The Adequacy of the Moral Law: Spinoza, Kant and the Experience of Freedom In this article we want to suggest that, in the Critique of Practical Reason, the Moral Law works as an adequate idea that makes us adequate causes and, consequently, that the freedom’s experience procured by its conscience is not so different from the one of eternity described in the fifth book of the Ethics. Indeed, both Spinoza and Kant admit the existence of something different from phenomena that, with them, is necessarily involved. "Faktum" is the Kantian name of this singular synthesis between heterogenous and, at the same time, also the name of the way in which, while the body endures, the mind can grasp something of its eternity thanks to the virtuous circle between necessity and freedom.
L'adeguatezza della legge morale: Spinoza, Kant e l'esperienza della libertà
CAMPO A
2020
Abstract
The Adequacy of the Moral Law: Spinoza, Kant and the Experience of Freedom In this article we want to suggest that, in the Critique of Practical Reason, the Moral Law works as an adequate idea that makes us adequate causes and, consequently, that the freedom’s experience procured by its conscience is not so different from the one of eternity described in the fifth book of the Ethics. Indeed, both Spinoza and Kant admit the existence of something different from phenomena that, with them, is necessarily involved. "Faktum" is the Kantian name of this singular synthesis between heterogenous and, at the same time, also the name of the way in which, while the body endures, the mind can grasp something of its eternity thanks to the virtuous circle between necessity and freedom.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
