; Elson, 2017; Rost et al., 2020), produced fifteen policy areas to conclude with implications for policy and future research. In this context, each of these policy areas represents a main comparison category within the *gendered unpaid care work index*, which is the original contribution of this thesis. This index ranked the performance of Turkey and Italy. The results show that although Italy outperformed Turkey, both are ineffective in transforming care relationships, and there is a significant gap to be closed.

According to this, *institutional infrastructure for data collection and processing* is critical for quality, comprehensive and consistent gender-disaggregated data. Turkey and Italy have a statistical framework enabling them to gather gender-disaggregated data. Being a part of international gender equality platforms leads to the formation of mechanisms to measure



time-use and unpaid care work. However, the institutional transformation process takes longer in Turkey than in Italy, arising from regional peculiarities. On the other hand, while more transparent data collection tools are needed for participants, practitioners and users, ever-changing international standards and different classifications (such as OECD vs EU) distract attention from the social phenomenon itself. In addition, the political independence of the institutions is crucial for objective and transparent data production. The *national gender equality framework* is also crucial to recognise the unpaid care work burden, which is lacking in Turkey and Italy. This deficiency causes the implementation of short-term projects and experiment policies which are often abandoned in the next budget year. In the absence of national-level policies that distribute care activities between households and the state, the internalisation of gender roles is more likely.

In order to establish a national framework, there is a need for an *institution for setting, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating gender equality goals* funded by taxes but operating independently of governments. As in the case of Turkey and Italy, the direct or indirect affiliation of these institutions to the Ministry of Family causes the determination of gender equality rights according to the family unit while jeopardising the independence of women's rights. This situation carries the risk of prioritising radical binary gender relations, especially in the period of right governments. For this, the *national legal framework* on gender equality should establish robust, transparent, and clear laws and regulations to protect care rights, enabling different lifestyles. *Protection against gender-based violence* also constitutes a crucial component of this process, which remains very limited in Italy, particularly Turkey. Femicides and especially intimate partner violence rates are very high in Turkey compared to Italy. Also, the local legal system's functioning seems insufficient to end male violence here. Therefore, laws should be revised to be clear and protective for women and LGBTIQ+. There is also a need for a change in trials that victimises perpetrators and provides time off based on 'moral reasons' and their 'good behaviour'. This approach sustains the understanding of protecting the family, not the woman. Thus, for transforming gender relations, there is an apparent need for political language, and actions need to be transformed by adopting a more inclusive human rights approach.

On the other hand, access to *universal health services*, which constitute broad social welfare rights with *education* and *social protection*, is crucial for redistributing the burden on women. This is particularly important in countries like Turkey and Italy, where care is mainly based on families. The family-based social policy provision dramatically restricts access to

quality health services, especially for low-income families and those without paid jobs. Considering that most health workers are women and women fill the gap when health services are inadequate, the inconsistencies in the system affect women the most, both as service providers and service recipients. In addition, effective and fair education policies are also needed in both countries, especially in Turkey, to eliminate poverty and inequalities and ensure sustainable development. Recognising that education is one of the most powerful tools to lift marginalised children and adults out of poverty requires the right to quality education to be designed as a sustainable investment and regarded as a human right. However, as in Turkey and Italy, any effort to transform gender relations will be incomplete unless there is a more straightforward, longer and more inclusive social protection which is not policy based on traditional family-oriented understandings but employs a gender transformative lens. On the contrary, they will intensify inequalities, including gender disparities.

There is also an evident need for quality and inclusive *universal childcare* to increase women's participation in the paid workforce and close the gender income and pension gap. Universal education right complements childcare which must begin with parental leaves and allowances during pregnancy. These policies, combined with the lack of provision for *gender-equal parental leaves*, constitute a significant barrier against women's labour force participation. They are essential tools for both promoting gender equality and realising the right to care. The critical importance of these policies stems from their simultaneous impact on outcomes in many areas, such as child and parent health and well-being, increasing the youth population, supporting women's labour market participation, and reducing gender pay gaps. However, the transfer of care from the state to the family, which is more pronounced in Turkey but also prevails in Italy, through minimal and gendered parental leave arrangements, very limited centre-based childcare services and very restricted child allowances, adds to women's caring responsibilities. On the other hand, the reluctance of increasingly neoliberal-oriented governments to provide this official support also shows that they ignore the contribution of care investments to growth.

