Sul miracolo come violazione delle leggi di natura. Da Hume al dibattito odierno

Since Hume’s essay Of Miracles, the definition of the miracle as a ‘violation of the laws of nature’ has been widespread in the modern philosophy of religion. Such as definition seems, prima facie, coherent with a theistic conception of miracles and, from a particular point of view, a product of the latter. Still, it was used by both Spinoza and Hume to deny the possi-bility and credibility of miracles. Therefore, in the contemporary discussion, most theists have abandoned it, despite its revival by some authors such as Richard Swinburne. In this article, I consider some attempts to circumvent the definition of the miracle as a ‘violation of the laws of nature’ (especially Clive S. Lewis and Robert Larmer’s attempts), claiming that they don’t fully succeed. In the wake of Thomas Aquinas, I argue that this definition of the miracle, though not to be considered exclusive, has the advantage of preserving a realistic notion of a miracle and its apologetic function in theism.