Focusing mainly on Meinong’s “Über emotionale Präsentation” and Veber’s “Die Natur des Sollens”, I examine their respective conceptions of ought. Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought, he deals with it as a part of his value theory. In “Über emotionale Präsentation” the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. Th e ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is the realm of possibility. In Die Natur des Sollens, Veber proposes a structured theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. I conclude by portraying the differences between Veber’s and Meinong’s conceptions of the ought.
Ali je najstvo predmet? Meinongov in Vebrov odgovor
RASPA, VENANZIO
2011
Abstract
Focusing mainly on Meinong’s “Über emotionale Präsentation” and Veber’s “Die Natur des Sollens”, I examine their respective conceptions of ought. Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought, he deals with it as a part of his value theory. In “Über emotionale Präsentation” the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. Th e ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is the realm of possibility. In Die Natur des Sollens, Veber proposes a structured theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. I conclude by portraying the differences between Veber’s and Meinong’s conceptions of the ought.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
