Distinguishing between mental act and content of representations and propositions in themselves, Bolzano offers a logico-semantical notion of content. Twardowski opposes to it a psychological conception of the content of representations and identifies the content of judgment, in the case of existential judgments, with the existence of the object, in the case of judgments about a relation, with the subsistence of the relation. In opposition to Twardowski, Meinong does not confound logical and psychological content and shows, by means of the notion of presentation, that a content is present in all experiences, including emotions.
Le vicende del contenuto attraverso Bolzano, Twardowski e Meinong
raspa venanzio
2018
Abstract
Distinguishing between mental act and content of representations and propositions in themselves, Bolzano offers a logico-semantical notion of content. Twardowski opposes to it a psychological conception of the content of representations and identifies the content of judgment, in the case of existential judgments, with the existence of the object, in the case of judgments about a relation, with the subsistence of the relation. In opposition to Twardowski, Meinong does not confound logical and psychological content and shows, by means of the notion of presentation, that a content is present in all experiences, including emotions.File in questo prodotto:
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