The correspondence between Alexius Meinong and Kazimierz Twardowski highlights the relationship between two philosophers who influenced the history of philosophy and psychology in Austria and Poland. In their epistolary exchanges they discussed, among other things, their epistemological approach and the university politics of their times. The extensive introduction, “Meinong und Twardowski – Orte und Worte” places the correspondence in its proper historical and philosophical context. The main themes that are discussed are the distinction between act, content and object and the theory of judgment. Twardowski elaborates the aforementioned distinction within the conceptual framework of Brentano's descriptive psychology, and, in doing so, he introduces important innovations. He always distinguishes a (mental) content and a (mind-independent) object for representations; in his formulation non-existent objects are made to correspond with the so-called "objectless representations". Furthermore, he applies the same distinction to judgments: in the case of existential judgments, their content is the existence of the object, while in the case of judgments about a relation, he identifies it with the subsistence of the relation. Reflection on judgments about a relation leads him to take the first step towards postulating a specific object of judgments, the state of affairs. As his contemporaries also recognized, Twardowski promoted a realist metaphysics as opposed to an idealist or transcendental or neo-Kantian one. This conception shows affinities with Meinong's object theory, just as the paths of the two philosophers with regard to the theory of judgment are similar. Meinong too will come to hypothesize a specific object of the judgments, which he calls "objective", starting from the reflection on the judgments about a relation, a class of judgments left out by Brentano and his followers. As for the distinction of content and object, albeit with differences, Meinong shares Twardowski's arguments and likewise accepts non-existent objects. However, his research on the content and object of the judgment is not just a continuation of Twardowski's. Meinong was dissatisfied with Twardowski's conception of the content of judgment. Unlike the latter, he distinguishes between logical content and psychological content; moreover, he highlights the difficulties of distinguishing, from a psychological point of view, uniform elements such as the content of the judgment and the act of a judgment. Through various arguments, which call into question his complex theory of presentation (Präsentation), Meinong shows that content and act of a judgment are distinguishable, although inseparable. The volume is rounded off with the editor's notes and a critical apparatus.

Der Briefwechsel

Raspa, Venanzio
2016-01-01

Abstract

The correspondence between Alexius Meinong and Kazimierz Twardowski highlights the relationship between two philosophers who influenced the history of philosophy and psychology in Austria and Poland. In their epistolary exchanges they discussed, among other things, their epistemological approach and the university politics of their times. The extensive introduction, “Meinong und Twardowski – Orte und Worte” places the correspondence in its proper historical and philosophical context. The main themes that are discussed are the distinction between act, content and object and the theory of judgment. Twardowski elaborates the aforementioned distinction within the conceptual framework of Brentano's descriptive psychology, and, in doing so, he introduces important innovations. He always distinguishes a (mental) content and a (mind-independent) object for representations; in his formulation non-existent objects are made to correspond with the so-called "objectless representations". Furthermore, he applies the same distinction to judgments: in the case of existential judgments, their content is the existence of the object, while in the case of judgments about a relation, he identifies it with the subsistence of the relation. Reflection on judgments about a relation leads him to take the first step towards postulating a specific object of judgments, the state of affairs. As his contemporaries also recognized, Twardowski promoted a realist metaphysics as opposed to an idealist or transcendental or neo-Kantian one. This conception shows affinities with Meinong's object theory, just as the paths of the two philosophers with regard to the theory of judgment are similar. Meinong too will come to hypothesize a specific object of the judgments, which he calls "objective", starting from the reflection on the judgments about a relation, a class of judgments left out by Brentano and his followers. As for the distinction of content and object, albeit with differences, Meinong shares Twardowski's arguments and likewise accepts non-existent objects. However, his research on the content and object of the judgment is not just a continuation of Twardowski's. Meinong was dissatisfied with Twardowski's conception of the content of judgment. Unlike the latter, he distinguishes between logical content and psychological content; moreover, he highlights the difficulties of distinguishing, from a psychological point of view, uniform elements such as the content of the judgment and the act of a judgment. Through various arguments, which call into question his complex theory of presentation (Präsentation), Meinong shows that content and act of a judgment are distinguishable, although inseparable. The volume is rounded off with the editor's notes and a critical apparatus.
978-3-11-046293-7
978-3-11-046382-8
978-3-11-046306-4
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11576/2639428
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