In this context, gender differences in paid employment opportunities, starting with access to education, childcare and health services, accumulate to the detriment of women of older ages. Thus, a *universal old age pension system* may be an effective policy tool to eliminate the gender gap in this period. Considering also women spend more extended periods of their older ages as survivors and tend to live longer compared to men, providing adequate funds that will not only support women but also transform social practice around gender

relations is crucial. Some countries apply special conditions (reducing the retirement age or the number of premium days, as in Turkey and Italy) for women to facilitate their retirement. Indeed, the lower and gradually decreasing gender pension gap in Turkey suggests that more comprehensive supportive pension arrangements are more effective than those in Italy and the EU. However, governments tend to increase the retirement ages according to life expectancy, also in Turkey and Italy. Thus, even more women will enjoy retirement benefits, achieving gender parity in pensions will remain a challenge.

On the other hand, *care-friendly working environment regulations* stimulate gender-transformative working conditions that will reorganise gender relations in the context of care right. However, they remain limited in Italy and especially in Turkey. In addition, if these practices are not carefully designed, as in Turkey, they can sometimes act in the opposite direction and harm gender equality. For example, the obligation to open a nursery causes companies to limit the number of female employees in practice. In this context, working conditions policies would enable parents to balance working hours with family responsibilities and facilitate women's greater participation in employment. Combining these regulations with the *specific regulations regarding directly unpaid care work and caregivers* will promote a more equitable sharing of unpaid care work between men and women, households, and the government. These regulations are also crucial to raise awareness of gender stereotypes as one of the most important reasons for women's unemployment. Given the fragmented care arrangements in Turkey, home care regulations and limited financial support entrust care to women rather than emancipating them. Nevertheless, both countries have regulated the inclusion of domestic workers in the social security system. In Italy, particularly, providing a carer's allowance based on residence provides more inclusive protection.

The critical factor for realising all these policies is the political will and determination, which also shapes *fiscal policies on unpaid care work*, including public funds and tax incentives that promote gender equality and transformation. The very limited role of the state in social expenditures limits the positive effects of the political reactions in Turkey and Italy. On the other hand, the lack of *gender-equal discourse* continues to polarise according to gender and impact the allocation and reallocation of money, resources, and power through government policies. Given the growing influence of religious institutions on politics in Turkey and Italy, addressing gender relations from a more traditionalist perspective is inevitable. In both countries, the discourse developed on the moral role of women in the family and society, and the sanctity of motherhood reinforces the homemaker role of women regardless of their socio-

economic consequences. Thus, it is crucial to raise awareness of the devastating socio-economic implications of the reliance on women's traditional gender roles that keep them isolated in the private sphere. In this, feminist activism and politics are essential.

To sum up, gendered unpaid care work is an outcome of complex and highly intertwined structures. With an *integrated analytical framework* and *gendered unpaid care work index*, this thesis has provided an alternative feminist perspective to understand and interpret these structures in Turkey and Italy. The results show that there is a clear need for comprehensive and internationally comparable but also locally adaptable policy guidelines that will enable longer-term national policies rather than funds for short-term projects. In this sense, each of the dimensions in the index presents an opportunity to transform gender relations and thus care relations, given the relevant structures discussed above. On the other hand, to explore the complex relations in question deeply and to reveal favouring and obstructing factors of the gender transformative policy process, there is a need for future research that provides new perspectives with more detailed and inclusive data and comparisons of different cases. Therefore, future data and analyses should provide not only information about polarised genders and heterosexual relations but also about same-sex couples and people from different backgrounds and socioeconomic circumstances. In this sense, the *integrated* approach and the *index* provide a basis for future comparisons between high-ranking countries in gender equality and other countries to highlight critical factors in a care-friendly environment and gender-transformative policies.

# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX-A: Glossary of Data

Variable Name	Definition	Data Source
Work	i) Own use production work, ii) Employment work, iii) Unpaid trainee work, iv) Volunteer work, v) Other work activities.	International Labour Organization (2013); United Nations Statistics (2017)
Gendered unpaid care work	Caring for people without monetary reward, often performed by women.	Istat TUS 2014, Turkstat TUS 2015
Labour force	Includes all persons employed either for wage or profit for at least one hour per week or those who have a job but are temporarily out of work due to illness, leave or industry action and people who are unemployed but actively looking for work and are currently eligible to start a job.	<a href="#">OECD</a>
Education expenditure by financial source	How much financial resources are devoted to education, by source of funds, type of transaction and education level and programme.	<a href="#">OECD Stat</a>
Public expenditure by level of education	Expenditure on education, expenditure of/on educational institutions and on enrolments	<a href="#">Eurostat, Education Expenditure Statistics</a>
Total education expenditure per student	Total expenditure on educational institutions per full-time equivalent student relative to GDP per capita	<a href="#">OECD Stat, Education Expenditure Statistics</a>
Net enrolment rates by level of education	The number of students of a theoretical age group enrolled in a specific level of education by the population in that age group	<a href="#">UNESCO</a>
Gross enrolment rates by level of education	The number of students enrolled in primary education regardless of age by the population of the age group which officially corresponds to primary education and multiplying by 100.	<a href="#">UNESCO</a>
Out of school rates	Out-of-school rates in population of lower secondary school age and in population of upper secondary school age	<a href="#">Eurostat</a>
Early leavers	The percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 having attained at lower secondary education and not being involved in further education or training.	<a href="#">Eurostat</a>
Employment rates by gender and educational attainment	Persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods and provide services for pay or profit in the relevant educational attainment level	<a href="#">OECD Stat, Education and Training Statistics</a>
Employment by sector and gender	Persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods and provide services for pay or profit in the relevant sector.	<a href="#">World Bank, Labour Force Statistics</a>
Ratio of child population aged 0-17	Percentage of 0-17 age group in total population	<a href="#">UN, Population Projections</a>
Births by mother's age group	Specific fertility rates by age and birth order at regional level. The age distribution of fertility data by mother's birth year refers to the complete cohorts.	<a href="#">Istat Population Statistics</a> ; (Turk Stat, 2022c)
Labour force participation by household types	The labour force is the sum of all persons of working age who are employed and those who are unemployed.	<a href="#">ILO</a>
Old age pension holders by gender	The number person receiving retirement income broken down by gender	<a href="#">Istat, Social Security and Welfare Statistics; Turk Stat, Social Protection Statistics, 2020</a>
Gender gap in pension income	The average benefits of female pensioners compared to average benefits received by males	<a href="#">OECD</a>

Informal work	Persons who are not registered to social security institution due to main job	<a href="#">Istat; Turk Stat, Labour Statistics, 2021</a>
Gini coefficient	Value in the interval of 0-1; where '0' denotes perfect equality while '1' denotes maximum inequality	<a href="#">OECD Stat</a>
Disposable income	Income which is available to households such as wages and salaries, income from self-employment and unincorporated enterprises, income from pensions and other social benefits, and income from financial investments	<a href="#">OECD Stat</a>
Poverty rates	The share of people with an equivalised disposable income (before and after social transfers) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold	<a href="#">OECD Stat</a>
Direct tax	Taxes on income by public authorities at regular intervals, except social contributions, on income from employment, property, capital gains or any other source. Real estate and land taxes are included if they are merely an administrative procedure for the assessment and collection of income tax.	<a href="#">OECD Stat</a>
Indirect tax	VAT and other deductible taxes directly linked to turnover which are excluded from turnover; taxes and duties linked to products; and taxes and duties linked to production.	<a href="#">OECD Stat</a>
Wealth tax	Tax which is applied sporadically or periodically on a person's wealth (net wealth taxes), and those applied on a transfer of wealth (transfer taxes)	<a href="#">Ministry of Treasure and Finance; OECD Stat</a>
Government expenditure by function (cofog)	Total general government expenditure is classified by functions (COFOG) and broken down by types of expenditure	<a href="#">Euro Stat; Ministry of Treasury and Finance</a>
Out-of-pocket household health expenditure	Direct payment for healthcare goods and services from the household primary income or savings	<a href="#">World Bank Health Expenditure Statistics; Turk Stat</a>

