The article discusses and evaluates Meinong’s assumptions as a kind of mental phenomena intermediate between representations and judgments. Assumptions are affirmative or negative but lack conviction. After an exposition of Meinong’s arguments in support of his thesis, the criticisms of Bertrand Russell and Anton Marty are analyzed. The former gives a positive assessment of assumptions which he interprets as presentations of judgments. According to Marty, assumptions are either representations (particularly representations of contents of judgments) or judgments; he also refutes all of Meinong’s arguments. Finally, a brief survey of subsequent theoretical developments in this controversy is offered.
Assumptions: Meinong and the Criticisms of Russell and Marty
Raspa, Venanzio
2025
Abstract
The article discusses and evaluates Meinong’s assumptions as a kind of mental phenomena intermediate between representations and judgments. Assumptions are affirmative or negative but lack conviction. After an exposition of Meinong’s arguments in support of his thesis, the criticisms of Bertrand Russell and Anton Marty are analyzed. The former gives a positive assessment of assumptions which he interprets as presentations of judgments. According to Marty, assumptions are either representations (particularly representations of contents of judgments) or judgments; he also refutes all of Meinong’s arguments. Finally, a brief survey of subsequent theoretical developments in this controversy is offered.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
