We advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilistic protocols. Our approach relies on a formalisation of the protocol in the setting of a probabilistic process algebra and a notion of process similarity based on weak probabilistic bisimulation. We illustrate this approach by presenting the analysis of a probabilistic nonrepudiation protocol which allows us to quantitatively estimate its fairness degree.
On Quantitative Analysis of Probabilistic Protocols
ALDINI, ALESSANDRO;
2004
Abstract
We advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilistic protocols. Our approach relies on a formalisation of the protocol in the setting of a probabilistic process algebra and a notion of process similarity based on weak probabilistic bisimulation. We illustrate this approach by presenting the analysis of a probabilistic nonrepudiation protocol which allows us to quantitatively estimate its fairness degree.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