*APPENDIX-B: Activity coding list of Harmonised European Time-Use Surveys, 2018*

PERSONAL CARE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SLEEPING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Sleeping</li> <li>○ Sick in bed</li> </ul> </li> <li>• EATING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Eating</li> </ul> </li> <li>• OTHER PERSONAL CARE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Washing and dressing</li> <li>○ Personal care services</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified personal care</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
EMPLOYMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MAIN JOB AND SECOND JOB <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Working time in main and second job (including short breaks and travel at work)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EMPLOYMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Lunch break in main and second jobs</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified activities related to employment</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
STUDY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SCHOOL OR UNIVERSITY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Classes and lectures</li> <li>○ Homework</li> <li>○ Internship</li> <li>○ Breaks at school/ university</li> <li>○ Extracurricular classes</li> <li>○ Other/ unspecified activities related to study</li> </ul> </li> <li>• FREE TIME STUDY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Free time study</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CARE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNSPECIFIED HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CARE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Unspecified household and family care</li> </ul> </li> <li>• FOOD MANAGEMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Food preparation and baking</li> <li>○ Dish washing</li> <li>○ Storing, arranging, preserving food stocks</li> </ul> </li> <li>• HOUSEHOLD UPKEEP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Cleaning dwelling</li> <li>○ Cleaning garden</li> <li>○ Heating dwelling and water</li> <li>○ Arranging household goods and materials</li> <li>○ Recycling and disposal of waste</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified household upkeep</li> </ul> </li> <li>• CARE FOR TEXTILES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Laundry</li> <li>○ Ironing</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified textile care</li> </ul> </li> <li>• GARDENING AND PET CARE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Gardening</li> <li>○ Tending domestic animals</li> <li>○ Caring for pets</li> <li>○ Walking the dog</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified gardening and pet care</li> </ul> </li> <li>• CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIRS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ House construction and renovation</li> <li>○ Repairs to dwelling</li> <li>○ Making, repairing and maintaining equipment</li> <li>○ Vehicle maintenance</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified construction and repairs</li> </ul> </li> <li>• SHOPPING AND SERVICES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Shopping (including online/ e-shopping)</li> <li>○ Commercial and administrative services</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified shopping and services</li> </ul> </li> <li>• HOUSEHOLD MANAGEMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Household management</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CHILDCARE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Physical care and supervision of child</li> <li>○ Teaching the child</li> <li>○ Reading, playing and talking with child</li> <li>○ Accompanying child</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified childcare</li> </ul> </li> <li>• HELP TO AN ADULT HOUSEHOLD MEMBER <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Physical care of an adult household member</li> <li>○ Other support to an adult household member</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
VOLUNTARY WORK AND MEETINGS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ORGANISATIONAL WORK <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Organisational work (work for or through an organisation)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• INFORMAL HELP TO OTHER HOUSEHOLDS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Construction and repairs as help</li> <li>○ Help in employment and farming</li> <li>○ Care of own children living in another household</li> <li>○ Childcare as help to another household</li> <li>○ Help to an adult person of another household</li> <li>○ Other/ unspecified informal help to another household</li> </ul> </li> <li>• PARTICIPATORY AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Meetings</li> <li>○ Religious activities</li> <li>○ Visits to cemetery and grave care</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified participatory activities</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
SOCIAL LIFE AND ENTERTAINMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SOCIAL LIFE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Socialising with family</li> <li>○ Visiting and receiving visitors</li> <li>○ Celebrations</li> <li>○ Audio and video conversation</li> <li>○ Communication by text messaging (SMS, instant messages, email, etc.)</li> <li>○ Time spent on social media</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified social life</li> </ul> </li> <li>• ENTERTAINMENT AND CULTURE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Cinema</li> <li>○ Theatre and concerts</li> <li>○ Art exhibitions and museums</li> <li>○ Library</li> <li>○ Attending live sports events</li> <li>○ Zoos, botanical gardens, natural reserves, etc.</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified entertainment and culture</li> </ul> </li> <li>• RESTING — TIME OUT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Resting — Time out</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
SPORTS AND OUTDOOR ACTIVITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PHYSICAL EXERCISE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Walking and hiking</li> <li>○ Jogging and running</li> <li>○ Cycling, skiing and skating</li> <li>○ Ball games</li> <li>○ Gymnastics and fitness</li> <li>○ Water sports</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified sports or outdoor activities</li> </ul> </li> <li>• PRODUCTIVE EXERCISE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Productive exercise (e.g. hunting, fishing, picking berries, mushrooms or herbs)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• SPORTS RELATED ACTIVITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Sports related activities</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
HOBBIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ARTS AND HOBBIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Arts (visual, performing, literary)</li> <li>○ Collecting 713 Making handicraft products</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified hobbies</li> </ul> </li> <li>• COMPUTING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Computing</li> <li>○ Information search using internet</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified computing</li> </ul> </li> <li>• GAMES</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Solo games and play, gambling</li> <li>○ Parlour games and play 733 Computer games</li> <li>○ Console games (on home console)</li> <li>○ Mobile games (on handheld device/ smartphone)</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified games</li> </ul>
MASS MEDIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• READING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Reading periodicals</li> <li>○ Reading books</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified reading</li> </ul> </li> <li>• TV, VIDEO AND DVD <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Watching TV, video or DVD</li> </ul> </li> <li>• RADIO AND RECORDINGS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Listening to radio or recordings</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
TRAVEL AND UNSPECIFIED TIME USE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TRAVEL BY PURPOSE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Travel to/ from work</li> <li>○ Travel related to study</li> <li>○ Travel related to shopping and services</li> <li>○ Travel related to childcare</li> <li>○ Travel related to other household care</li> <li>○ Travel related to voluntary work and meetings</li> <li>○ Travel related to social life</li> <li>○ Travel related to other leisure</li> <li>○ Travel related to changing locality</li> <li>○ Other or unspecified travel purpose</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Source: (Eurostat, 2019)

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