One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior. Highlights ► We develop an evolutionary dynamics to study corrupt behavior. ► There exists a threshold from which agents prefer to follow a non-corrupt behavior. ► A key variable is the reviewing rate of imitation for the choices of behavior.

Corruption driven by imitative behavior

Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez
2012

Abstract

One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior. Highlights ► We develop an evolutionary dynamics to study corrupt behavior. ► There exists a threshold from which agents prefer to follow a non-corrupt behavior. ► A key variable is the reviewing rate of imitation for the choices of behavior.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11576/2657385
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