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EnglishThis paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a ”first mover advantage”. We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response noncooper- atively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic complements. We apply this result to Cournot and Bertrand games and to public goods economies.
| Titolo: | A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities |
| Autori: | |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2003 |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a ”first mover advantage”. We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response noncooper- atively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic complements. We apply this result to Cournot and Bertrand games and to public goods economies. |
| Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11576/1889397 |
| ISBN: | 9783540002673 |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 2.1 Contributo in Volume (Articolo su libro) |
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