The success of user-centric networks depends on the willingness of the participants to cooperate by sharing resources and services. Reputation-based incentives and remuneration (based either on fiat money or on virtual currency) have emerged as two complementary incentive mechanisms to increase users’ motivation and to discourage selfish behaviors. In this paper, we conduct a formal study of the benefits of the joint application of these two mechanisms in the context of a cooperation model recently proposed for user-centric wireless networks. To this purpose, several performance properties of cooperation incentives mechanisms are defined and analyzed through model checking of probabilistic systems with an underlying Markov process semantics.
Model Checking of Trust-Based User-Centric Cooperative Networks
ALDINI, ALESSANDRO;BOGLIOLO, ALESSANDRO
2012
Abstract
The success of user-centric networks depends on the willingness of the participants to cooperate by sharing resources and services. Reputation-based incentives and remuneration (based either on fiat money or on virtual currency) have emerged as two complementary incentive mechanisms to increase users’ motivation and to discourage selfish behaviors. In this paper, we conduct a formal study of the benefits of the joint application of these two mechanisms in the context of a cooperation model recently proposed for user-centric wireless networks. To this purpose, several performance properties of cooperation incentives mechanisms are defined and analyzed through model checking of probabilistic systems with an underlying Markov process semantics.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
