Apparently, neither the appeal to approximate truth nor to novel predictions can rescue the “no miracle” argument from Laudan’s criticisms. For Lyons (2002) there are historical counterexamples even to the weaker “deployment” realism: novel predictions supposedly derived from false claims. But if so, those successes would seem unexplainable, even by Lyons’ “modest surrealism.” In fact, I argue, some of those predictions were an easy guess, or probable in the light of available evidence, and others were not essentially derived from false claims. Hence, a claim can be assumed to be true if it is actually crucial in deriving an improbable novel prediction.
Defending Deployment Realism Against Alleged Counterexamples
ALAI, MARIO
2014
Abstract
Apparently, neither the appeal to approximate truth nor to novel predictions can rescue the “no miracle” argument from Laudan’s criticisms. For Lyons (2002) there are historical counterexamples even to the weaker “deployment” realism: novel predictions supposedly derived from false claims. But if so, those successes would seem unexplainable, even by Lyons’ “modest surrealism.” In fact, I argue, some of those predictions were an easy guess, or probable in the light of available evidence, and others were not essentially derived from false claims. Hence, a claim can be assumed to be true if it is actually crucial in deriving an improbable novel prediction.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
