The paper suggests a possible relation between the concept of conatus, as it is presented in Hobbes’ De Corpore, and that of corpora simplicissima, as formulated by Spinoza in his short treatise on physics in Ethica. The reflexion doesn’t concern the philological and historical question of Hobbes as source of Spinoza’s thought, but focuses on the definitions of those two concepts, in order to evaluate their function as a foundation of a philosophy of nature set free from theological premises and in light of a mechanism inspired by the idea of matter as potentia/power, as opposed to the cartesian concept of extentio as moles quiescens.
«Conatus» e «corpora simplicissima». Hobbes e Spinoza sulla natura e origine del moto
Cristina Santinelli
2018
Abstract
The paper suggests a possible relation between the concept of conatus, as it is presented in Hobbes’ De Corpore, and that of corpora simplicissima, as formulated by Spinoza in his short treatise on physics in Ethica. The reflexion doesn’t concern the philological and historical question of Hobbes as source of Spinoza’s thought, but focuses on the definitions of those two concepts, in order to evaluate their function as a foundation of a philosophy of nature set free from theological premises and in light of a mechanism inspired by the idea of matter as potentia/power, as opposed to the cartesian concept of extentio as moles quiescens.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
