Until recently, the configuration of geopolitical orientations in the Italian electorate seemed to reflect processes of political polarization triggered by the upsurge of populism, which reached its zenith at the general election of 2018. In particular, the emergence of pro-Russian sympathies among Italian parties seemed to overlap Euroscepticism and a more general rejection of mainstream western politics. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, in February 2022, may further shift the geopolitical points of reference of Italian parties and the party system. The article uses survey data to analyse the reactions of the Italian electorate to the outbreak of war on the Eastern borders of the EU and to compare the geopolitical positions of party electorates before – in the spring of 2020 – and (immediately) after this new potential watershed. The results suggest an (at least temporary) consensus among Italian voters in favour of the Ukrainian cause, a marked weakening of pro-Russian sentiments, and an (at least provisional) suspension of the polarization linked to international references.

Rally 'round the Ukrainian flag. The Russian attack and the (temporary?) suspension of geopolitical polarization in Italy

Fabio Bordignon;Ilvo Diamanti;Fabio Turato
2022

Abstract

Until recently, the configuration of geopolitical orientations in the Italian electorate seemed to reflect processes of political polarization triggered by the upsurge of populism, which reached its zenith at the general election of 2018. In particular, the emergence of pro-Russian sympathies among Italian parties seemed to overlap Euroscepticism and a more general rejection of mainstream western politics. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, in February 2022, may further shift the geopolitical points of reference of Italian parties and the party system. The article uses survey data to analyse the reactions of the Italian electorate to the outbreak of war on the Eastern borders of the EU and to compare the geopolitical positions of party electorates before – in the spring of 2020 – and (immediately) after this new potential watershed. The results suggest an (at least temporary) consensus among Italian voters in favour of the Ukrainian cause, a marked weakening of pro-Russian sentiments, and an (at least provisional) suspension of the polarization linked to international references.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11576/2698250
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