Technology transfer with search intensity and project advertising

In this paper we present a model where technology transfer is embedded into a competitive model of utility and prot maximization and is the result of a matching process between heterogeneous Knowledge Transfer Oces (KTOs) and innovative rms. Our model improves on previous literature by endogenizing the process that drives the dynamics of university researchers in search and rm vacant projects. We are able to show that the KTOs' reservation fee rate must be greater than the ratio between the marginal researcher cost and the marginal utility of matched projects, and that technology transfer strictly depends on the eciency units of searching researchers and vacant projects. Further, we show that rm technological progress might be too low when KTOs too much intensively search for project matches. This occurs because both sides of the market ignore the externalities of their decisions. Finally, behavioral complementarity, substitutability, and free riding are all potential equilibrium outcomes.