The efficacy and efficiency of cooperation incentives in user-centric networks is a challenging issue that involves tradeoff among trust, social, and economic aspects. Two well-established approaches to stimulate resource sharing and cooperation rely on reputation and remuneration, the complementary functioning of which shall increase users' motivation and discourage mistrust and selfishness. In order to verify the benefits of the joint application of these mechanisms, we specify and analyze formally a recently proposed cooperation model by employing tool-supported probabilistic model checking techniques.

Formal Approach to Design and Automatic Verification of Cooperation-Based Networks

ALDINI, ALESSANDRO
2013

Abstract

The efficacy and efficiency of cooperation incentives in user-centric networks is a challenging issue that involves tradeoff among trust, social, and economic aspects. Two well-established approaches to stimulate resource sharing and cooperation rely on reputation and remuneration, the complementary functioning of which shall increase users' motivation and discourage mistrust and selfishness. In order to verify the benefits of the joint application of these mechanisms, we specify and analyze formally a recently proposed cooperation model by employing tool-supported probabilistic model checking techniques.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11576/2568581
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