The paper examines Meinong’s and Veber’s conceptions of ‘ought’. Meinong’s theory of ought is a part of his value theory. In Über emotionale Präsentation the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is the realm of possibility. In Die Natur des Sollens, Veber proposes a theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. Finally, the differences between Veber’s and Meinong’s conceptions of the ought are portrayed.
Sollen: il dover essere è un oggetto? Le risposte di Meinong e Veber
RASPA, VENANZIO
2012
Abstract
The paper examines Meinong’s and Veber’s conceptions of ‘ought’. Meinong’s theory of ought is a part of his value theory. In Über emotionale Präsentation the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is the realm of possibility. In Die Natur des Sollens, Veber proposes a theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. Finally, the differences between Veber’s and Meinong’s conceptions of the ought are portrayed.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
