We analyze the main dynamical properties of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ℰ) for asymmetric two-population games of finite size and its corresponding replicator dynamics. We introduce a definition of ℰ for two-population asymmetric games and a method of symmetrizing such an asymmetric game. We show that every strategy profile of the asymmetric game corresponds to a strategy in the symmetric game, and that every Nash equilibrium (ℰ) of the asymmetric game corresponds to a (symmetric) ℰ of the symmetric version game. We study the (standard) replicator dynamics for the asymmetric game and we define the corresponding (non-standard) dynamics of the symmetric game. We claim that the relationship between ℰ, ℰ and the stationary states () of the dynamical system for the asymmetric game can be studied by analyzing the dynamics of the symmetric game.
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Replicator Dynamics in Asymmetric Two-Population Games
Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez
2011
Abstract
We analyze the main dynamical properties of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ℰ) for asymmetric two-population games of finite size and its corresponding replicator dynamics. We introduce a definition of ℰ for two-population asymmetric games and a method of symmetrizing such an asymmetric game. We show that every strategy profile of the asymmetric game corresponds to a strategy in the symmetric game, and that every Nash equilibrium (ℰ) of the asymmetric game corresponds to a (symmetric) ℰ of the symmetric version game. We study the (standard) replicator dynamics for the asymmetric game and we define the corresponding (non-standard) dynamics of the symmetric game. We claim that the relationship between ℰ, ℰ and the stationary states () of the dynamical system for the asymmetric game can be studied by analyzing the dynamics of the symmetric game.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
