This paper investigates the effects of property taxation on fiscal discipline for a sample of OECD countries over the period 1973–2011. We find that aggregate property taxation in total tax revenues is not statistically correlated with the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, a greater reliance on property taxes pertaining to sub-national governments contributes to fiscal discipline, suggesting that fiscal decentralization should favor responsive tax base instruments.
Property tax and fiscal discipline in OECD countries
SACCHI, AGNESE;
2014
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of property taxation on fiscal discipline for a sample of OECD countries over the period 1973–2011. We find that aggregate property taxation in total tax revenues is not statistically correlated with the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, a greater reliance on property taxes pertaining to sub-national governments contributes to fiscal discipline, suggesting that fiscal decentralization should favor responsive tax base instruments.File in questo prodotto:
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