Lügen wir, wenn wir höflich sind? Eine pragmatische Annäherung an Lüge und Aufrichtigkeit

This study faces the question of whether politeness is to be considered a form of lie. The idea of associating polite behaviour with a lack of sincerity is suggested by a common-sense-view as well as by literature (e.g. Goethe). The text discusses this common-sense-view and attempts to underpin it through an analysis of the use of the words politeness and lie in German. It then focuses on a scientific approach to the problem by questioning what it means as regards pragmatics and the theory of communication if the condition of sincerity and the maxim of quality were systematically undermined as would be the case if one states that polite utterances, hence a certain part of everyday communication, are at least partially lies. To find an answer to this question, it is obviously necessary to outline a definition of lie as well as of politeness. The study, therefore provides a review of a several scientific approaches to lying followed by an overview on recent discussions in the field of politeness theory. Politeness is found to be an aspect of communication aimed at the management of relationships; in this function, it does not have any propositional content. Therefore, it cannot be a considered a lie in the sense of an assertion the speaker believes to be false. The study comes to the conclusion that the sincerity of polite utterances does not refer to the propositional content, but to the speaker’s attitude. In this sense it might be a lie, but it is not necessarily such.