The paper examines Meinong’s and Veber’s conceptions of ‘ought’. Meinong’s theory of ought is a part of his value theory. In Über emotionale Präsentation the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is the realm of possibility. In Die Natur des Sollens, Veber proposes a theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. Finally, the differences between Veber’s and Meinong’s conceptions of the ought are portrayed.

Sollen: il dover essere è un oggetto? Le risposte di Meinong e Veber

RASPA, VENANZIO
2012-01-01

Abstract

The paper examines Meinong’s and Veber’s conceptions of ‘ought’. Meinong’s theory of ought is a part of his value theory. In Über emotionale Präsentation the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is the realm of possibility. In Die Natur des Sollens, Veber proposes a theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. Finally, the differences between Veber’s and Meinong’s conceptions of the ought are portrayed.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11576/2514980
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