The No Miracle Argument and Strong Predictivism vs. Barnes

Strong predictivism, the idea that novel predictions per se confirm theories more than accommodations, is based on a “no miracle” argument from novel predictions to the truth of theories (NMAT). Eric Barnes rejects both: he reconstructs the NMAT as seeking an explanation for the entailment relation between a theory and its novel consequences, and argues that it involves a fallacious application of Occam’s razor. However, he accepts a no miracle ar-gument for the truth of background beliefs (NMABB): scientists en-dorsed a successful theory because they were guided by largely true background beliefs. This in turn raises the probability that the theory is true; so Barnes embraces a form of weak predictivism, according to which predictions are only indirectly relevant to confirmation. To Barnes I reply that we should also explain how the successful theory constructed, not just endorsed; background beliefs are not enough to explain success, scientific method must also be consid-ered; Barnes can account for some measure of confirmation of our theories, but not for the practical certainty conferred to them by some astonishing predictions; true background beliefs and reliability by themselves cannot explain novel success, the truth of theories is also required. Hence, the NMAT is sound, and strong predictivism is right. In fact, Barnes misinterprets the NMAT, which does not in-volve Occam’s razor, takes as explanandum the building of a theory which turned out to predict surprising facts, and successfully con-cludes that the theory is true. This accounts for the practically certain confirmation of our most successful theories, in accordance with strong predictivism.