The replacement of the original Golden Rule with the principle of a balanced budget in its most rigid form of the Schuldenbremse (debt brake) refers, first of all, to the overall restructuring of relations between the Bund and the Länder within the German financial constitution. The federal reform of 2009 stands as an effect and, at the same time, as a result of the gradual strengthening of the supranational fiscal constraints. This essay questions the impact of the Schuldenbremse on the constitutional identity clause, especially with regard to the possible tensions with the structural principle of the federal and social State.

Schuldenbremse e clausola d'identità costituzionale in Germania

LOSURDO, FEDERICO
2015-01-01

Abstract

The replacement of the original Golden Rule with the principle of a balanced budget in its most rigid form of the Schuldenbremse (debt brake) refers, first of all, to the overall restructuring of relations between the Bund and the Länder within the German financial constitution. The federal reform of 2009 stands as an effect and, at the same time, as a result of the gradual strengthening of the supranational fiscal constraints. This essay questions the impact of the Schuldenbremse on the constitutional identity clause, especially with regard to the possible tensions with the structural principle of the federal and social State.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11576/2638384
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